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ABSTRACT 
 
Goldstein, Thalia R., Boston College, May 2010. The Effects of Acting Training on 
Theory of Mind, Empathy, and Emotion Regulation. Major Advisor: Ellen Winner 
 
Despite the widespread involvement of individuals in drama either as performers or 
audience members, psychologists know very little about the cognitive and affective 
underpinnings of acting. Acting may provide a powerful lens through which to 
understand how we understand our own and others’ minds. In this dissertation, I review 
research on theory of mind, empathy, and emotion regulation, show how these three skills 
are related to acting theory and acting training, and discuss studies I have previously 
completed demonstrating correlations between skill in acting and skill in theory of mind, 
empathy, and positive emotion regulation. I then completed four studies. Study 1 was a 
longitudinal study comparing children (ages 8-10) receiving acting vs. visual arts training 
over the course of one academic year testing the hypothesis that acting training in 
childhood is causally related to development of advanced theory of mind, positive 
emotion regulation, and empathy. Study 1 found that children in acting classes gain in 
empathy and expression of emotion over a year above children involved in other art 
forms. Study 2 was a qualitative study designed to determine the kinds of habits of mind 
taught, explicitly and implicitly, in acting classes for children (ages 8-10). The purpose of 
Study 2 was to determine the extent to which acting teachers strive to teach theory of 
mind, empathy, and adaptive emotion regulation in their acting classes. Study 2 found 
that children in acting classes at this age are taught about physicality and motivation, with 
 vi  
no emphasis on empathy or emotion regulation and only a slight emphasis on theory of 
mind. Study 3 was parallel to Study 1, but with young adolescents, aged 13-15. Study 3 
found that adolescents involved in acting classes gain in their empathy, theory of mind 
acuity, and expressive emotion regulation over the course of a year over and above 
adolescents involved in other art forms. Study 4 was parallel to Study 2, with acting 
classes for adolescents. Study 4 found that adolescent acting classes focus on theory of 
mind and motivation, without any emphasis on empathy or emotion regulation. I 
conclude by considering the potential impact of this research on our understanding of 
typical development in theory of mind, empathy, emotion regulation, and on our 
understanding of individuals deficient in these skills. 
  1
CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
It is an odd fact about homo sapiens that we pretend to be others without any 
intent to deceive, and that we do so for the enjoyment and edification of ourselves and 
others. Even though some researchers have reported pretense, deception and physical 
imitation in non-human primates (Byrne & Whiten, 1988), no researchers have ever 
reported dramatic acting in non-humans. Most people are involved in acting, whether as 
audience members of film, television, or theatre, and many children and adolescents 
study acting in school or in acting classes outside of school. Dramatic acting and theatre 
are ancient. From the 6th century B.C. when Thespis, the first actor, stepped out of the 
Greek chorus to give a monologue (Brown, 1995) through the modern day, we have been 
fascinated by those individuals who enact characters for our pleasure (Benedetti, 2007).  
It is the underlying thesis of this dissertation that through acting children can 
become better able grasp others’ mental states (theory of mind), to feel others emotions 
(empathy), and to regulate their emotions. These three skills are critically important for 
social understanding (Bosacki & Astington, 1999; Chandler, 1987; Liddle & Nettle, 
2006) and social competence (Bartsch & Estes, 1996; Davis, 1983; O’Connor, & Hirsch, 
1999), as can be seen from the study of individuals who are deficient in these skills (e.g., 
those with autism spectrum disorders, depression, or sociopathy). While we know a great 
deal about typical development and deficiencies in these abilities (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 
2008; Gotlib & Hammen, 2002; Gross, 2006; Mealey, 1995; Wellman, & Liu, 2001), we 
know very little about high levels of these skills due to acquired expertise or inborn 
giftedness (Olson & Dweck, 2008). 
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Psychologists know very little about the cognitive and affective underpinnings of 
acting (despite the presence of an entire industry devoted to finding out about actors’ 
personal lives). For comparison, note the large body of research on the psychological 
underpinnings of visual artistry (e.g., Arnheim, 1974; Freeman, 1980; Gardner, 1980; 
Golomb, 2004; Hagen, 1980; Zeki, 1999; for a review see Winner, 2006) and music (e.g., 
Bamberger, 1991; Deutsch, 1982; Sloboda, 1986; Trehub, 2003; for a review see Winner, 
2006). Developmental psychologists have of course explored many skills that actors and 
acting theorists (e.g. Chekhov, 1991; Cole & Chinoy, 1970; Hagen & Frankel, 1983; 
Hull, 1985; Stanislavsky, 1950) mention as important for actors -- such as imagination, 
pretense, mimicry (and its connections to understanding of self and other), theory of 
mind, empathy, and emotion regulation (e.g. Harris, 2000; Gross, 1998; 2006; Meltzoff & 
Prinz, 2002; Piaget 1962; Saarni, 1991; Wellman, & Liu, 2001). But research by 
psychologists that has been conducted explicitly on acting has focused only on the 
memory and verbal skills underlying and fostered by acting (Noice & Noice 1997, 2006; 
Podlozny, 2000). No prior body of research has examined other kinds of cognitive and 
affective foundations of acting – specifically, the skills required to create a character 
realistically. In the research presented here, I investigate whether acting training in 
childhood and adolescence fosters higher levels of theory of mind, empathy, and adaptive 
emotion regulation.  
Acting Theory and Western Theatre 
 For the purposes of this dissertation, I define acting as the realistic portrayal of a 
character. I acknowledge that there are as many definitions of “acting” as there are 
theorists of acting, a controversy beyond the scope of this investigation. There are also 
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many theories of what makes an actor ‘good’ or ‘realistic’ or moving’ to an audience, a 
controversy which I will also sidestep. I chose to focus on acting that is western in origin, 
and descended from the “System” of Stanislavsky (the early years), the “Method” of 
Strasberg and the teachings of Stanford Meisner, because this is the type of acting taught 
in the schools where the participants in these studies took lessons. It is perhaps easiest to 
think of acting in this context as football - each game is different, but everyone knows 
what is being played and when (Woodruff, 2003). 
Theatre has been found in every culture documented by anthropologists. 
Religious rituals, which take on the air of theatre, are probably as old as the earliest 
humans (Frazer, 1993; Malinowski, 1992), and all cultures watch performances of some 
type (Benedetti, 2007). Western theatre as we know it began during the 6th century B.C. 
in ancient Greek theatre when, as mentioned above, a chorus member, Thespis, stepped 
out from the chorus and began to act out the play as a character within the story, rather 
than tell it as a narrator (Brown, 1995). However, ancient Greek acting was not realistic, 
and would not be recognized today as great. Greek acting was formalized and ritualized, 
and adhered closely to the rules of rhetoric. The plot and action were more important than 
the characters, who were assigned inflexible personalities that determined all their actions 
(Benedetti, 2007). Instead of portraying psychological reality, which is today regarded as 
essential to great acting (Stanislavsky, 1950), Greek actors used body parts to symbolize 
psychological reality, such as showing a diseased foot to portray inner suffering 
(Easterling & Hall, 2002). This was similar to Asian theatre where no attempt is made to 
portray characters realistically. Characterization was highly stylized, and is perhaps 
closer to dance than to theatre as we know it in the United States.  
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Modern western theatre, in which actors portray characters realistically, began 
with the Elizabethans in England at the beginning of the 17th century (Hayman, 1969). 
Before this point, acting was closely related to the work of orators, with the art of theatre 
defined as a species of rhetoric (Roach, 1985) and tied closely to the church. Because of 
the size of Elizabethan stages and audiences, as well as the lack of footlights, gestures 
and actions in Shakespeare’s time had to be exaggerated (Hayman, 1969). However, the 
characterizations were based on real life, and the actors strove to “become” the characters 
they portrayed. Richard Burbridge, the most famous actor of Shakespeare’s time, was 
said to be so immersed in his part that he would not come out of character in his dressing 
room in between scenes (Hayman, 1969).  
Theories about the best approach to acting may have begun with Denis Diderot 
who wrote extensively on the work of the actor in his seminal work The Actor’s Paradox 
(1770/1957). Diderot believed that acting involved a three stage process. The actor first 
observes the “passions” (fear, rage, awe, joy, etc), then reflects on emotional behavior 
and its expression, and finally experiments with the appropriate tone and gestures until 
hitting the right “mark” for a moment onstage. The great artist actors, he argued, continue 
to experiment with these three steps throughout rehearsal and performance in order to 
arrive at true realism (Roach, 1985) without any personal emotional involvement. Diderot 
believed in integrity and consistency in performances above all, and the ability to produce 
real tears (in the actor) without real emotion night after night was the ultimate goal. 
Emotion and cognition were meant to split apart (Benedetti, 2007). 
After Diderot, the late 19th century French actor Constant Coquelin asserted that 
mind and imagination were the central aspects of acting. Mind and imagination created 
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the nature of the character, and then the voice and the body followed (Benedetti, 2007). 
An actor’s job was to understand the psychology of the character from the outside. 
Coquelin agreed with Diderot that the actor must stay in full control and avoid feeling the 
emotions of the character. The actor lived inside of the persona he or she creates, but was 
not affected by that persona. Instead, the actor “pulls the strings that make his characters 
run the gamut of human emotions” (Cole & Chinoy, 1949, p.192).  
The Scottish critic and author William Archer, (also in the late 1800s), opposed 
these views, arguing that actors must feel what they are acting and depend on that feeling 
to be effective actors (Archer, 1888/1957). This approach was directly opposed to the 
kind of separation of understanding and feeling which Diderot and Coquelin 
recommended. We see this same disagreement in the 19th century Russian acting theorist, 
Konstantin Stanislavsky vs. the 20th century German playwright Bertold Brecht. 
Stanislavsky (1950) taught that realism onstage could only be attained by recognizing and 
replicating the emotions of the characters: the actor must feel real emotions and 
experience actual memories. In contrast, Brecht believed that the actor must remain 
emotionally detached from the character being portrayed, free of histrionics. This 
detachment, he argued, would cause audience members to think, particularly about the 
relationship of the play to their own lives. What he did not want was for the audience 
merely to empathize with the characters and come away feeling “purged” of emotion 
(Roach, 1985; Benedetti, 2007).  
Since Diderot, Coquelin, Stanislavsky and Brecht, acting theory has been split 
between those who believe an actor should feel the emotions of his character versus those 
who believe the actor must avoid feeling the emotions of his character (Hayman, 1969) in 
  6
order to achieve the ultimate goal of creating a realistic portrayal of a character on stage. 
However, all acting theorists write about the necessity to understand acutely a character’s 
mental and emotional state before creating him/ her. 
The most commonly used theory of acting today in the United States, Method 
derivative acting (Verducci, 2000), based in the acting theorist and coach Konstantin 
Stanislavsky’s “System” (Stanislavsky, 1950), is based on the ideal of “living truthfully 
under imaginary circumstances." In order to get to this truth, Method acting focuses on 
the need to understand and then recreate the thoughts and emotions of a character 
onstage. Stanislavsky (1950) argued that good acting means understanding and creating 
the entire inner life of a character. The actor must grasp the character’s enduring 
dispositions, life purpose, and overall objectives, and then use this understanding of what 
motivates the character throughout the play and in each moment (Noice & Noice, 2006). 
Actors think deeply about the motivations, beliefs, and value systems of the characters 
they enact, and make these internal states come alive through the way the words are 
spoken and the bodily and facial expressions accompanying the words. The script is a 
blueprint: the actors expand and understand that blueprint (Noice & Noice, 1996). 
 According to Method approach of teaching acting, the actor must actually feel the 
emotions of the character being portrayed (Hayman, 1969) in order to create a realistic 
portrayal. Existing within the mind of a character and experiencing his or her emotions is 
how convincing characterizations are built (Stanislavsky, 1950). Method acting involves 
the fusion of an actor’s action with the experience of the heightened emotions of the 
character (Murray, 1996). Actors must know what an emotion feels like in order to be 
able to convey this emotion believably (Stanislavsky, 1950). Although creating a “true 
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emotion” onstage is considered elusive and difficult (Meisner & Longwell, 1987), much 
of acting theory and coaching is devoted to the creation of realistic emotions in 
performance. Actors learn to use their own emotions as tools to portray emotions they are 
not themselves feeling. 
 In short, a close reading of acting theory texts reveals the importance of training 
actors to understand others, to feel others’ emotions (at least for Method acting training, 
which predominates in the United States today), and to regulate and use one’s emotions 
adaptively in order to show the truth of a role. The studies reported here are motivated by 
the hypothesis that acting training fosters theory of mind, empathy, and positive ways of 
regulating emotions.  
Goals 
The goal of this dissertation is to examine theory of mind, empathy, and positive 
emotion regulation, using acting as a lens. This project investigated whether the teaching 
of acting explicitly and/or implicitly seeks to foster these three habits of mind; the extent 
to which children and adolescents gifted in these habits of mind seek out acting; and the 
extent to which training in acting actually succeeds in strengthening skill in theory of 
mind, the inclination to feel empathy, and the ability to regulate one’s emotions in an 
adaptive, positive manner. Because acting is an activity requiring the analysis of a 
character’s mental world, the possible experiencing of a character’s emotions, and the 
control of one’s own emotions in order to portray a character realistically, acting can 
provide a new window on how these key interpersonal and personal abilities are acquired. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THEORY OF MIND, EMPATHY, AND EMOTION REGULATION: 
 DEVELOPMENTAL TRAJECTORIES AND RELATIONSHIP TO ACTING 
In this chapter, I review major milestones in the development of theory of mind, 
empathy, and emotion regulation, focusing particularly on factors that may strengthen 
these skills or allow children to use them more adaptively. I then review what is known 
about the relationships between each of these skills and training in acting, considering 
theories of acting training as well as relevant empirical research, including previous 
studies I have conducted. Finally, I introduce the studies to be reported in Chapters 3-6.  
Theory of Mind 
The understanding that behaviors are driven by beliefs, desires, and intentions, 
along with the ability to infer the beliefs, desires, and intentions behind behavior, is 
variously referred to in the psychological literature as the having of a ‘theory of mind’ 
(e.g., Perner, 1991; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001), ‘mentalizing’ (Morton, Frith & 
Leslie, 1991), ‘mind reading’ (Whiten, 1991), and the capacity of ‘social intelligence’ 
(Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997), all of which I will refer to below 
by the umbrella term “theory of mind.” Theory of mind refers to both the detecting of 
mental states and the decoding of those states - both recognizing agency and 
intentionality and determining what the agent’s intention is (Harkness, Sabbagh, 
Jacobson, Chowdrey & Chen, 2005) - and is a fundamental cognitive capacity underlying 
everyday social understanding (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007; Sabbagh & Seamans, 2008). 
Reading others’ minds is so ubiquitous that we often do not realize we are doing it 
(Lillard, 2000a). Theory of mind should be distinguished, however, from perspective 
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taking, as someone can be good at taking another’s point of view, and yet be bad at 
understanding or reading their thoughts and feelings (Gleason, Jensen-Campbell & Ickes, 
2009): it is possible to understand another’s mental or emotional states without having to 
take their perspective.  
The Development of Theory of Mind 
We know a great deal about the normative development of theory of mind, 
particularly in the first five years of life (Flavell, 1999). We know far less about theory of 
mind development after the preschool years. In what follows I briefly review what 
research has revealed about the major milestones in theory of mind development, and 
discuss what we know about individual differences. 
Emergence of Theory of Mind in Infancy and Preschool 
The first intimations of a child’s theory of mind can be seen in infancy as babies 
follow another’s line of sight and engage in joint attention (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007); later 
developments emerge in early childhood as children realize that seeing leads to knowing, 
that desire can guide behavior (Lewis & Mitchell, 1994), and that individuals can believe 
things that are false (Perner, 1991; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001). Infants begin to 
project their own inner experience to others, a rudimentary form of mentalizing (Meltzoff 
& Brooks, 2008). And some research has found that children as young as 15 months can 
predict a target’s behavior based on their understanding of the target’s false belief 
(Oninshi & Baillargeon, 2005).  
Children begin to understand the concept of desire before they understand the 
concept of belief (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Flavell, Flavell, Green & Moses, 1990). 
Understanding belief requires having a representational theory of mind. The acquisition 
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of a representational understanding of mind is demonstrated by the child’s understanding 
of false belief, which emerges somewhere between the ages of three and four (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Understanding false belief depends upon the 
realization that a belief is a representation of external reality, and thus can be a false 
representation (Perner, 1991). This understanding is the most investigated milestone in 
theory of mind development, and is considered the point when children “have” a theory 
of mind. 
Theory of Mind in Middle Childhood 
A later, more sophisticated understanding of subjectivity, referred to as 
“interpretive theory of mind,” emerges by the age of seven or eight, when children realize 
that two people can have different interpretations of the same reality (Carpendale & 
Chandler, 1996). Interpretative theory of mind is more advanced than understanding of 
false belief, because children must understand that different people can have various 
responses to identical, true stimuli. For example, children who possess an interpretative 
theory of mind understand that a picture that may look like two shark fins to them can 
appear to be two knives to another person, and two witches’ hats to a third. However, 
even when an eight-year-old can understand the concept of ambiguity and individual 
interpretation in a simple task, they still do not have a mature understanding of the 
complexities of interpretation (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). 
Theory of Mind after Middle Childhood 
Children reach ceiling levels on false belief and interpretive theory of mind tasks 
by four and eight, respectively, and psychologists seem to have assumed that 
development of theory of mind stops by the age of eight Chandler (1987). Chandler has 
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noted the prevailing assumption that theory of mind is fully developed by middle 
childhood, and has argued persuasively that theory of mind continues to develop in 
adolescence as individuals develop the ability to create meta-representations 
(understanding the context of their own interpretations and representations of reality), 
recognize multiple points of view on the same topic, and recognize how personal bias 
shapes how events are interpreted. Adolescence is marked by changes in social, cognitive 
and biological processes that enable the development of new, subtle, mind reading acuity 
(Gleason, Jensen-Campbell & Ickes, 2009). Theory of mind in later adolescence and 
adulthood therefore becomes a multidimensional capacity (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007).  
Although all individuals have basic mind reading ability, some individuals may be 
better at this skill than others (Realo, Allik, Nolvak, Valk, Ruus, Schmidt, et al, 2003). 
There is a great deal of egocentrism even in how adults think about the minds of others 
(Barr & Keysar, 2005), and in order to truly understand the mind of another person, 
people must rid themselves of the information they know (Royzman, Cassidy & Baron, 
2003). Therefore, the development of theory of mind may not ever come to a complete 
end point. It may instead continue to develop and will never function perfectly 
(Royzman, Cassidy & Baron, 2003).  
Little thought has been given to the possibility that individual differences in 
theory of mind exist in adulthood, with some individuals becoming true experts. Only a 
few studies have examined the development of theory of mind skills past middle 
childhood. Choudhury, Blakemore, and Charman (2006) found that the reaction time 
required to shift from a first person to a third person perspective decreases with age (i.e. 
understanding that I will feel sad if I cannot go to a party, versus that Sally will feel sad if 
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she is not allowed to go to a party); and Abell, Happe, and Frith (2000) found that the 
tendency to describe animated shapes mentalistically continues to develop throughout 
adolescence. Consistent with these findings, the neural substrates underlying theory of 
mind, particularly in the prefrontal cortex, have been shown to change during 
adolescence (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006), and frontal and temporal circuits 
associated with theory of mind develop well into young adulthood (Gogtay, Giedd, Lusk, 
Hayashi, Greenstein, Vaituzis et al., 2004; Lenroot, Gogtay, Greenstein, Wells, Wallace, 
Clasen et al., 2007). Accurate judgments of others mental states require the same brain 
regions as those in motor imitation (Zaki, Weber, Bolger & Ochsner, 2009), and reading 
others’ emotions involves brain areas overlapping with areas mediating the feeling of 
these same emotions personally (Decety& Grezes, 2006). However, the above mentioned 
research has not actually assessed particularly advanced or subtle forms of theory of 
mind. No research has yet examined the development of the ability to infer the many 
complex mental states underlying opaque behavior, the kinds of abilities that we might 
see in “theory of mind experts”- people who excel at “reading” other people. Reading 
other people in the real world is a complex, dynamic, and contextually embedded task, 
which relates to early theory of mind ability only in its basis (Zaki, Weber, Bolger & 
Ochsner, 2009).  
Correlates of Theory of Mind Skill 
The majority of research on individual differences in theory of mind has focused 
on adolescents and adults with deficits – such as those with Asperger’s syndrome (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997), closed head injuries (Dennis, Purvis, 
Barnes, Wilkinson & Winner, 2001), and paranoia (Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004; 
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Kinderman, Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998). However, some work has looked at the correlates 
of theory of mind skill at various ages.  
Age, of course, is the largest predictor of theory of mind level (Sabbagh & 
Seamans, 2008). However, false belief understanding can be speeded up by certain 
environmental factors. Children who have more siblings to interact understand false 
belief sooner than those with fewer siblings, showing that social communicative 
experiences promote theory of mind development (Jenkins & Astington, 1996). Mothers’ 
use of affective words and mental state talk predicts children’s later false belief 
understanding (Bartsch & Estes, 1996), and parents’ scores on theory of mind measures 
predict their children’s level (Sabbagh & Seamans, 2008). Early understanding of false 
belief is also correlated with early social pretend play (Harris, 2000). 
Theory of mind ability in middle childhood is associated with the quality of 
parental interaction (McElwain & Volling, 2004), sibling interactions (Perner, Ruffman 
& Leekam, 1994), and other social- environmental factors, such as number of emotion 
words used by parents and the quality of attachment (Hughes et al., 2005). Middle 
childhood theory of mind ability is correlated with social competence (Liddle & Nettle, 
2006). In adolescence, theory of mind is associated with positive peer relationships, 
emotional adaptation, and social adjustment. Adolescents with higher levels of theory of 
mind have higher quality friendships, greater peer acceptance, more mutual friendships 
and lower levels of victimization. Theory of mind enables adolescents to respond 
appropriately in social interactions when relationship formation is crucial (Gleason, 
Jensen-Campbell & Ickes, 2009). 
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Several studies have reported stable individual differences in theory of mind 
accuracy in adulthood, as well as correlates with high levels of theory of mind. Feedback 
about ability and accuracy can improve performance on theory of mind tasks, as can 
repeated exposure to a particular target (Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995). 
However, neither self-reported ability to read others’ thoughts and feelings (Realo, Allik, 
Nolvak, Valk, Ruus, Schmidt, et al., 2003) nor personality (Stinson & Ickes, 1992) are 
associated with actual theory of mind ability. Being able to read the mental and emotional 
states of a partner is associated with relationship quality and closeness in marriage, and 
feeling threatened or in distress can impair theory of mind ability (Simpson, Orina & 
Ickes, 1992).  
Dysphoric young adults show higher levels of theory of mind than do those 
without dysphoria, and are better able to identify both positively and negatively valenced 
mental states of others (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, and Chen, 2005). High 
levels of theory of mind in depression may be due to the kind of ruminative introspection 
that so often accompanies depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993), 
or may be due to extra attention that dysphoric individuals pay to their environment 
(Harkness, et. al, 2005).  
Adult readers of fiction score higher than those who prefer nonfiction on the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) Task (Mar, Oatley, Hirsch, de la Paz & Peterson, 
2006), an advanced measure of theory of mind in which participants must determine, just 
by looking at a picture of someone’s eyes, what that person is feeling or thinking. The 
RME task is the most used advanced theory of mind task in the field. This fiction-reader 
advantage may be due to the kind of interaction with characters which occurs when one 
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reads fiction deeply. Involvement in narrative fiction allows the reader to experience 
something beyond themselves (Oatley, 1999) and this modeling and matching of a 
character can allow the reader to have insight into his behavior (Mar & Oatley, 2008). 
However, while fiction reading was related to the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task in 
this study, it was not related to another social-perceptual theory of mind task called the 
Interpersonal Perception Task (Costanzo & Archer, 1983). On the Interpersonal 
Perception Task, participants watch a video and then use prosodic and nonverbal cues to 
determine the mental and emotional states of each individual character, and the 
relationships among the characters. Mar et al. (2006) explain this contradiction in terms 
of the heterogeneity of the concept of empathy, in both its cognitive (theory of mind) and 
emotional forms. However, another issue may be with the IPT measure as itself, as 
participants must rely on both verbal and nonverbal cues to come to the correct answer. 
This measure requires not only an understanding of the mental state of the target, but also 
the ability to read the interaction between several targets and their relationship, a more 
complex task. 
Adult psychologists (compared to student psychologists) score higher on the 
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition, in which one must interpret people’s 
intentions and motivations from videotaped interpersonal interactions (Dziobek et al., 
2006; Hassenstab, Dziobek, Rogers, Wolf, & Convit, 2007), and are better able to 
identify emotions expressed by a patient during a videotaped session (Machado, Beutler, 
& Greenberg, 1999). This advantage is most likely due to the practice and/or demands of 
being a therapist. 
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Adults with more close friends show higher levels of theory of mind than those 
with fewer friends, as measured by the Imposing Memory Task in which many mental 
states must be held in mind at once, referred to as “multiple theory of mind” (Stiller & 
Dunbar, 2007). In this task, participants heard stories involving multiple levels of theory 
of mind (i.e. he said that she thinks that they believe, etc). However, individual 
differences on this task may be due to working memory skill rather than theory of mind 
skill. 
Taken together, the findings reviewed above reveal individual differences in 
theory of mind ability beginning in childhood and continuing into adolescence and 
adulthood exist and are correlated with a variety of other skills and traits. 
Theory of Mind and Acting 
Why might theory of mind be associated with acting training? Actors think deeply 
about the motivations, beliefs, and value systems of the characters they enact, and must 
make these internal states come alive through the way their words are spoken and their 
bodily and facial expressions. In the words of one actor, “We do things in reverse in the 
theater. We get the script which is…at the end of the thought process; we … go back and 
find out what the thought was… the impulse that created the thought that created the 
words,” (Noice, 1991, p. 420-421). Script writers present a blueprint of attitudes, 
emotions, and motivations of a character, and it is up to the actor to fill in the gaps as 
realistically as possible (Noice & Noice, 1996). Actors must become and portray each 
character whether or not they identify with their characters. They must become people 
who are entirely different from themselves, perhaps even people they find repellent. 
Method acting in particular requires evaluating a character through the mind of the 
  17
character, rather than the modern mind of the actor (Peskin, Mar & Bischoff, 2010). This 
impersonation and analysis of characters is similar to the ways in which we understand 
others in our daily lives- through imitation and reading others. Experience in acting may 
thus be a particularly potent training ground for the skill of understanding others’ minds. 
Actors must be able to grasp subtle aspects of their character’s intentions, desires, 
motivations, beliefs, and emotions in order to create a realistic portrayal of a complex 
human onstage or screen. The constant use of the questions “what does the character 
want?” (Hagen & Frankel, p. 142), “what would motivate me to behave as the character 
is behaving?” (p. 161), and knowing the character’s attitude towards the world (Hull, 
1985) leads actors to a deep understanding of the mental and emotional state of the 
character. This “cold” understanding of the character’s mental states is what allows the 
actor to adopt the perspective of the character and see the world through the character’s 
eyes. I use the term “cold” because an actor can understand another’s mental and 
emotional states, without experiencing the other’s emotions. 
There have been multiple studies showing connections between children’s fantasy 
and pretend play and their theory of mind (Taylor & Carlson, 1997), and children’s 
imitation and theory of mind (Meltzoff & Decety, 2003). Imitation and mimicry also aid 
theory of mind in adulthood, but only when the person being mimicked is truthful (Stel, 
vanDijk, & Oliver, 2009). There is neurological evidence that the same areas of the brain 
implicated in mental state judgments are activated in response to pretense, even when that 
pretense involves no explicit instruction for theory of mind (German, Niehaus, Rarty, 
Giesbrecht & Miller, 2004). In addition, there have been a few studies, reviewed below, 
linking acting training or acting exercises to outcomes that depend heavily on the ability 
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to understand and ‘read’ others minds -- perspective taking, social understanding, and 
social competence.  
Previous Research on Acting and Theory of Mind 
Chandler (1973) tested the effect of role playing on perspective taking and social 
skills in emotionally disturbed, delinquent adolescent boys. Boys were either given 
experience in role playing different characters in a videotaped skit, or they were taught 
referential communication skills (the control group). The boys began with low social 
competence and low levels of perspective taking. Perspective taking was measured by a 
series of pictures from which the boys had to explain what a bystander who entered into 
the events of the story late knew, as distinct from the complete information that the boys 
themselves had. The boys were scored for the amount of egocentricity in their 
explanations of the bystander’s knowledge. After ten weeks, those in the role playing 
group improved in cognitive perspective taking and both groups increased in referential 
communication skill. But the role playing group also showed reductions in their 
delinquent behavior (although Chandler admits that this may be due to becoming better 
criminals, less likely to get caught, rather than less deviant people.)  
Chandler, Greenspan, and Barenboim (1974) gave another group of delinquent 
boys a similar role playing task in which they created their own videotaped skits and 
acted out various characters, adopting different perspectives in the same situation. These 
boys were compared to a group that created videos but did not act in them. These anti-
social children were not good at stepping outside of their own vantage point and taking 
others’ perspectives. However, after 12 months, those who had acted out roles in their 
videos had higher perspective taking scores and lower rates of delinquency (or again at 
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least lower rates of getting caught for delinquency) than those who had made but not 
acted in videos. Although the studies reported above have examined links between acting 
and skills which require theory of mind, no previous work has directly examined whether 
acting training is associated with higher levels of theory of mind. While Chandler et al 
had boys act out roles, role play is a different activity than a complete acting class, as can 
be seen in Studies 2 and 4. A complete acting class involves a variety of activities 
including physical warm up exercises, improvisation or other acting games, and a variety 
of acted out scenes, where some actors may play parts while others watch and make 
comments.  
Previous Studies from my Lab  
 Over the past three years, I have conducted four correlational studies examining 
links between acting training and theory of mind expertise. These studies, all 
correlational in design and described below, have demonstrated a clear association 
between acting training and theory of mind acuity. 
Theory of mind and acting in 8-10 year olds. I compared theory of mind skills in 
8-10-year olds with acting training (n=14), dance training (n=15), or without any 
performing training (n=7) (Goldstein & Winner, in preparation). Dance training was 
chosen as the treatment for the treated control group because like acting, dance is a 
performing art form, but unlike acting, dance does not require entering the mind of 
fictional characters. The three groups were matched on SES, age, and verbal intelligence 
as measured by the Vocabulary subtest of the WISC. Children completed two types of 
theory of mind tasks- perceptual theory of mind, in which participants must judge an 
individual’s mental and emotional state based on perceptual cues, such as a picture or 
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video, and cognitive theory of mind, in which participants must judge an individual’s 
mental and emotional state based on a story of that individual’s behavior. Children 
completed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (for children), a perceptual theory of 
mind task, and two cognitive theory of mind tests in which they heard a story about a 
character ending with a statement that is either not literally true or mistaken (Faux Pas 
and Strange Stories tests). Children were then questioned about what the speaker really 
believed and/or really meant.  
While cognitive theory of mind did not differ across groups (p > .1), the children 
with acting training outperformed both other groups on perceptual theory of mind, F (2, 
35) = 2.975, p = .06. A post hoc test revealed that actors performed moderately better 
than nonactors, p = .08, but similarly to dancers.  
Theory of mind and acting in adolescents. In Study 1 of Goldstein, Wu, and 
Winner (2009-2010), I compared theory of mind expertise in adolescents with and 
without acting experience. The actor group consisted of 68 high school students (37 
female, 29 male) ranging in age from 14-18 (M = 15.79 years). Of these, 54 attended a 
public high school and were involved in acting through elective acting classes throughout 
their day and after school; fourteen were majoring in theater at an independent residential 
school in which students specialize in an art form. The control group consisted of 48 
students (22 female, 21 male, 4 no response) ranging in age from 14-19 (M = 16.35 
years). Of these, 34 attended the same public high school as those in the actor group, and 
14 attended the same residential school as those in the actor group, and none had been 
involved in acting (as determined by a screening questionnaire). Participants were 
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matched on SES (as measured by parent education level) and academic achievement (as 
measured by academic GPA). 
Theory of mind was measuring using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task 
(RME). The RME is an untimed, self-paced test consisting of 37 black and white 
photographs of the eye region of the face (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), taken from pictures 
of faces in magazines. Each picture is shown with four mental state words, one of which 
correctly describes the mental state shown by the eyes, and three of which are similarly 
valenced foils. The mental states to be detected include emotions (e.g. despondent, 
excited) and cognitive states (e.g. skeptical, anticipating). Correct answers were 
determined by the authors of the task, and then verified by eight expert judges. 
Actors (M = 27.47) scored higher than nonactors (M = 25.06) on the RME test. A 
two way ANOVA (group x sex) revealed no interaction of group with sex (p > .12). As 
predicted, there was a main effect of group, F (1, 108) = 8.60, p = .008, with a large 
effect size, d = .83, due to the superior performance of actors. These findings demonstrate 
that adolescent actors perform better than adolescents without acting experience in theory 
of mind.  
Theory of mind and acting in adults. In Study 2 of Goldstein, Wu, and Winner 
(2009-2010), I examined theory of mind expertise in adults with and without acting 
training. The actor group consisted of 23 graduate students studying theater education (18 
female, 5 male) ranging in age from 21 to 44 (M=26.22 years). The control group 
consisted of 21 undergraduates majoring in psychology with no experience in theater (11 
female, 13 male) and ranging in age from 18 to 21 (M=19.45 years). Although the actor 
group was older, a bivariate correlational test revealed no association between age and 
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performance on any of our outcome variables, and I therefore did not include age in any 
further analysis. Scholastic achievement was assessed by self-reported verbal and math 
SAT scores. Although the nonactor group scored higher on both verbal and match SAT 
scores, a bivariate correlational test revealed no association between SAT verbal scores 
and performance on any of our outcome variables, (ps > .48) and I therefore did not 
include verbal scores in any further analysis.  
Theory of mind was assessed by the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition 
(MASC) (Dziobek et al., 2006). This measure consists of a 15-minute film about four 
young adults (Sandra, Betty, Cliff, Mike) getting together on a Saturday night for a 
dinner party. The film is divided into 43 different clips with 1-2 theory of mind questions 
about the characters’ beliefs, intentions, and emotions following each clip, for a total of 
51 questions, including six control questions. Theory of mind questions asked about why 
characters spoke and behaved the way they did, and called for mentalistic interpretations 
(e.g. “she is afraid others will laugh”; “she is embarrassed by Betty’s remark”; “he feels 
disappointed and left out”). Control questions asked about physical actions and objects in 
the movie (e.g., “How did Cliff shave in Sweden?”).  
Scoring followed the instructions laid out by the developers of the MASC. For 
example, in one episode, the four protagonists are making dinner. Sandra gets up to start 
cutting vegetables and Betty helps. Cliff says that he and Mike should help as well, but 
Mike says he doesn’t like cooking - it is “ladies work.” Betty offers to find something 
Mike would be particularly good at and suggests cutting onions. Participants are then 
asked “Why is Betty saying this?” and are given four response choices. The correct 
choice is an appropriate psychological reason for the character’s behaviors (to pay Mike 
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back for his nasty remark); the “Theory of mind-plus” choice was one in which excessive 
mentalistic explanations -- potentially correct but not based on evidence -- were offered 
(Betty wants to make Mike cry and feel humble); the “Theory of mind-minus” choice 
was either an incorrect mentalistic explanation or a non-mentalistic explanation (to make 
Mike cut the onions); the incorrect choice was too broad for the specific question asked 
(she thinks he is good at cutting onions). 
A one way ANOVA with group as the between subject factor and number correct 
as the dependent variable revealed a main effect of group, F (1, 43) = 3.81, p = .057, d 
=.08. As hypothesized, actors chose the correct explanation more than did non-actors, (M 
= 36.70 vs. = 34.55). Actors had more advanced levels of theory of mind than did non-
actors. Actors proved better able to zero in on the precise mental states underlying the 
interactions in the video clips. 
Childhood theory of mind and professional actors. I interviewed 11 professional 
actors and 10 scientist-turned lawyers to determine some of the early childhood 
precursors of, and predictors for, becoming a professional actor (Goldstein & Winner, 
2009). One of the questions asked was about their attunement to others’ mental and 
emotional states (i.e. “Were you especially attuned to others’ emotions/ motivations“); 
another question asked was, “Were you a mimic (imitating other’s behavior, speech, 
etc)?”. 
Actors were more likely than lawyers to report engaging in mimicry as children (6 
actors vs. 3 lawyers). One actor reported mimicking “mannerisms and speech,” while 
another reported “I was always able to pick up on the way people spoke and acted and 
stuff like that, but then I think eventually it became more interesting to me of what it said 
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about the person.” For this actor, mimicking others seemed to be a way to come to an 
understanding of others.  
Results from my initial studies just reviewed show that at three age groups, 
training in acting is correlated with high theory of mind skills. Given the emphasis on 
understanding a character’s mental states, emotional states, intentions and beliefs, it is not 
surprising that those individuals involved in acting have higher levels of theory of mind.  
Empathy 
The term empathy has been used in a variety of ways, both in psychological 
research and in lay language (Spreng, McKinnon, Mar & Levine, 2009). I define empathy 
here as feeling that other’s feelings. Some researchers have instead defined empathy as 
the ability to read and understand another’s emotions (i.e. Hogan, 1969; Strayer, 1987). 
However, the ability to understand others’ emotions is actually a theory of mind skill 
rather than an empathy skill. The ability to take another’s perspective cognitively is also a 
theory of mind skill rather than an empathy skill (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006), although 
perspective taking may be a precursor to empathy (Ames, Jenkins, Banaji, & Mitchell, 
2008; Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff & Decety, 2006).  
Others have defined empathy as both the understanding and the sharing in 
another’s emotional state (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006; Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet & 
Pichael, 2001), which mixes the definitions of empathy and theory of mind. Still others 
separate these two components as affective versus cognitive empathy (Stel, vanBaaren & 
Vonk, 2008), but state that there is a continuum of ability between the two. Like Bryant 
(1982), who defines empathy as having an explicit emotional response to the emotions of 
other, and Zaki, Bolger, and Ochsner (2008), who define empathy as the capacity to feel 
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the emotions of others, I define empathy as a concurrent, appropriate emotional reaction 
(whether these emotions are positive or negative) to another’s emotion. It can be either 
automatic and unconscious or require effort and conscious awareness (Decety & Jackson, 
2004).  
Feeling another’s feelings is independent of feeling badly for another’s situation, 
and the urge to act on these feelings to change the other’s situation (Davis, 1983; Jolliffe 
& Farrington, 2006), (although it may motivate action [Zhou, Valiente & Eisenberg, 
2003]). I define the latter as sympathy, compassion, or pro-social behavior (Coplan, 
2004; Spreng, McKinnon, Mar & Levine, 2009). Neither empathy nor theory of mind are 
required for compassion and pro-social behavior (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). This is 
because sympathy, compassion and pro-social behavior are limited to situations in which 
another is feeling negative emotions. In my view, empathy can involve, positive, 
negative, or both kinds of emotions, and is the quality of feeling the emotions of other 
people (Eisenberg, 2000; Mar & Oatley, 2008). Empathy is also different from emotion 
contagion, which lacks an element of perspective taking and a strong sense of self-other 
differentiation (Coplan, 2004) and has been written about as an ‘immature’ form of 
empathy (Hoffman, 2000).  
Confounding Empathy and Theory of Mind 
Empathy and theory of mind have sometimes been assumed to be one and the 
same trait, or at least strongly related to one another (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004; Davis, 1983; Galinksy, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008; Spreng, McKinnon, Mar & 
Levine, 2009; Strayer, 1987). Empathy and theory of mind may have been conflated due 
to findings showing a correlation between levels of these two skills (Eisenberg, Fabes, & 
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Spinard, 2006), claims that both empathy and theory of mind require the development of 
an ability to discriminate between self agency and other agency (Decety & Grezes, 2006), 
and/or the finding that and empathy cannot exist without cognitive perspective taking and 
understanding of emotions (Batson, Lishner, Carpenter, Dulin, Harjusola-Webb, Stocks 
et al., 2003). But, empathy and theory of mind must be clearly distinguished. Theory of 
mind refers to the cognitive understanding of what another is thinking or feeling; 
empathy refers to the tendency to match one’s emotions to the emotions perceived in 
another. While theory of mind involves ‘cold’ cognitive understanding of another’s 
beliefs and feelings, empathy requires feeling the other’s feelings. Empathy is being 
emotionally moved by an understanding of what someone else feels (Verducci, 2000).  
Theory of mind can exist without empathy, as has been shown in psychopaths 
(Mealey, 1995) and bullies (Bosacki & Astington, 1999). Bullies and psychopaths are 
strong in understanding what others are thinking and feeling, but weak in empathy: they 
can understand what the victim may be feeling but they do not feel the victim’s suffering. 
Bullies and psychopaths succeed in bullying and manipulating others because they 
understand others so well. If they actually felt their victims’ feelings, they would likely 
not behave as they do. 
The Development of Empathy  
Empathy in early childhood 
Empathy begins to develop in infancy, probably with early mimicry (Meltzoff, 
2002), although some theorists believe empathic responses are partly innate (Mar & 
Oatley, 2008). What appears to be an empathetic response can be seen in infancy when 
babies cry in response to the crying of other babies. Once they are mobile, children make 
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physical advances towards someone who is in distress, and as they gain the ability to 
perspective take, will engage in pro-social behavior (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987), a 
marker of feeling empathy. However, we cannot be sure that this is instead a marker of 
sympathy or compassion, rather than emotion matching. As the child begins to separate 
her own feeling states from those of others, and is able to differentiate between her own 
and others emotions, between two and three years old, she also begins to express empathy 
towards others (Hoffman, 1981, 2000). Children’s level of empathic response behavior, 
(and therefore it is assumed, their empathy) is stable over time through elementary school 
(Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinard, 2006). And very young children who respond empathically 
are likely to continue responding empathically as they get older (Strayer, 1987). Although 
again, in much of the research on young children’s empathy, empathy is equated with 
sympathy.  
Empathy in middle childhood 
 Between the ages of 7-13, children begin to focus on others’ emotions, rather than 
on the events that caused those emotions, as the focus of their empathy (Strayer, 1993). 
As role taking abilities at this age increase (Roberts & Strayer, 1996), so does empathy, 
although there is evidence that levels of empathy in middle childhood remain stable 
throughout the lifespan (Rosenblum & Lewis, 2003). Empathy at this age also relies on 
the ability to self-regulate. If the emotional experience of another person is too much for 
a child to handle, he/she will not be able to feel empathy (Eisenberg, 2000).  
Empathy after childhood 
Research on empathy and empathic responses in adolescence is mixed. Measured 
through facial and gestural indices, empathic response actually decreases with age 
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(Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinard, 2006). However, as measured through self-report, empathy 
increases with age throughout adolescence (Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987). Jolliffe & 
Farrington (2006), who developed a measure of empathy which is specific for adolescent 
populations, found that females at this age have higher levels of empathy than males, and 
that empathy levels are related to both parental supervision and SES. 
Neuroscientists have recently begun to examine the brain basis of empathy in 
adults. Although there is no evidence (yet) for an empathy module in the brain (Decety, 
2005), the areas of the brain activated when imagining one’s own action are activating 
when watching another’s action. For example, research has shown that perceiving others 
in pain and experiencing pain oneself recruit overlapping neural systems (Decety & 
Jackson, 2006).  
Empathy and Acting 
The claim that acting experience is a training ground for empathy has been put 
forth by several theorists and acting researchers. The emotions that actors deal with and 
feel in the practice of becoming characters may lead to higher levels of empathy, much 
like engagement with narrative fiction facilitates our understanding and therefore 
empathy for others (Mar & Oatley, 2008). When individuals mimic others, either 
consciously or not, they begin to feel the emotions of others (Hatfield, Cacioppo & 
Rapson, 1993; Stel, vanBaaren & Vonk, 2008). And actors who take the perspectives of 
their characters and play a role may begin to feel the emotions of the characters, although 
at a qualitatively different level (Coplan, 2004).  
Theatre theorist Levy (1997, p. 70) suggests that theater is a “school for feeling” 
and that involvement in theatre can help children learn about moral values. As children 
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are involved in theatre, they will learn to experience their own emotions more deeply and 
fully. Educated emotions, Levy (1997) argues, respond more morally than uneducated 
emotions, leading to increases in empathy. However, what Levy might be discussing here 
is closer to sympathy or compassion, rather than emotion matching.  
Psychologist Metcalf (1931) argued that empathy plays a more prominent role in 
theatre than in any other art form. Actors, according to Metcalf, adopt the emotion and 
personality of anyone around them, portray that person’s emotion just as it would appear 
in real life, and therefore must have a great deal of empathy for all those around them.  
Psychologist Verducci (2000) also hypothesized that the experience of acting 
fosters empathy. Actors must figure out their character’s personality by paying special 
attention to the intricacies of the character’s behavior (since the words of the script may 
not fully reveal the character’s inner world), and this heightened attention to details of 
behavior as a window onto a person’s inner world leads to heightened empathy. But 
according to the definition of empathy in this dissertation (the ability to feel another’s 
emotions, not just understand them), what Verducci is actually writing about is theory of 
mind.  
There have been only a few studies, to my knowledge, which directly tested the 
link between acting experience and so-called ‘empathy’. Schellenberg (2004) found that 
six-year-old students involved in drama lessons improved in their adaptive social 
behavior (as reported by their parents and teachers) more so than did the group of 
children who had taken music lessons or who had no lessons of any kind. He attributed 
this to the social nature of drama lessons. However, he did not measure or study empathy 
directly. 
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Dow, Leong, Anderson & Wenzel (2007) hypothesized that clinical encounters by 
doctors are similar to the interactions actors engage in on a daily basis. Doctors in clinical 
practice must be able to read vocal tone, body language and emotional expression, and 
then respond in the moment. Medical students underwent an acting class and over 10 
weeks were judged to gain in empathic skills as rated by neutral observers.  
One unpublished dissertation examined whether being involved in acting 
increased empathy levels (Collum, 1976). Although not peer reviewed or published, and 
indeed with some considerable problems, as mentioned below, this is one of the only 
attempts at an empirical study of the otherwise theoretically accepted idea that actors are 
more empathic than non-actors.  
Collum assessed empathy using the Hogan Empathy Scale (Hogan, 1969), a self-
report measure that defines empathy (erroneously, in my view) as an intellectual 
understanding of another’s mind without the experience of that person’s feelings (Hogan, 
1969). This scale includes items measuring far more than empathy: social confidence 
(e.g. “I usually take an active part in the entertainment at parties”), emotion regulation 
(e.g. “I am usually calm and not easily upset”), emotional sensitivity (e.g. “I have tried 
my hand at poetry”), and nonconformity (e.g. “It is the duty of a citizen to support his 
country, right or wrong”), as well as what would normally be considered sympathy or 
pro-social tendencies (e.g. “I easily become impatient with people”). Eighty-three 
professional actors, MFA students in acting at the University of Florida, and 
undergraduate theatre majors, were compared to a group of 24 non-theatre majors at the 
university. 
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Actors scored significantly higher on this measure than did non-actors. However, 
scores declined with age in professional actors, with those professional actors who had 
worked the most as actors in the previous year showing the lowest overall levels of 
empathy within the actor population. Actors who made 100% of their previous year’s 
income from acting actually had negative correlations with their empathy scores. Collum 
hypothesized that actors are drawn to acting because of underlying higher levels of 
empathy. However, as an actor becomes more involved in the business of professional 
acting, the harsh difficulties of living one’s life in the theater lead to a decline in 
empathy. Collum’s findings, though theoretically interesting, should be viewed with 
reservation due to the measure of empathy used, which involved questions of emotion 
matching, but also cognitive understanding, self regulation, and even extroversion.  
More recently, using Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright’s (2004) Empathizing 
Quotient (EQ), Nettle (2006) found that professional actors scored higher in empathy 
than a control group. The control group was from an earlier study conducted in the 
Baron-Cohen lab, recruited to help validate and normalize the EQ for later testing. The 
EQ measures affective empathy, defined as a parallel or reactive emotional response to 
the emotions of others (i.e. “I tend to get emotionally involved with a friends’ 
problems”), closer to my definition of emotion matching. Actors were recruited and 
tested via the internet. Nettle also hypothesized that acting attracts people with high 
empathy to begin with, rather than fostering growth in empathy as a function of acting 
experience. However, whether acting attracts empathetic individuals to the profession, 
fosters empathy, or both, could only be determined by an experimental study as 
completed in this dissertation. 
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Previous Studies from My Lab 
The same three correlational studies described above included empathy along 
with theory of mind measures. Although in one study, actor superiority in empathy 
approached significance, none of these studies demonstrated a clear correlation between 
acting training and empathy.  
Empathy and acting in 8-10 year olds. In the study reported above, (Goldstein & 
Winner, in preparation) the same 8-10 year old participants also completed Bryant’s 
(1983) Index of Empathy for Children (see above for participant and control variable 
details). This is a widely used, untimed, self-report task consisting of one practice item 
and 22 brief descriptions of a situation. Participants are asked whether they agree or 
disagree with statements such as “I get upset when I see a boy being hurt,” or “I think it is 
funny that some people cry during a sad movie or while reading a sad book.” These 
questions measure both emotion matching, and compassionate or sympathetic reactions 
to others’ emotional situations. 
There was no difference between the three groups, p > .3, nor was there a 
difference when the two control groups (dance and no training) were combined and 
compared against the actor group, p > .5. This finding demonstrates that children taking 
acting classes show no advantage in empathy.  
Empathy and acting in adolescents. In Study 1 of Goldstein, Wu, and Winner 
(2009-2010), the same adolescent participants who completed the Reading the Mind in 
Eyes to determine whether actors had higher levels of theory of mind also completed a 
measure of empathy (see above for participant and control variable details). Empathy was 
assessed by the Index of Empathy for Children and Adolescents (Bryant, 1982), the same 
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measure used for the 8-10 year olds. Instead of answering “yes” or “no” as the children 
did, adolescents judged the strength of their responses on an eight point Likert scale.  
Actors scored higher than non-actors on empathy. A two-way ANOVA (group x 
sex) revealed that this difference only approached significance, F (1,108) = 2.80, p=.10, 
d= 0.27. Consistent with previous findings, there was a strong effect of sex, F (1,108) = 
22.99, p < .001, d = 2.21, with females (M = 24.02) scoring higher on empathy than 
males (M = 10.27). A two-way ANOVA (group x sex) showed no interaction of group 
with sex (p > .40). These findings demonstrate that adolescent actors a slight advantage in 
empathy. 
Empathy and acting in adults. In Study 2 of Goldstein, Wu, and Winner (2009-
2010), the adult participants who completed the Movie for the Assessment of Social 
Cognition to determine whether actors had higher levels of theory of mind also 
completed a measure of empathy (see above for participant and control variable details). 
Empathy was measured by the empathic concern subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (Davis, 1983), a scale similar to the Index of Empathy used in with the adolescents. 
The empathic concern subscale assesses the tendency to have feelings of sympathy and 
concern for others, and consists of statements such as, “I often have tender, concerned 
feelings for people less fortunate than me;” “Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other 
people when they are having problems;” and “When I see someone being taken 
advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.” Participants were asked to rate each 
statement on a 7-point Likert scale, from “Does not describe me at all” to “Describes me 
exactly.”  
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A one way ANOVA with group as the between subject factor showed no effect of 
group on the empathic concern subscale of the IRI, F (1, 42) = .66, p > .41, d = .10. The 
actors actually scored lower (M = 35.23) than did the psychologists (M = 36.73). 
However, this group did not complete a measure which separated concern for others from 
feeling their emotions, and therefore must be interpreted with reservations, as empathy 
defined as matching the emotions of others is not the same thing as feeling compassion or 
concern for another. 
 In these previous studies, I have shown a slight relationship between acting and 
empathy in adolescence but no relationship between acting and empathy in adulthood, 
which contradicts previous theoretical and empirical findings. There are several reasons 
why acting and empathy may not be related in adult actors. Actors could need to protect 
themselves from feeling too strongly the emotions of every character they play, and 
therefore may shut down their emotional responses to others in general. Additionally, 
adult actors may not transfer any empathy they do feel for characters onstage to their 
offstage lives.  
Empathy and Emotion Regulation 
The ability to understand and regulate one’s own emotions is an important 
component of empathy. Individuals who feel emotions intensely are more likely to feel 
the distress of another easily (Decety, 2005), and individuals who are better able to 
regulate their emotions are between able to feel concern for others (Derryberry & 
Rothbart, 1988). Empathy requires the ability to feel another person’s affect while 
keeping your own emotions intact (Decety & Jackson, 2006). There is some, but not 
complete overlap neurologically between the self and other representations (Decety & 
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Grezes, 2006). Individuals who are able to regulate their emotions are probably better at 
empathy, although the links between socio-cognitive skills and regulatory aspects of 
emotional response are rarely analyzed (Eisenberg, Champion & Ma, 2004).  
Emotion Regulation 
Emotion regulation is defined as individuals’ knowledge of and control over their 
emotions (Gross, 1998; Gross, 2002), and is separate from the ability to understand 
emotions (Larsen, To, & Friedman, 2007). Emotion regulation is more intricate than 
merely coping with already felt emotions or protecting oneself from future inappropriate 
emotions (although it is often used interchangeably with the term coping). Emotion 
regulation involves the initiation of new or changing of ongoing emotional responses 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005). It can occur at several different points during the duration of a 
single emotion, including before the emotional response occurs (Gross, 1998; Saarni, 
1999), and takes two main forms: cognitive reappraisal, or changing one’s attitudes about 
an emotional situation in order to circumvent or preempt an emotional response, and 
suppression, or restraining the outward expression of an emotion. Because some 
emotions are not appropriate in certain situations, all individuals must learn to regulate 
and change their emotions. The ability to control emotion is important for human 
adaptation (Ochsner & Gross, 2005) and occurs across time and situation (Carver & 
Scheier, 1994). Optimal emotional regulation involves the ability to use a flexible range 
of regulation and coping strategies (Saarni, 1999). 
The Development of Emotion Regulation 
Emotion regulation in infancy 
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Emotion regulation in infancy consists of as self soothing behavior as well as 
response to the soothing by a caregiver (Eisenberg, 2006). Individual differences in 
emotionality and emotion regulation in young children are basic components of 
temperament, and are related to attachment style (Cole, Martin & Dennis, 2004; Rothbart 
& Sheese, 2006).  
Emotion regulation in childhood 
Self regulation shows continuity throughout the lifespan (Rothbart & Sheese, 
2006), and as cognitive skills develop, children are able to engage in more complex 
(Shields & Cicchetti, 1997) and adult-like emotion regulation techniques, such as leaving 
or removing the source of a emotion, ignoring an emotion (Thompson, 2006); choosing 
the particular emotion regulation strategy which will work best for a situation (Eisenberg, 
2006). However, most emotion regulation research on elementary school children focuses 
on the ability to emotionally regulate, rather than on determining the particular strategies 
used (Shields & Cicchetti, 1997).  
By six years old, children understand that emotions are internal and can be 
modified (Saarni, 1999). During later elementary school, there is a marked increase in the 
understanding and use of cognitive strategies of emotion regulation (Rice, Levine, & 
Pizarro, 2007). Some work by Saarni (1997) shows that children, aged 6-8 and 10-12, 
when told stories of emotional events and asked about “best” and “worst” emotion 
regulation responses, prefer beneficial coping strategies such as problem solving and 
support seeking, avoiding negative strategies such as aggressive externalizing, which 
does not provide situational gains. By age 10, most children have developed a range of 
coping strategies that involve the ability to appraise the amount of control they have over 
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a situation, the ability to shift their thoughts from the situation to another topic, the ability 
to reframe a situation, and the ability to consider a situation from various angles (Saarni, 
1999).  
Emotion regulation after childhood  
The regulation of emotion is a key skill developed during adolescence (Steinberg, 
2005). As children enter adolescence, they become more aware of their own emotional 
lives (Herba & Phillips, 2004); adolescents are more self aware and self reflective than 
younger children (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006), developing more executive control 
and meta-cognitive strategies of their emotions as they get older (Larson & Brown, 
2007). The higher the level of self-reflection, the more likely it is that emotion regulation 
will include more perspectives, and lead to higher levels of self efficacy, and emotional 
well-being in the long term (Saarni, 1999). There seem to be no real gender differences in 
adolescent emotion regulation (Neumann, vanLier, Gratz & Koot, 2009).  
The two strategies most often studied in adult emotion regulation research are 
reappraisal and expressive suppression (Gross, 2002). Reappraisal, or cognitive 
regulation, involves changing the way in which a person looks at his current situation in 
order to change its emotional impact. Expressive suppression, or behavioral regulation, 
involves preventing the outward expression of an emotion. These two strategies involve 
very different types of regulation and cause different outcomes (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). 
Although emotion regulation is typically thought of as used to decrease negative and 
increase positive emotions, instrumental emotion regulation can be used to increase or 
decrease positive emotions as well (Gross, 1999; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008).  
Correlates of Emotion Regulation Skill 
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Higher levels of competence in emotion knowledge are associated with higher 
rates of social adjustment and fewer emotional problems in four year olds, with females 
having an advantage over males (Bennett, Bendersky & Lewis, 2005). Parents have a 
direct influence on how their children learn to regulate emotion, through teaching of 
emotion regulation as well as modeling behavior (Thompson, Easterbrooks, & Padilla-
Walker, 2003). 
In adults, emotion regulation techniques figure prominently in health (John & 
Gross, 2004); there is an optimal mix of emotion regulation strategies for health, 
somewhere between overt and free expression at all times and the complete inhibition of 
emotions (Gross & Levenson, 1997). Adults use two main strategies of emotion 
regulation. Response-focused strategies involve manipulating the output of the emotion 
generation process (Gross, 1998). For example, expressive suppression involves 
inhibiting the overt expression of emotion. Conversely, antecedent-focused strategies 
involve manipulating the input that gives rise to an emotion (Gross, 1998). Cognitive 
reappraisal involves changing the way one thinks about the emotion-eliciting event. 
Avoidance of ones’ emotions can prolong suffering, whereas engagement with 
one’s emotions can alleviate it (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Hayes, Strosahl & 
Wilson, 1999). For example, college students who denied their unpleasant feelings and 
used other forms of dysfunctional coping during a stressful exam period reported higher 
levels of stress after the exam (Carver & Scheier, 1994). Similarly, denial and avoidance 
predicted higher levels of distress in a sample of breast cancer patients following surgery 
(Carver et al., 1993); participants who reported greater acceptance of their emotions 
experienced lower levels of distress both immediately following a stressful event and 
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over time. Emotional avoidance prevents people from engaging in further regulation 
strategies and is inversely related to confidence (Carver & Scheier, 1994). On the other 
hand, once people engage with their emotions, they have the opportunity to employ 
strategies to bring about actual change. Individuals who are able to differentiate between 
their emotions can also have a higher and more subtle level of emotion knowledge and 
are therefore better able to positively regulate their emotions (Barrett, Gross, Christensen 
& Benvenuto, 2001). Task focus and positive reframing can allow for positive benefits 
(Carver & Scheier, 1994), but overall, comfortable and known strategies are the best to 
use in coping (Carver, Scheier, & Weintrab, 1989).  
Emotion Regulation and Acting 
Actors must have power over their emotions in order to portray a character’s 
emotions on stage. Actors cannot play their own emotions onstage independent of their 
character. They must either replace their emotions with their characters’ or blend their 
emotions with their characters’ emotions. True emotion on stage, equivalent to what we 
actually experience off-stage, is extremely difficult to achieve and is considered the most 
“elusive” aspect of acting (Meisner & Longwell, 1987). Actors use emotional homework 
done in rehearsal to call up the necessary emotions on demand (Hull, 1985). Conscious 
preparation of an emotional state is imperative. Strasberg believed that each actor should 
have a store of ten to twelve affective memories that can be called up at any time in 
service of a part; some actors will also improvise an unwritten scene before an onstage 
scene occurs in order to create the correct emotional state for the first moment on stage 
(Hull, 1985).  
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No research (prior to the research I have conducted, reported below) has 
examined how actors regulate their emotions, or whether their strategies of emotion 
regulation are different or more adaptive than those of the general population. However, 
some research has assumed that actors are experts in creating emotions on cue. 
Researchers have employed actors to show emotions in a laboratory setting, in order to 
then examine facial (Ekman, Levenson & Friesen, 1983), physiological (Futterman, 
Kemeny, Shapiro & Fahey, 1994), and neurological (Pelletier, Bouthillier, Levesque, 
Carrier, Breault, Paquette, et al., 2003) correlates of those emotions. All of these studies 
assume that actors are better at creating emotion on command than are non-actors 
(Halberstadt, Winkielman, Niedenthal & Dalle, 2009). They also assume that the facial/ 
physiological/ neurological patterns produced by actors when they create an emotion are 
the same as spontaneously occurring emotions (Ekman, Levenson & Friesen, 1983; 
Pelletier et al., 2003). However, it is not clear to what extent actors’ emotions produced 
on demand are the same as spontaneous emotions, whether actors are actually better at 
producing emotions than non-actors, or what strategies actors were using to regulate their 
emotions in these situations. 
One study has examined the emotional development of adolescents involved in a 
theatrical show (Larson & Brown 2007). Larson and Brown used grounded theory 
analysis to show that the adolescents’ experiences with emotions in the context of acting 
helped them learn about regulating and understanding emotions in general. However, 
there was no control group in this study, and emotion regulation was not assessed with 
validated measures. The researchers argued that the learning about emotions that 
occurred was due to the group leader’s openness about emotions. However, the 
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possibility that the emotion learning came about through the process of creating and 
acting in a performance was not considered. 
Previous Studies from my Lab 
Emotion regulation in actors in context. I have conducted one study on the 
relationship between strategies of emotion regulation and acting training (Goldstein & 
Tamir, in prep). Participants were 32 undergraduate students, majoring in social sciences, 
and 18 undergraduate students, majoring in acting at a conservatory Bachelor’s of Fine 
Arts (BFA) program. To distinguish strategies of emotion regulation in daily life from a 
performance context, I created three versions of a set of emotion regulation measures, 
described below. One version (i.e., “general”) was designed to assess experiences and 
affect regulation in daily life. A second version (i.e., “contextual-actors”) was designed to 
assess emotion experience and regulation among actors as they prepare to go onstage. A 
third version (i.e., “contextual-nonactors”) was designed to assess emotion experience 
and regulation among nonactors as they prepare to give a presentation. The versions 
included the same items, with an additional clause that specified the relevant context. 
Participants completed four subscales of the COPE scale (Carver et al., 1989) that 
assess avoidance of one’s unpleasant feelings. First, the behavioral disengagement 
subscale assesses the tendency to avoid unpleasant feelings. Second, the denial subscale 
assesses the tendency to deny unpleasant feelings when they occur. Third, the restraint 
subscale assesses the tendency to avoid immediate engagement with unpleasant feelings. 
Fourth, the acceptance subscale reflects the opposite of emotional avoidance, assessing 
the tendency to acknowledge unpleasant feelings. 
  42
Participants then completed three measures that reflect typical levels and 
regulation of emotional expressivity. First, participants completed the negative and 
positive expressivity scales of the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (Gross & John, 
2003). Second, participants completed the suppression subscale of the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 1997). Third, participants completed the 
venting subscale of the COPE scale (Carver et al., 1989).  
Participants also completed two measures that assess the frequency of using 
cognitive regulation strategies. First, participants completed the cognitive reappraisal 
subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003). Second, 
participants completed the positive reinterpretation subscale of the COPE scale (Carver et 
al., 1989).  
After conducting a principal components analysis, three factors emerged, 
reflecting emotion expression, cognitive regulation, and emotional avoidance strategies. 
The strategy of acceptance did not reliably load on any factor and was therefore analyzed 
separately.  
To determine whether there was an interaction of performance context on 
emotional avoidance, I ran a repeated measures ANOVA with Group (actor vs. nonactor) 
as a between-subjects factor and Context (daily life vs. performance) as a within-subject 
factor. There was a main effect for Group, F (1, 47) = 8.92, p <. 01: actors tended to 
avoid their emotions less than nonactors. As predicted, however, this effect was qualified 
by a significant Group x Context interaction, F (1, 47) = 9.39, p < .01. Actors were less 
likely than nonactors to avoid their emotions when they perform. However, the two 
groups did not differ in emotional avoidance in daily life. Follow-up tests of simple 
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effects confirmed that actors and nonactors were significantly different from one another 
in emotional avoidance when performing, F (1, 47) = 14.94, p < .01, but not in daily life, 
F < 1. 
To determine whether actors were more likely to accept their emotions when 
performing, mirroring the finding with emotional avoidance, I ran a repeated measures 
ANOVA with Group (actors vs. nonactors) as a between-subjects factor and Context 
(daily life vs. performance) as a within-subject factor. This analysis yielded a main effect 
of Context, F (1, 47) = 14.31, p < .001, with higher acceptance of unpleasant emotions 
when performing (M = 19.24) compared to daily life (M = 17.32). As predicted, however, 
this effect was qualified by a significant Group x Context interaction, F (1, 47) = 4.91, p 
< .05. Actors were more likely to accept their unpleasant emotions when performing 
compared to daily life. This pattern was less pronounced for nonactors. Tests of simple 
effects showed a significant difference between acceptance in daily life compared to 
when performing among actors, p < .02, but not nonactors, t < 1.8.  
To test the hypothesis that actors would be more emotionally expressive overall 
than nonactors I conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
Group (actor vs. nonactor) as a between-subjects factor and Context (in daily life vs. 
when performing) as a within-subject factor. As predicted, there was a main effect of 
Group, with actors higher in emotional expression than nonactors, F (1, 47) = 26.97, p < 
.001 (Ms = 19.76 and 14.75 for actors and nonactors, respectively). There was also a 
main effect for Context, such that both actors and nonactors were more expressive of 
their personal feelings in daily life than when performing, F (1, 47) = 90.16, p <.001 (Ms 
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= 19.12 and 13.84 in daily life and when performing, respectively). The Context x Group 
interaction was not significant, F < 1.90.  
To test the hypothesis that actors and nonactors would not differ in their use of 
cognitive regulation strategies, regardless of context, I ran a repeated measures ANOVA 
with Group (actors vs. nonactors) as a between-subjects factor and Context (daily life vs. 
performance) as a within-subject factor. There was a main effect of Context, F(1, 45) = 
7.35, p < .01, such that both actors and nonactors used cognitive regulation strategies 
more frequently when performing compared to daily life (Ms = 23.09 and 21.63, 
respectively). No other effects were significant, Fs < 1.  
Actors are encouraged to use their own feelings and channel them in ways that 
promote the portrayal of their character. Acting, therefore, cultivates a positive attitude 
toward both pleasant and unpleasant emotions. Consistent with this assumption, these 
findings suggest that when they perform, actors are less likely to avoid their emotions 
compared to nonactors. This pattern could not be explained by context-dependent 
differences in emotional experiences nor by differences in the dispositions of actors and 
nonactors.  
Childhood emotion regulation and professional actors. In the retrospective study 
described earlier (Goldstein & Winner, 2009), the same professional actors who 
answered questions about their understanding of other’s minds and emotions also 
answered questions about their own emotional understanding and regulation (see above 
for population details). Actors reported a high level of appreciation for their own 
emotions, labeling themselves as “sensitive” as children (9 out of 11). In comparison, 
only four out of 10 lawyers reported being emotionally sensitive as children. One actor 
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reported testing himself to see how much emotion he could handle, “When I used to go to 
a movie, … some sort of … Walt Disney flick, if there was a frightening scene in it, I 
used to come back and go to my room and turn the lights out… and test myself to see if I 
had been frightened or not.” Another actor recalled his “two brothers who thought I was 
too ‘sensitive’.” Another actor described how, as a child, he was “always extremely 
affected by the energy in a room, and quite quiet, interestingly enough, as I soaked it all 
in.”  
These studies have confirmed the common sense view that actors need to be, and 
are, emotionally expressive. Actors must be comfortable with their emotions and be able 
to clearly and easily express them onstage. Actors report a high level of emotional 
awareness from a young age, and college actors reported high levels of expressivity. 
However, the rest of my findings emphasize a strong difference between emotion 
regulations onstage versus offstage. Actors regulate their emotions onstage by accepting 
them more and avoiding them less, while nonactors show a less extreme pattern.  
Dissertation Studies 
The studies conducted here are designed to answer two broad questions: (1) Does 
acting training result in higher levels of theory of mind, stronger empathy, and more 
adaptive emotion regulation compared to other kinds of arts training (visual arts, music) 
in children and adolescents? (2) Do acting teachers attempt to teach these three skills 
when they work with children and adolescents (8-10 year olds and 13-15 year olds)? The 
first question was investigated by a quasi-experimental longitudinal intervention study 
testing the hypothesis that acting training in childhood and adolescence is causally related 
to development of advanced theory of mind, positive emotion regulation, and empathy 
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defined as emotion matching. The second question was investigated by means of a 
qualitative study analyzing the habits of mind taught in acting classes for 8-10 year olds 
and for adolescents. Acting classes were videotaped and teacher discourse was analyzed 
and coded for the explicit and implicit teaching of theory of mind, strategies of emotion 
regulation, empathy, as well as other skills related to acting.  
I chose to include two age groups in this study for several reasons. By comparing 
children and adolescents, I was able to determine whether there are developmental 
differences in the extent to which training can affect theory of mind, empathy, and 
positive emotion regulation. Previous research has shown that theory of mind is still 
developing into adolescence, but there is controversy in the literature over whether 
empathy develops with age, and whether strategies used to regulate emotions change over 
development. We know that the brain is still developing rapidly though late childhood 
and adolescence (Casey, Geidd, & Thomas, 2000). By using two age groups, I was able 
to determine whether participants in middle childhood or adolescents’ level of change in 
theory of mind, empathy and strategies of emotion regulation are differentially affected 
by arts training. Even though Piaget and Inhelder proposed that an abrupt change in 
thinking occurs during adolescent, research shows that changes in cognition actually 
occur slower and more subtly. Individual differences begin to appear where previously 
there was one universal pathway to various cognitive abilities (Kuhn, 2006).  
The study conducted here is quasi-experimental in design. It was not feasible to 
randomly assign children to either acting or other art classes. I am well aware of the self-
selection factor that may be at work in this study: students who select acting training may 
be ones already strong in the skills to be investigated. I strove to accept students into the 
  47
study who had very little prior training, but this was not possible in all cases. I dealt with 
this problem by assessing outcomes at pretest, and by gathering information about 
amount of prior training. Because I found some differences at pretest, I have examined 
whether there is a relation between amount of prior training and outcomes at pretest.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
STUDY 1 
 Study 1 investigated whether one year of acting training was causally related to 
theory of mind, empathy and adaptive emotion regulation in 8-10 year olds. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty five children (aged 90 – 131mo, M = 110mo; 14 male, 21 female) initially 
enrolled in acting classes at the Wheelock Children’s Theatre at Wheelock College, with 
thirty-one completing classes due to attrition. Participants included students who had 
already signed up for classes, as well as those recruited explicitly for participation in the 
study. Forty children (aged 96-125 mo, M = 106mo; 19 male, 21 female) enrolled in 
visual arts classes at Acton Art School, with thirty-seven completing classes due to 
attrition. Participants were all recruited specifically for this study. There was no age 
difference between the groups, F (1, 71) = 2.49, p = .12, and no SES difference, F (1, 72) 
= 1.12, p = .28. At Wheelock Family Theatre, children participated in one sixty minute 
class each week. Classes were taught by professional actors from the Boston area. 
Children enrolled in three nine week sessions. At ActonArt, children participated in one 
ninety minute class per week, taught by professional artists, for three 10 week sessions.  
Materials 
Theory of Mind 
Theory of mind was assessed using three standard measures, two of which used 
stories to measure children’s understanding of the difference between intention and 
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behavior and the use of non-literal language, and one of which used static photos to 
measure children’s ability to read the mental states of another person.  
The Faux Pas task (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999) 
involves short stories in which one character commits a faux pas (i.e. a woman 
accidentally calls a little boy a girl). Children are then asked if “someone said something 
they should not have said” and what was the faux pas. Each story also has control 
questions to ensure that children understood the story and where the misunderstanding of 
the main character occurred. This task is considered an advanced theory of mind task 
because children must understand the difference between intention and behavior, as well 
as understand why someone’s feelings might get hurt. Children are scored on their ability 
to detect a faux pas, and their correct explanation of that faux pas. Each faux pas story 
also asks two control questions, to ensure the participant understood the lack of 
knowledge of one character about the situation of the other. There are 10 faux pas stories 
and five control stories, to ensure that children are not making errors in memory or story 
understanding. The Faux Pas task can be found in Appendix 1.  
The Strange Stories (Happé, 1994) are short stories in which non-literal 
situations, such as metaphor, sarcasm, double bluffs, white lies, and figures of speech, 
occur. Children must then determine if the non-literal element of the story is “true”, and 
what was the meaning behind the non-literal element. Children are given points for using 
mental state explanations. This task is considered an advanced theory of mind task 
because understanding non-literal language requires grasping speakers’ beliefs and 
intentions. There are eight strange stories and one physical control story, which does not 
involve non-literal language. Each strange story involves two questions, one to determine 
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if the child recognizes that the language used is non-literal, and the second to determine if 
the child can and does use mental state language to describe the events in the story. The 
child can give a ‘correct’ answer that either does or does not involve a mentalistic 
explanation for the protagonists’ behavior, but is only scored as correct if the answer has 
a mental component. The Strange Stories task can be found in Appendix 1.  
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test for children (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) presents children with photos of faces with only the eyes 
showing, taken from magazines. Children are asked to choose from among four mental 
and emotional state terms the one that best describes what the eyes reveal. This is 
considered an advanced measure of theory of mind because children must be able to infer 
a person’s mental state just from the expression in their eyes. Children can ask for the 
definition of any word they wish. There are 28 items in this measure; the test can be 
found in Appendix 1. Healthy participants have been found to score around 70% correct 
on this measure (Sabbagh & Seamans, 2008). 
Empathy 
 Empathy was assessed in two ways, by a standard self report scale and by an 
emotion matching test created for this study, described below. There is significant 
heterogeneity in measures of empathy (Spreng, McKinnon, Mar & Levine, 2009), but 
both here and in Study 3 (Chapter 5), I chose standardized, widely used measures which 
focused on the tendency and ability to match the emotions of another.  
 The Index of Empathy for Children (Bryant, 1982) involves children’s judgments 
of whether they have a concurrent emotional reaction to other’s emotional situations. 
Sample statements on which participants must classify themselves (with a yes/no answer) 
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include: “It makes me sad to see a girl who can’t find anyone to play with.” “I really like 
to watch people open presents, even when I don’t get a present myself.” “I get upset 
when I see a boy being hurt.” There are 22 items in this measure, which has a .68 alpha 
for 4th graders and .79 alpha for 5th graders (Zhou, Valiente & Eisenberg, 2003). A copy 
of this measure can be found in Appendix 2. 
The Video Emotion Match test was developed for this study to investigate 
children’s emotional responses to fictional characters and situations while watching a 
movie. Children watched four thirty - second clips from movies in which the main 
character was either feeling sad or scared. They were then asked how they thought the 
main character felt (cognitive understanding of another’s emotion), how they themselves 
felt (emotion matching) and how sorry they felt for the character (sympathy/compassion). 
This measure assessed children’s ability to read emotions (theory of mind), and separated 
this ability from their tendency to match another’s emotion (empathy) and their tendency 
to feel compassion. The answer sheet for this measure can be found in Appendix 2. 
Emotion Regulation and Emotionality 
 Children completed one measure of emotion regulation, and two adapted adult 
measures of emotionality. Parents completed one measure of emotional experience on 
behalf of their children. 
 The Coping Strategies Interviews (Saarni, 1997) involves five stories chosen 
randomly for each child from 10 possible stories in which the protagonist undergoes a 
stressful situation (i.e. her pants rip on the playground for everyone to see and laugh at). 
The child is then given seven options of what the protagonist could do: support-seeking 
(i.e. ask the teacher for help), problem-solving/ self-reliance (i.e. pull her sweatshirt down 
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and go find new pants at the lost and found), distancing (i.e. ignoring the laughing and 
pull her sweatshirt down), internalizing (i.e. run home very upset), and externalizing (i.e. 
yell ‘Shut up!’ at the kids and throw their ball over the fence). To create parallel options 
with adult measures of emotion regulation, I added the options of cognitive regulation 
(think about her pants ripping as a funny joke) and suppression of emotions (hide her face 
in her hands so no one could see she was blushing) for each question. Children were then 
asked why the option they picked is the best option, how the protagonist will then feel, 
what the worst option is, and what the child herself would do in that situation. This task 
can be found in Appendix 3. 
The Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003), adapted from the 
adult measure, assesses how often the participant expresses emotions, with separate 
subscales for positive and negative emotions (i.e. I’ve learned it is better to suppress my 
anger than to show it; It is difficult for me to hide any fear I may feel; I laugh out loud 
when something funny happens).  
The Affect Intensity Measure (AIM), (Larsen, 1984), adapted from the adult 
measure, measures how strongly an individual feels emotions, through questions such as 
“I feel pretty bad when I tell a lie.” Children answered both the AIM and the BEQ on a 
four point Likert Scale (e.g. 1) Almost never 2) Sometimes 3) A lot 4) Always). 
The PANAS-X (Laurent, Catanzaro, Joiner, Rudolph, Potter, Lambert, et al., 1999) 
measures emotional experience. Parents were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale how 
often in the past month their child has felt various emotions, both positive and negative. 
All three questionnaires can be found in Appendix 3. 
Control Measures 
  53
Demographic Information. Parents were asked to fill out a questionnaire 
specifying how much experience their child had with acting and/or the visual arts. Parents 
were asked to fill out any training, out of class experience, school experience, and 
practice at home before the beginning of classes. This questionnaire is included in 
Appendix 7. To determine whether participants showed early signs of acting interest, 
parents completed a seven point Likert Scale questionnaire detailing their child’s 
propensity for pretend play, role playing, imitation and mimicry, and fantasy attunement, 
as they remember from when their child was five years old. This questionnaire is 
included in Appendix 7. 
IQ. All participants completed the WISC-IV (Wechsler, 1991), vocabulary subtest, 
a measure that correlates with full-scale IQ. Having an IQ measure was important 
because several measures involve verbal stories, and I wanted to be able to control for 
verbal ability.  
SES. In order to ensure that any differences found in this study are not due to 
socio-economic differences, parents indicated on a questionnaire their highest level of 
education. SES was then calculated using the following scale: 1) Some high school 2) 
High school degree 3) Some college 4) BA, BS or BFA 5) MA, MS, MFA, MBA, MPH 
6) PhD, MD, JD (Norton, Winner, Cronin, Overy, Lee & Schlaug, 2005). 
Visual Observation 
 To determine if a year of visual arts training but not acting training was associated 
with visual observation, participants were presented with two pictures of birds and two 
pictures of fish. The pictures were very similar on the surface, but extremely different in 
small details. Participants were asked to describe any similarities and any differences 
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between the two birds and the two fish. Answers were tape recorded and then transcribed. 
Each feature the child mentioned, whether a similarity or a difference, was coded for 
level of detail: broad, medium, or specific. See Appendix 8 for pictures. 
Learning in the Parent Domain 
 At the end of the academic year, in June 2009, all acting teachers were asked to 
indicate on a seven point scale each student’s level of learning over the year: (1) student 
has made no progress; (7) student has made considerable progress. This score was used 
to investigate whether the level of teacher rated learning was associated with gains in 
theory of mind, empathy, or adaptive emotion regulation.  
Procedure 
 Children were seen individually at the convenience of the parent, child, and 
experimenter. Children were seen either at Acton Art or at Boston College. All measures 
were randomly ordered for each child, and children were allowed to take a break halfway 
through the testing session, or whenever they requested one. Children were seen at the 
beginning and end of the year of classes, once in September 2008 and again in June 2009.  
Hypotheses 
Performances at Pretest 
Control variables 
Preliminary analysis was conducted to ensure that the acting and nonacting 
groups did not differ on age, SES, or vocabulary level. 
Group Differences 
Due to the fact that children in the acting group were likely to have had some 
prior acting experience, training, or acting talent, I needed to check for differences at 
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pretest. MANOVAs on parental ratings of characteristics (e.g. role play, mimicry, fantasy 
attunement) were conducted to determine whether the two groups differed by traits. 
ANOVAs by group were performed on each outcome. These analyses were followed by 
MANOVAs by group performed separately on theory of mind, empathy, and emotion 
regulation measures. These analyses tested the hypothesis that students interested enough 
in acting to take class show advantages on the measures at pretest. 
Because of the possibility of self-selection, I hypothesized that the acting group 
would have higher levels of theory of mind at pretest on all measures, higher levels of 
emotional expression at pretest, and lower levels of emotion denial and suppression. With 
regard to empathy, I did not expect to find any differences on my standard measures of 
empathy: this expectation was based on three previous studies that I have conducted, all 
of which showed no advantage in empathy for students involved in acting training 
(Goldstein & Winner, in prep; Goldstein, Wu, & Winner, 2009-2010). Because some 
acting theorists and coaches stress the need to keep a certain distance from one’s 
character and not to feel the character’s emotions too intensely, acting training may not 
foster empathy at all, and may even lead to a decline in empathy due to the need to 
protect oneself against feeling too intensely. With regard to emotionality and emotion 
regulation, I expected to find differences in emotionality (affect intensity and 
expressivity) at pretest, due to preexisting interest in acting training. However, I did not 
expect to find differences in the use of adaptive versus maladaptive emotion regulation 
strategies between the two groups. 
To reiterate, I expected to find differences at pretest because these groups were 
not randomly created. Children chose to go into either the art group or the theatre group. 
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Therefore, self selection may dictate that individuals come into each type of class with 
preexisting differences in the skills to be tested by this dissertation, due to either inborn 
differences that cause them to seek out acting training, or previous experience and 
training before the study began. 
Individual Differences Within Acting Group Only 
At both ages, regression analyses tested the hypotheses that amount of previous 
training predicts pretest levels of theory of mind and positive emotion regulation in the 
acting group, and may or may not predict pretest levels of empathy in the acting group 
(depending on which of the above empathy hypotheses is correct). 
Change as a Function of Acting Training 
Group Differences 
Over time, the acting group should improve more in theory of mind and positive 
emotion regulation skills, compared to the students receiving visual arts training. To test 
these hypotheses, I conducted two-way ANCOVAs, with group and sex as between 
subject measures, time as the within subject measure, and controlling for vocabulary 
score on each measure. Again, based on my three previous studies mentioned above 
which found no advantages in empathy for children in acting classes, I hypothesized that 
the acting group would not be significantly different from the nonacting group in 
empathy. 
Individual Differences Within Acting Group Only 
Regression analyses were used to test the hypotheses that levels of acting learning 
as rated by teachers predict levels of positive change scores in levels of theory of mind, 
positive emotion regulation, and possibly empathy.  
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Relationships Among Theory of Mind, Empathy, and Emotion Regulation Strategies 
The relationships between theory of mind, empathy, and positive emotion 
regulation were examined by means of correlational analyses at pretest and again at 
posttest. I hypothesized that pretest levels of theory of mind, empathy, and positive 
emotion regulation would correlate within both groups. I hypothesized that these three 
skills at posttest would be positively correlated in the nonactor group, but not in the actor 
group. Actors need to separate the understanding of and the feeling for a character. 
Actors who have a higher level of theory of mind (understanding) will not necessarily 
have a higher level of empathy (feeling), because the two should be separated in the 
creation of characters over the course of acting training. Therefore, I predicted a negative 
correlation between theory of mind and empathy in the actors. For the non-actors, I 
hypothesized that denial and disengagement emotion regulation would be negatively 
related to empathy: the more one denies and disengages from one’s emotions, the less 
empathy one should feel for others. For the actors, empathy was expected to be 
negatively related to either the skills of theory of mind or positive emotion regulation 
strategies due to the need to emotionally separate from characters. 
Results 
Pretest 
Control measures 
A one way ANOVA by group showed there was no difference between the 
groups’ verbal IQ, as measured by the WISC vocabulary test, F (1, 72) = 1.10, p = .30, 
and therefore verbal IQ was not included as a factor in any further pretest analysis. A one 
way ANOVA by group showed there was no difference between the groups’ SES, F (1, 
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71) = 0.73, p = .39, and therefore SES was not included as a factor in any further 
analysis. 
Theory of Mind 
 In the analyses reported below, I included sex as a factor due to previous findings 
showing a female advantage in theory of mind in childhood (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; 
Bryant, 1982; Happé, 1995; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006; Nicolopoulou & Richner, 2007), 
and one study showing a male advantage in theory of mind in adulthood (Russell, 
Tchanturia, Rahman, & Schmidt, 2007). Means and Standard Deviations for all theory of 
mind scores can be found in Table 1. 
A two way MANOVA (group x sex) with the three theory of mind measures as 
outcome variables revealed no differences by sex, Wilks’ Lambda F (3, 65) = 1.54, p = 
.21, by group, Wilks’ Lambda F (3, 65) = 0.98, p = .69, and no interaction F (1, 71) = 
0.35, p = .79.  
In order to create a single theory of mind measure, I created Z scores for each of 
the individual theory of mind measures, and then created a mean theory of mind Z score. 
A two way ANOVA (group x sex) with the Z theory of mind score as the outcome 
measure revealed no differences by sex, F (1, 72) = 0.42, p = .52, group F (1, 72) = 0.51, 
p = .48, and no interaction of group x sex F (1, 72) = 0.25, p = .56.  
Reading the Mind in the Eyes. A two way ANOVA (sex x group) revealed no 
differences on the total Reading the Mind in the Eyes test by sex, F (1, 71) = .59, p = .44, 
by group, F (1, 71) = 1.15, p = .29, and no interaction of the two F (1, 71) = 1.29, p = .26.  
Faux Pas. A two way ANOVA (sex x group) revealed no differences on the 
overall Faux Pas test by sex, F (1, 71) = .60, p = .44, by group, F (1, 71) = 0.14, p = .71, 
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and no interaction of the two F (1, 71) = 0.04, p = .83. A two way MANOVA (sex x 
group) also revealed no differences by sex, group or the interaction, on each of the four 
subscales of the Faux Pas task (recognition, explanation, faux pas control, story control) 
ps > .26.  
Strange Stories. A two way ANOVA (sex x group) revealed no differences on the 
Strange Stories test by sex, F (1, 72) = 1.84, p = .18, by group, F (1, 72) = 0.02, p = .90, 
or the interaction of the two F (1, 71) = 0.01, p = .92. A two way MANOVA (sex x 
group) also revealed no differences on the two subscales of the Strange Stories task 
(recognition, explanation) by sex, group, or the interaction of sex and group, ps > .15.  
Empathy 
 In the analyses reported below, I again included sex as a simultaneous predictor 
because of widely reported sex differences in empathy (Bryant, 1982; Joliffe & 
Farrington, 2003). Mean scores and Standard Deviations for all empathy measures can be 
found in Table 2.  
Video Emotion Match Task. A two way ANOVA (sex x group) revealed a 
significant effect of group on matching emotions, F (1, 72) = 9.23, p = .003. Across all 
four movie clips, actors (M = .58) matched the emotions of the protagonist more often 
than nonactors (M = .25). However, there was no effect of sex F (1, 72) = .17, p = .68 and 
no interaction of sex and group F (1, 72) = 0.03, p = .85 for how often participants 
matched the emotions of the protagonist.  
 A two-way ANOVA (sex x group) revealed no significant effect of group F (1, 
72) = 1.21, p = .27, sex F (1, 72) = 0.07, p = .79, or an interaction of group x sex F (1, 
72) = 0.54, p = .46, on how sorry participants felt for the protagonists across movie clips.  
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 A two-way ANOVA (sex x group) revealed a significant effect of group F (1, 70) 
= 9.12, p = .004. Actors (M = 2.58) felt a stronger emotional reaction to the movie clips 
than nonactors (M = 2.12). There was no significant effect of sex F (1, 70) = 0.24, p = 
.62, and no interaction of group by sex F (1, 70) = 0.13, p = .73, on the measure of how 
strongly participants felt an emotional reaction to the events of the movie clip. 
 A two-way ANOVA (sex x group) revealed no significant effect of group F (1, 
72) = 0.23, p = .63, sex F (1, 72) = 0.42, p = .51 on how strongly participants judged the 
protagonists’ emotion reaction to the events in the film clip. However, there was an 
interaction of group x sex F (1, 72) = 5.95, p = .02. Female actors (M = 3.5) judged the 
protagonist as feeling the strongest level of emotion, followed by male non actors (M = 
3.44), and then male actors (M = 3.26) and female nonactors (M = 3.28). 
Index of Empathy for Children. A two way ANOVA (sex x group) revealed no 
differences on the Index of Empathy by sex, F (1, 72) = 0.22, p = .64, group, F (1, 72) = 
0.15, p = .70, or the interaction of the two F (1, 71) = 0.19, p = .66. 
Emotionality and Emotion Regulation 
 All means for measures of emotionality and emotion regulation can be found in 
Table 3.  
Coping. For each coping story, participants were asked to choose the best, second 
best, worst and the emotion regulation strategy they themselves would chose. I first 
report on each individual strategy, and any differences in how often it was chosen as a 
best (collapsed across best and second best), worst, and personal strategy. I then combine 
strategies based on theoretical considerations. 
  61
 Social support seeking. A one way ANOVA on social support seeking as the best 
option revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.24, p = .63. A one way 
ANOVA on social support seeking as the worst option revealed no differences between 
the groups, F (1, 74) = 2.36, p =.12. A one way ANOVA on social support seeking as 
chosen personal option revealed no differences between the groups F (1, 65) = 0.001, p 
=.97. 
Problem solving. A one way ANOVA on Problem solving as the best option 
revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.23, p =.64. A one way ANOVA 
on problem solving as the worst option revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 
74) = 0.49, p =.48. A one way ANOVA on Problem solving as chosen personal option 
revealed no differences between the groups F (1, 74) = 1.09, p =.30.  
Distancing. A one way ANOVA on distancing as the best option revealed no 
differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.17, p =.68. A one way ANOVA on 
distancing as the worst option revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 
0.01, p =.94. A one way ANOVA on distancing as chosen personal option revealed no 
differences between the groups F (1, 74) = 0.49, p =.48. 
Internalizing. A one way ANOVA on internalizing as the best option revealed no 
differences between the groups F (1, 74) = 0.01, p =.90. A one way ANOVA on 
Internalizing as the worst option revealed no difference between the groups, F (1, 74) = 
2.56, p =.11. A one way ANOVA on Internalizing as chosen personal option revealed no 
difference between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.49, p =.48. 
Externalizing. A one way ANOVA on externalizing as the best option revealed no 
differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.20, p = .65. A one way ANOVA on 
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externalizing as the worst option revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 65) = 
0.54, p =.46. A one way ANOVA on Externalizing as chosen personal option revealed a 
trend difference between the groups, F (1, 74) = 3.64, p = .06. This occurred because the 
actors externalized more than the nonactors.  
Suppression. A one way ANOVA on suppression as the best option revealed a 
significant difference between the groups F (1, 74) = 4.46, p = .04. This occurred because 
the actors chose suppression as the best option more often than the nonactors. A one way 
ANOVA on suppression as the worst option revealed no differences between the groups, 
F (1, 74) = 0.37, p =.54. A one way ANOVA on suppression as chosen personal option 
revealed a trend difference between the groups, F (1, 74) = 2.76, p =.10. This occurred 
because the nonactors suppressed their emotions in their own responses more often than 
the actors, who never suppressed their emotions. 
Cognitive reappraisal. A one way ANOVA on cognitive reappraisal as the best 
option revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.23, p = .63. A one way 
ANOVA on cognitive reappraisal as the worst option revealed no differences between the 
groups F (1, 74) = 0.33, p =.56. A one way ANOVA on cognitive reappraisal as chosen 
personal option revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 65) = 2.40, p =.12. 
Adaptive Strategies. A measure of ‘adaptive strategies’ was created by combining 
participant’s scores for social support seeking, problem solving, and cognitive 
reappraisal. A one way ANOVA on adaptive strategies as the best option revealed no 
differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.96, p = .33. A one way ANOVA on 
adaptive strategies as the worst option revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 
  63
74) = 1.63, p =.21. A one way ANOVA on adaptive strategies as chosen personal option 
revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.18, p = .67.  
Expressive Strategies. A composite score of expressive strategies, defined as 
strategies in which the participant chooses to express emotions in order to regulate them 
was created by combing participants’ scores for internalizing, externalizing, and 
suppression. A one way ANOVA on expressive strategies as the best option revealed no 
differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.11, p = .73. A one way ANOVA on 
expressive strategies as the worst option revealed no differences between the groups, F 
(1, 74) = 0.26, p =.61. A one way ANOVA on expressive strategies as chosen personal 
option revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.02, p = .88.  
Experience Strategies. A composite score of experience based strategies, defined 
as strategies in which the participant chooses to experience their emotions in order to 
regulate them was created by combing participants’ scores for problem solving, cognitive 
reappraisal, and distancing. A one way ANOVA on experience based strategies as the 
best option revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.48, p = .49. A one 
way ANOVA on experience based strategies as the worst option revealed no differences 
between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.09, p =.76. A one way ANOVA on experience based 
strategies as chosen personal option revealed no difference between the groups, F (1, 74) 
= 0.61, p = .44.  
Observational Acuity 
A one way ANOVA on the total number of similarities and differences described 
revealed a significant difference between the groups, F (1, 74) = 5.17, p = .03. This 
occurred because the actors mentioned more similarities and differences than the 
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nonactors. However, a one way ANOVA on percentage of broad characteristics described 
revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.46, p =.49; A one way ANOVA 
on percentage of medium characteristics described revealed no differences between the 
groups, F (1, 74) = 1.78, p =.18. A one way ANOVA on percentage of specific 
characteristics described revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 2.39, p 
=.13; A one way ANOVA on percentage of non-visual characteristics described revealed 
no differences between the groups, F (1, 74) = 0.007, p =.93; and a one way ANOVA on 
percentage of anthropomorphizing characteristics described revealed no differences 
between the groups, F (1, 74) = 1.55, p =.21. Observational acuity mean and standard 
deviation scores can be found in Table 4. 
Characteristic Differences 
There were sixteen characteristics on which we asked parents to rate their 
children. Due to the conceptual similarities between many of the characteristics (i.e. Does 
your child like to: role play/ dress up/ perform), I conducted a principal components to 
examine the structure of this data. Parental rating of each characteristic was entered as a 
variable and subjected to a principal components analysis with Varimax rotation. This 
analysis yielded a 6 factor solution. All loadings by factor are shown in Table 5.  
The first factor accounted for 30.78% of the variance, with an eigenvalue of 5.23. 
The characteristics that loaded highly on this factor were role playing, dressing up in 
costumes, performing and making up plays and stories. Accordingly, I refer to this factor 
as the Theatrical Performance factor. The second factor accounted for 10.18% of the 
variance, with an eigenvalue of 1.73. The scales that loaded highly on this factor were 
extroversion, class clown, and enjoying an audience. Accordingly, I refer to this factor as 
  65
the Audience factor. The third factor accounted for 9.41% of the variance, with an 
eigenvalue of 1.60. The scales that loaded highly on this factor were attuned to others, 
memories for books and words, and attunement to fiction. I refer to this factor as the 
Other Worlds factor. A fourth factor accounted for 8.32% of the variance, with an 
eigenvalue of 1.41. The characteristics that loaded highly on this factor were the 
emotional sensitivity, feeling bored and feeling different. I refer to this factor as the 
Emotional Lonely factor. A fifth factor accounted for 7.85% of the variance, with an 
eigenvalue of 1.33. The characteristics that loaded highly on this factor were the mimicry 
and daydreaming. I refer to this factor as the Creating factor. A sixth factor accounted for 
6.15% of the variance, with an eigenvalue of 1.05. The characteristic that loaded highly 
on this factor was imaginary playmate. I then created aggregates for each of these factors, 
by averaging across the items that loaded highly on each factor.  
To determine whether the children who selected to enroll in acting classes or art 
classes differed on these factors, I conducted a one way MANOVA with group as the 
between subject variable. There was a significant difference between the groups, F (1, 
60) = 2.39, p = .04. There was a significant difference between the groups on the 
Theatrical Performance, F (1, 66) = 6.95, p = .01 and Audience F (1, 66) = 12.06, p = 
.001 factors, and a trend difference on the Imaginary Playmate factor F (1, 66) = 2.747, p 
= .10. There were no differences between the groups on the Other worlds, F (1, 66) = 
1.06, p = .30, Emotionally Lonely, F (1, 66) = .006, p = .94, or Creating F (1, 66) = 0.37, 
p = .54 factors. Mean scores on each factor by group can be found in Table 6. 
Correlations Among Theory of Mind, Empathy, and Adaptive Emotion Regulation 
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 In order to determine the relationship between theory of mind, empathy, and 
adaptive emotion regulation, a bivariate correlation matrix using standardized overall 
scores for theory of mind, empathy, and adaptive emotion regulation was conducted for 
each experimental group individually. As shown in Table 7, theory of mind and empathy 
were not correlated in either group, and emotion regulation was not correlated with either 
theory of mind or empathy in the nonactor group. However, for the actors, adaptive 
emotion regulation was positively correlated with theory of mind (r = .53, p = .001). 
Previous Experience 
 In order to determine the possibility that previous experience (before entering 
acting classes) with acting predicted the level of theory of mind, empathy and adaptive 
emotion regulation at pretest, a series of regressions with number of previous hours of 
acting experience as the independent variable and outcome test as the dependent variable 
were conducted.  
Theory of mind. A regression with previous acting experience as the independent 
variable and Reading the Mind in the Eyes as the dependent variable was not significant 
F (1, 69) = 0.439, p = .51. A regression with previous acting experience as the 
independent variable and the Faux Pas test as the dependent variable was not significant 
F (1, 69) = 0.02, p = .88. A regression with previous acting experience as the independent 
variable and the Strange Stories test as the dependent variable was not significant F (1, 
69) = 0.46, p = .50.  
Empathy. A regression with previous acting experience as the independent 
variable and the Index of Empathy as the dependent variable was not significant F (1, 69) 
= 0.04, p = .85. A regression with previous acting experience as the independent variable 
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and Emotion Matching Movie test as the dependent variable was not significant F (1, 69) 
= 0.25, p = .62. 
Emotion regulation. A regression with previous acting experience as the 
independent variable and adaptive emotion regulation strategies as the dependent variable 
was not significant for ‘best’ choices F (1, 69) = 0.68 p = .41 or for personal choices F (1, 
69) = 0.02 p = .89. 
Posttest 
WISC Vocabulary 
A repeated measures ANOVA showed an interaction of time x group, F (1, 65) = 
4.17, p = .045. This occurred because the nonactors increased their vocabulary level at a 
faster rate from time 1 (M = 31.05) to time 2 (M = 36.77) than the actors from time 1 (M 
= 28.51) to time 2 (M = 31.74). There was also a main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 5.02, p 
= .029, which occurred because the nonactors (M = 33.92) had a higher vocabulary level 
than the actors (M = 30.13) across both time points. 
Theory of Mind 
I again included gender a simultaneous predictor, due to previous findings 
showing a female advantage in theory of mind in childhood (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; 
Bryant, 1982; Happé, 1995), and one study showing a male advantage in theory of mind 
in adulthood (Russell, Tchanturia, Rahman, & Schmidt, 2007). All means for theory of 
mind scores are shown in Table 1. I also included vocabulary score as a covariate for all 
theory of mind tests because the nonactors and actors differed in their vocabulary scores 
across time.  
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Reading the Mind in the Eyes. A  three way repeated measures ANOVA with 
gender and group as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects 
variable, controlling for the mean vocabulary score, revealed no interaction of time by 
group F (1, 63) = .664, p = .418. There was no effect of group, F (1, 63) = .003, p = .953, 
and no effect of sex, F (1, 63) = .547, p = .46. 
Faux Pas Task. A three way repeated measures ANOVA with gender and group 
as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable on Faux Pas 
Recognition revealed no interaction of group by time, F (1, 63) = .805, p = .373. There 
was no main effect of group F (1, 62) = .089 p = .767, and no main effect of sex F (1, 62) 
= .245, p = .623. However, there was a trend effect of time, F (1, 63) = 3.78 p = .056, 
which occurred because both groups improved in their Faux Pas Recognition score from 
time 1 (M = 11.79) to time 2 (M = 12.90) 
A three way repeated measures ANOVA with gender and group as the between 
subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable on Faux Pas Explanations 
revealed no interaction of group by time, F (1, 62) = .37, p = .545, and no main effect of 
group F (1, 62) = .739, p = .393. However, there was a main effect of sex F (1, 62) = 
3.896, p = .053. This occurred because as expected, females (M = 7.81) scored higher 
than males (M = 6.93). There was also a main effect of time F (1, 62) = 6.188, p = .016, 
which occurred because scores at time 2 (M = 7.81) were higher than scores at time 1 (M 
= 7.01). 
A three way repeated measures ANOVA with gender and group as the between 
subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable on Faux Pas Total Score 
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revealed no interaction of group by time, F (1, 62) = .972, p = .328, no main effect of 
group F (1, 62) = .07 p = .79, and no main effect of sex F (1, 62) = .015, p = .90. 
Strange Stories. A three way repeated measures ANOVA with gender and group 
as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable on Strange 
Stories Recognition revealed no interaction of group by time, F (1, 63) = .935, p = .337, 
no main effect of group F (1, 63) = .044 p = .834, and no main effect of sex F (1, 63) = 
.029, p = .866.  
A three way repeated measures ANOVA with gender and group as the between 
subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable on Strange Stories 
Explanations revealed no interactions of group by time, F (1, 63) = 1.691, p = .198, and 
no main effect of group F (1, 63) = .321, p = .573. There was no main effect of sex, F (1, 
63) = 2.22, p = .14. There was a main effect of time F (1, 63) = 31.184, p < .001, which 
occurred because scores at time 2 (M = 7.27) were higher than scores at time 1 (M = 
4.89).  
A three way repeated measures ANOVA with gender and group as the between 
subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable on Strange Stories Total Score 
revealed no interactions of group by time, F (1, 63) = 1.102, p = .298, no main effect of 
group F (1, 63) = .489 p = .287, and no main effect of sex F (1, 63) = 2.31, p = .133.  
Empathy 
 In the analyses reported below, I again included sex as a simultaneous predictor 
because of widely reported sex differences in empathy (Bryant, 1982; Joliffe & 
Farrington, 2003). All means and standard deviations for Empathy scores are shown in 
Table 2. 
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Video Empathy Matching. A repeated measures ANOVA with gender and group 
as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable revealed no 
interaction of group and time F (1, 64) = 1.13, p = .29 and no main effect of sex F (1, 64) 
= .13, p = .72 for matching the emotions of characters. However, there was a main effect 
of group, F (1, 64) = 7.39, p = .008, d = 1.23. This occurred because actors (M = .58) 
were overall more likely to match the emotions of their characters than nonactors (M = 
.29).  
Video Empathy Compassion. A repeated measures ANOVA with gender and 
group as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable revealed 
no interaction of group and time F (1, 64) = .308, p = .581. There was no main effect of 
group F (1, 64) = 1.317, p = .255, and no main effect of sex, F (1, 64) = .209, p = .649.  
Video Empathy Emotion Strength. A repeated measures ANOVA with gender and 
group as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable revealed 
a trend interaction of group and time F (1, 62) = 2.737, p = .10, which occurred because 
while actors stayed at a stable high rate of emotional reaction to fictional characters over 
time, nonactors went up over time. There was a main effect of group F (1, 62) = 8.86, p = 
.004, which occurred because actors rated themselves as feeling stronger emotions for the 
character than nonactors. There was no main effect of sex, F (1, 64) = .395, p = .53. 
Video Empathy Character Emotion Strength. A repeated measures ANOVA with 
gender and group as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects 
variable revealed no interaction of group and time F (1, 64) = .56, p = .46. There was no 
main effect of group F (1, 64) = 0.11, p = .74, and no main effect of sex, F (1, 64) = 1.06, 
p = .31.  
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Index of Empathy for Children. A repeated measures ANOVA with gender and 
group as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable revealed 
a time by group interaction: actors gained in empathy over and above nonactors, F (1, 64) 
= 4.257, p = .043, d = .532. This was modified by a three way trend interaction of sex and 
group over time, F (1, 64) = 2.894, p = .094, which occurred because while both male 
and female actors went up in their empathy scores across time, only female nonactors 
increased their empathy scores over time. Male nonactors actually decreased slightly. 
There was a main effect of time, F (1, 64) = 4.574, p = .036, which occurred because 
scores were higher at time 2 (M = 13.93) than at time 1 (M = 13.02). There was also a 
main effect of group F (1, 64) = 5.81, p = .019. This occurred because across time, actors 
(M = 14.25) scored higher than nonactors (M = 12.69). There was no main effect of sex F 
(1, 64) = 2.416, p = .125. 
Emotionality and Emotion Regulation 
All means for scores of emotionality and emotion regulation can be found in 
Table 3. 
Affect Intensity. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects 
variable and time as the within subject variable on affect intensity revealed no interaction 
of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.11, p = .74. There was no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 
2.52, p =.11. 
Expressivity. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects 
variable and time as the within subject variable on positive expressivity revealed no 
interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.67, p = .41, and no effect of group, F (1, 65) = 
1.69, p = .20. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable 
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and time as the within subject variable on negative expressivity revealed no interaction of 
group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.77, p = .38, and no effect of group, F (1, 65) = 1.09, p = .30.  
Coping.  
 For each coping story, participants were asked to choose a strategy that was the 
best strategy, the second best strategy, the worst strategy, and which strategy they 
themselves would chose. I first report on each individual strategy, and any differences in 
how often it was chosen as a best (collapsed across best and second best), worst, and 
personal strategy. I then report on aggregates of theoretically similar strategies.  
 Social support seeking. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between 
subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on social support seeking as the 
best option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.01, p = .92, and no main 
effect of group, F (1, 65) = 0.99, p =.32. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the 
between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on social support 
seeking as the worst option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 2.41, p = 
.12, and no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 2.41, p =.12. A repeated measures ANOVA 
with group as the between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on 
social support seeking as chosen personal option revealed no interaction of group x time, 
F (1, 65) = 0.02, p = .88, and no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 0.73, p =.39. 
Problem solving. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between 
subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on problem solving as the best 
option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.28, p = .59, and no main 
effect of group, F (1, 65) = 0.01, p =.98. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the 
between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on problem solving as 
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the worst option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 1.90, p = .17, and no 
main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 0.08, p =.77. A repeated measures ANOVA with group 
as the between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on problem 
solving as chosen personal option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 
1.05, p = .31, and no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = .61, p =.43.  
Distancing. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects 
variable and time as the within subject variable on distancing as the best option revealed 
no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.02, p = .88, and no main effect of group, F 
(1, 65) = 0.71, p =.40. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects 
variable and time as the within subject variable on distancing as the worst option revealed 
no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.28, p = .59, and no main effect of group, F 
(1, 65) = 0.48, p =.48. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects 
variable and time as the within subject variable on distancing as chosen personal option 
revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 1.18, p = .28, and no main effect of 
group, F (1, 65) = 0.01, p =.94. 
Internalizing. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects 
variable and time as the within subject variable on internalizing as the best option 
revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.16, p = .68 and no effect of group, 
F (1, 65) = 0.01, p =.90. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between 
subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on internalizing as the worst 
option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 1.33, p = .25, and no main 
effect of group, F (1, 65) = 1.18, p =.28. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the 
between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on Internalizing as 
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chosen personal option revealed a trend interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 2.77, p = 
.10, which occurred because actors internalized less and nonactors internalized more over 
time. There was no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 0.19, p =.66. 
Externalizing. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects 
variable and time as the within subject variable on externalizing as the best option 
revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 1.38, p = .24, and no main effect of 
group, F (1, 65) = 1.24, p = .27. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between 
subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on externalizing as the worst 
option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.12, p = .73, and no main 
effect of group, F (1, 65) = 1.07, p =.30. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the 
between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on externalizing as 
chosen personal option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 1.73, p = .19. 
There was a main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 11.83, p =.001. This occurred because 
actors externalized significantly more than nonactors.  
Suppression. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects 
variable and time as the within subject variable on suppression as the best option revealed 
an interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 7.25, p = .009. This occurred because actors’ 
choice of suppression as the best option went down sharply over time, while the 
nonactors’ choice of suppression stayed stable. There was no main effect of group, F (1, 
65) = 0.47, p = .49. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects 
variable and time as the within subject variable on suppression as the worst option 
revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.001, p =. 97, and no main effect of 
group, F (1, 65) = 0.53, p =.47. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between 
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subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on suppression as chosen 
personal option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.17, p = .68, and no 
main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 2.01, p =.16. 
Cognitive Reappraisal. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between 
subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on cognitive reappraisal as the 
best option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.69, p = .41, and no main 
effect of group, F (1, 65) = 0.01, p = .92. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the 
between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on cognitive reappraisal 
as the worst option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.21, p = .65, and 
no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 0.11, p =.74. A repeated measures ANOVA with 
group as the between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on 
cognitive reappraisal as chosen personal option revealed a no interaction of group x time, 
F (1, 65) = 2.56, p = .11. There was no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 0.28, p =.59. 
Adaptive Strategies. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between 
subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on choosing adaptive strategies 
as the best option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.53, p = .47, and 
no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 1.11, p = .29. A repeated measures ANOVA with 
group as the between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on 
choosing adaptive strategies as the worst option revealed no interaction of group x time, 
F (1, 65) = 1.86, p = .18, and no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 0.31, p =.58. A 
repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and time as the 
within subject variable on choosing adaptive strategies as personal option revealed a no 
interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.76, p = .38. There was a trend main effect of 
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group, F (1, 65) = 2.83, p =.09. This occurred because actors overall used less adaptive 
strategies for their own responses than nonactors.  
Expressive Strategies. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between 
subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on choosing expressive strategies 
as the best option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.10, p = .75, and 
no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 0.17, p = .68. A repeated measures ANOVA with 
group as the between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on 
choosing expressive strategies as the worst option revealed no interaction of group x 
time, F (1, 65) = 0.12, p = .72, and no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 1.26, p =.26. A 
repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and time as the 
within subject variable on choosing expressive strategies as personal option revealed a no 
interaction of group x time, F (1, 61) = 0.34, p = .55. There was no main effect of group, 
F (1, 61) = 0.16, p =.68. 
Experience Based Strategies. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the 
between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on choosing adaptive 
strategies as the best option revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 1.74, p = 
.19, and no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 0.25, p = .62. A repeated measures ANOVA 
with group as the between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on 
choosing adaptive strategies as the worst option revealed no interaction of group x time, 
F (1, 65) = 0.06, p = .81, and no main effect of group, F (1, 65) = 0.24, p =.63. A 
repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and time as the 
within subject variable on choosing adaptive strategies as personal option revealed a no 
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interaction of group x time, F (1, 65) = 0.002, p = .97. There was no main effect of group, 
F (1, 65) = 0.64, p =.46. 
Observational Acuity 
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on total number of similarities and differences 
comments revealed an interaction of group x time, F (1, 63) = 5.59, p = .021. This 
occurred because the actors made less total comments over time, while the nonactors 
made more total comments. There was no main effect of group, F (1, 63) = 0.48, p = .49.  
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on percentage of broad comments revealed no 
interaction of group x time, F (1, 63) = 0.00, p = .99. However, there was a trend effect of 
group, F (1, 63) = 3.12, p = .082. This occurred because the actors made a larger 
percentage of broad comments than the nonactors.  
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on total percentage of medium comments revealed no 
interaction of group x time, F (1, 63) = 0.99, p = .32, and no main effect of group, F (1, 
63) = 0.006, p = .94.  
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on total percentage of specific comments revealed no 
interaction of group x time, F (1, 63) = 1.85, p = .18, and no main effect of group, F (1, 
65) = 0.83, p = .36. 
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on total percentage of nonvisual comments revealed 
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no interaction of group x time, F (1, 63) = 0.06, p = .81, and no main effect of group, F 
(1, 63) = 0.015, p = .90. 
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on total percentage of anthropomorphizing comments 
revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 63) = 0.04, p = .84, and no main effect of 
group, F (1, 63) = 2.20, p = .14.  
Correlations Among Theory of Mind, Empathy, and Adaptive Emotion Regulation 
In order to determine the relationship between theory of mind, empathy and 
adaptive emotion regulation at time two, a bivariate correlation matrix using standardized 
overall scores for theory of mind, empathy, and adaptive emotion regulation was 
conducted for the overall sample population, as well as for each experimental group 
individually. As shown in Table 8, theory of mind, empathy, and adaptive emotion 
regulation were not correlated in either group. 
Learning 
 Teachers were asked to rate the amount they believed each student had learned 
over the past year. To determine whether teacher rated learning predicted change in 
theory of mind, empathy, emotionality, or emotion regulation over the course of the year, 
each outcome variable was regressed onto teacher rated learning.  
Theory of mind. A linear regression revealed learning did not predict change on 
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task, F (1, 29) = 1.09, p = .31, the Strange Stories task, 
F (1, 28) = 0.17, p = .69, or the Faux Pas task F (1, 28) = 0.00, p = .99. 
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Empathy. A linear regression revealed learning did not predict change on the 
Index of Empathy, F (1, 28) = 0.09, p = .93, the Movie Match Empathy (1, 28) = 0.09, p 
= .93, or Compassion ratings (1, 28) = 1.32, p = .26.  
Emotionality and Emotion Regulation. A linear regression revealed learning 
moderately predicted change on Affect Intensity, F (1, 27) = 3.26, p = .08, and 
Expressivity of negative emotions, F (1, 27) = 2.85, p = .10, but learning did not predict 
expression of positive emotions, F (1, 27) = 0.007, p = .93. The more actors were rated as 
learning, the higher their affected intensity and negative expressivity scores. 
Discussion 
 To summarize, there were fewer differences between the groups at pretest than 
originally hypothesized. There were differences on parental rated characteristics. 
Specifically, parents of children who enrolled in acting classes described their children as 
engaging in more role play, dress up, and pretend play, as well as being more extroverted 
and more likely to be a class clown. This is not surprising considering I was not able to 
randomly assign participants to group. Previous experience with acting specifically, 
however, did not predict any of my outcome measures. There were also no differences in 
SES, vocabulary, or age, and no differences in theory of mind between the two groups at 
pretest. In regards to empathy, while there were no pretest differences on the 
dispositional measure of empathy (the Index of Empathy), the children enrolled in acting 
classes were more likely to match the emotions of the fictional protagonist in the Movie 
Match videos, and more likely to feel a stronger emotional reaction. In regards to 
emotionality and emotion regulation, at pretest the actors were more likely to show 
externalizing responses personally while the nonactors were more likely to choose 
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suppression. And the children in acting classes were more likely to choose suppression as 
the best option. However, there were no differences in the choice of adaptive emotion 
regulation strategies as the best way to cope with an emotionally taxing problem, the 
worst way to regulate emotions, or in the personal choice of adaptive emotion regulation 
strategies. Finally, the actors mentioned more similarities and differences in the visual 
acuity measure, but there were no differences in the percentage of broad, medium, and 
specific details discussed. At pretest, theory of mind was correlated with adaptive 
emotion regulation for actors, but not for nonactors. 
 After a year of acting training, there were more, and important, differences. 
Because there was a significant interaction of group and time for vocabulary level, with 
the nonactors increasing their vocabulary over the year above the actors, vocabulary was 
covaried in all analysis. For theory of mind, there were no interactions of group and time 
and no main effects. However, for empathy, there was a main effect of group on 
matching the emotions of a fictional protagonist in a film clip, and importantly, there was 
an interaction of group and time on dispositional empathy as measured by the Index of 
Empathy scale. In regards to emotionality and emotion regulation, actors’ choice of 
suppression as the best option went down sharply over time, while the nonactors’ choice 
of suppression stayed stable. For personal choice of emotion regulation strategies, actors 
internalized less and externalized more while nonactors internalized more, and due to this 
split, actors used overall less adaptive strategies than nonactors. For observational acuity, 
the actors made fewer comments over time while the nonactors made more comments. 
While the percentages of specific and medium comments did not change, actors made a 
larger percentage of broad comments overall than the nonactors. There were no 
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correlations between theory of mind, empathy, and emotion regulation at posttest in 
either group. This was contrary to hypothesis and could have occurred for several 
reasons. First, it is possible that these skills develop differentially in 8-10 and in 13-15-
year-olds and therefore training did not affect any of the participants, regardless of type. 
We know from clinical research that one can be skilled in one area (e.g. theory of mind) 
but deficient in another (e.g. empathy). Perhaps, despite theory to the contrary, the typical 
pattern is one of no correlations between these skills, as these results suggest.  
 Teacher rated learning of acting did not predict change in theory of mind, 
empathy, or the use of adaptive emotion regulation strategies. But learning did 
moderately predict change in affect intensity, and increases in expressivity of negative 
emotions.  
 In summary, one year of acting classes was associated with an increase in 
dispositional empathy and an increase expression of emotions. Why did theory of mind 
not increase for the actors? One likely possibility is that growth in theory of mind acuity 
may require more intense “doses” of acting training than the 90 minutes a week that the 
actors received. Another possibility is that growth in theory of mind skill may require 
more explicit training than that received by the actors (as seen in Study 2, Chapter 4). 
Perhaps the theater classes received by this age group did not contain a sufficient amount 
of “acting” lessons – that is, lessons in how to analyze characters and then impersonate 
them. This possibility was examined in Study 2 and is discussed in the next chapter.  
Finally, the theory of mind measures administered to the younger age group may not 
have been sufficiently sensitive or true-to-life to pick up differences. They did not 
combine dynamic visual and auditory cues but instead required children to make 
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inferences based on stories alone (Faux Pas and Strange Stories tests) or based on visual 
but static cues (Reading the Mind in the Eyes test), and therefore may have been 
relatively insensitive measures. 
Contrary to initial hypothesis, dispositional empathy increased for the actors over 
time. The undertaking of learning how to act enabled these children to increase their 
tendency to feel the emotions of another. However, the actors did come to their classes 
with a heightened tendency to match the emotions of a fictional character, a tendency that 
did not change over the year of lessons. But there are important differences between these 
measures. The video emotion matching is with a fictional character, while the Index of 
Empathy is a measure of generalized empathy towards real others. Perhaps the use of 
fictional situations and film clips is measuring actors’ tendency to become engaged with 
film and acting, or perhaps they are more likely to become engaged in fiction as a 
precursor to being interested in acting, a possibility explored in previous work (Goldstein 
& Winner, 2009). 
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CHAPTER 4: 
STUDY 2 
 Study 1 revealed an actor advantage in both empathy and expressive emotion 
regulation for the 8-10-year old age group. The goal of Study 2 was to determine what 
skills were taught in the acting classes that these participants took. More specifically I 
sought to determine whether empathy and expressive emotion regulation were taught 
implicitly or explicitly, and if so, to uncover the methods, exercises, and teachable 
moments that the instructors used to convey these and other skills.  
Method 
Participants 
Seven weekly acting classes at Wheelock Family Theatre at Wheelock College 
were selected for study. These classes are open to all children who wish to sign up; with 
no audition required. Wheelock Family Theater classes were chosen because this 
program offers acting classes for 8, 9 and 10 year olds, and because Wheelock Family 
Theatre is considered one of the premiere acting programs for children in Boston. All 
participants in Study 1 were also participants in these classes. All additional students’ 
parents signed consent forms to have their children video taped for the purposes of this 
study. These seven classes were taped throughout the year in order to observe a wide 
range of classes while not disrupting the curriculum. 
One hour Saturday morning classes (three for 6-8 year olds, four for 9-11 year 
olds) were videotaped in their entirety for later analysis. No special instructions were 
given to the teacher or the class, and the teachers were blind to the hypotheses of the 
study. The camera focused on the teacher, as the objective of this study was to determine 
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what the teacher was attempting to impart to the students. When necessary to show how a 
particular game or concept was interpreted by the children in the class, the camera was 
turned to the class to capture students’ reactions.  
Overview of Class Activities  
 The classes involved a variety of improvisation games at the beginning of the 
year, and a few scene study sessions at the end of the year. Games included physical 
exercises, such as trying to get the entire class into one small square of space; character 
driven improvisations, such as making one member of the class guess who other 
members of the class were enacting as based on their interactions; verbal games, such as 
passing along verbal sounds and gestures as quickly and cleanly as possible; observation 
exercises, such as having students look at each other, then look away and change a few 
physical characteristics such as untying their shoes, and then turn back and guess what 
had changed; and group building improvisations, such as having the students build a 
machine piece by piece with their bodies, including all sounds and gestures and 
interactions, then having the machine go faster, slower, and break down, ending with a 
discussion of the function of the machine. At the end of the year, students rehearsed and 
performed one large group scene, a fairy tale designed to allow each child a specific part. 
Throughout these different exercises and scene rehearsals, different skills were 
emphasized – some games emphasized only one skill, some emphasized many skills, and 
some skills were emphasized over the course of many games. The quotations below come 
from a variety of exercises over the course of the year from several different classes. The 
class from which each quotation was pulled is noted after the quotation, and context for 
the quotation is provided if necessary. 
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Coding 
Classes were coded in terms of the kinds of skills the teachers were trying to 
teach. The coding system used was developed with the help of several professional actors 
and professors of acting based on what they believed would be taught in the acting 
classes, and how acting theorists (Hagen & Frankel, 1973; Hull, 1985; Stanislavsky, 
1950) have described understanding a character’s thoughts, feelings, beliefs and 
motivations (theory of mind), feeling a character’s emotions (empathy), and the control 
and expression of emotion in the actor (emotion regulation). Additional codes, explained 
below, were developed to ensure that all teaching moments were coded for whatever skill 
was being taught. The manual was adjusted as further codes became necessary 
throughout the process. See Appendix 9 for the coding manual. 
All classes were transcribed verbatim, and transcripts were ‘chunked’. Each time 
the teacher made a comment or instruction, or reacted to a comment from a student, this 
counted as one ‘chunk’. Each class had between 200-400 codable ‘chunks’ of teacher 
comments. Coders read the transcript while watching the videos and judged what the 
teachers were attempting to teach in each chunk. Each video was coded by four coders, 
working independently. If more than one code could apply to a particular chunk of 
transcript, the coders were allowed to apply up to four codes. Coders were given the 
coding manual describing all possible codes and were instructed to follow the manual as 
precisely as possible. These codes were then entered into SPSS and checked for 
reliability. 
Codes Used 
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 The following codes are listed by centrality to the overall hypotheses (theory of 
mind, empathy, emotion regulation) followed by other codes in alphabetical order. Each 
code is provided with a few examples from the taped classes. 
Theory of Mind 
 
 “Remember be very specific, you want to be very specific and know exactly what your 
character is doing and why they are doing it and what they think about that and possibly 
what they think about the other people or other images on stage… [after the scene] 
Awesome, you had a character you had an action, you had, and obviously you had 
feelings…intentions… feelings about it”. (Wheelock 11/01) 
 
“Rich man [character name] how do you feel about this house?” (Wheelock 5/01 9-11(2)) 
 
Teacher: “OK so let’s think about a personality, things about them that are. … Things 
about them that are true, but not specifically someone who really exists and that’s not 
somebody from a movie or TV or something. … Give me an adjective about his 
personality. He’s???”  
Child: “well he’s angry at her because she hasn’t been working on anything.”  
Teacher: “OK you’re worried and angry.” (Wheelock 11/01) 
 
The three episodes above were all coded as instruction in theory of mind. Any 
instance in which the teacher instructed students to think about the motivations, beliefs, 
and feelings underlying a character’s lines and actions was coded as theory of mind. 
Additionally, theory of mind was coded when the teacher asked the students to think 
about  
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• other characters’ (besides the one they were playing) mental or emotional 
states 
• the relationship and status between two characters 
• what the students would do if they were a particular person or carrying out 
a particular behavior 
• what the students themselves would believe desire or intend in a particular 
situation. 
Empathy 
 
[To a girl playing a character who is crying] “You know what, let’s do it silently, ok so 
you are just really sad, ok. I want to see you visually crying… so this is going to be hard 
for you as you are one of the smiliest people I have ever met in my life so I need to really 
see you sad, ok?” (Wheelock 5/01 9-11(1)) 
 
Training in empathy was defined as any instance in which the teacher instructed 
students feel a character’s emotions. Additionally, empathy was coded when students 
were instructed to  
• recall feeling a particular emotional moment in their own life because it 
was similar to what their character is feeling 
• feel the emotion of the character and match their emotion, even though it 
was objectively different from the emotion of the child at that moment (as 
in the example above, which was also coded as emotion regulation) 
Coders also noted if the teacher instructed the student to separate from the emotions of 
the character as instruction in ‘lack of empathy’.  
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Emotion Regulation 
 
[In response to: What do we want to see in this exercise?] 
Child: “You want to show your emotions on your face.”  
Teacher: “Yes, you want to show some emotion in your face, so that you don’t have 
people standing there with a neutral face (puts hands up to the face) we want something 
to be going on with their emotions.” (Wheelock, 11/01) 
 
 “So notch up the attitude I want to see attitude, attitude, attitude, OK. You think he is 
just a complete loser.” (Wheelock 5/01 9-11(2)) 
 
Training in emotion regulation was defined as any instance in which the teacher 
instructed students in how to generate and express emotions. This was often double coded 
with empathy, if the instructor is teaching students how to generate and feel emotions in 
the context of matching the emotions of a particular character, rather than in the abstract. 
Emotion regulation was also coded when teachers instructed students  
• how to use their own emotions as tools to create a character’s emotions 
• how to resist denying, disengaging or suppressing emotions 
• to create affective memories from their own lives to then use in a scene  
• to physicalize and outwardly express emotions (as in the first example) 
without a specific technique to regulate emotions 
• to show their emotions on their face, to bring more emotion and attitude to 
the surface so that the audience can clearly see the emotion (as in the 
second example) 
• to express as much emotion as possible (as in the second example). 
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Classroom Management 
 
 “Alright, so let’s pass some sounds and gestures around … Lets do some sounds and 
gestures, I’m going to pass around 3 or 4 of them and Laurie will do 3 or 4 of them and 
then if guys would like to raise your hand, OK?” (Wheelock 11.01).  
 
Classroom management was coded any time the teachers instructed the students 
in self-control or when teachers managed day-to-day activities in the classroom. This 
included  
• focusing the students on paying attention or calming down 
• organizing classroom activities. 
Imagination 
 
[In response to a fantasy machine made of children’s bodies and noises] “What do you 
think you were making? … Well, audience, what do you think they were making?” 
(Wheelock, 11/01) 
 
Training in imagination was defined as any time teachers instructed students to 
imagine what the environment was like in a particular situation. This was specific to  
• imagining the physical environment, (smell, sounds and physical 
appearance)  
• did not include imagining the emotions, beliefs or desires of a character, to 
avoid overlapping with codes for theory of mind. 
Language/ Definitions 
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 “I want you to do another story. OK, where we’re going to go around but I want you this 
time you have to use a word from whatever the previous person said. Not three people 
ago but some word from whatever they say in there line, you have to listen to so that you 
can put it in to yours... so you have to use, language some word like hopefully a 
meaningful word from whatever the person before you said.” (Wheelock 11/18) 
 
 “OK, the word of the story I going to be clown, alright everything you say has to have 
the word clown in it, but also you have to listen to the person next to you and make it a 
story OK? … So I am scared on clowns.” (Wheelock 11/18) 
 
Training students in language and definition was coded any time the teachers 
instructed students to use and understand language precisely, or defined terms from the 
script for the students. This code was also used  
• when the students played games in which they had to use a word 
repeatedly 
• when students centered a scene around a particular word and all of its 
definitions 
• when students would think about language and how it can have a variety 
of meanings and occur in a variety of different stories and situations 
Motivation and Self Trust 
 
 “You are on the right track, just be even more snobby OK.” (Wheelock 5.01 9-11(1))  
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 “Jack great job, you’re so expressive, you’re really, now that you are knowing the lines 
better. Go even further; when the narrative say bold as brass, I want to see you gathering 
your courage to go up to the door.” (Wheelock 5.01 9-11(1))  
 
Motivation and self trust was coded any time the teacher instructed students to 
persevere and have confidence or to trust their impulses and to continue along the path 
they were travelling in their scene or exercise. This also included: 
• When the teacher would respond “good job” or “keep going” to a 
students’ inquiry, this was also coded as motivation and self trust 
• Teaching students to trust their acting instincts and their emotional 
expression and to take it as far as possible 
• When students were encouraged to follow their initial instincts about an 
improvisation exercise or scene and to take it as far as possible 
Observation of Others 
 
 “observation is when we pay attention to things, we notice things. So Amber [another 
teacher] and I will stand in front of each other (both stand facing each other) and we are 
going to check each other out. I will look at Amber and Amber will look at me and we 
will notice things about each other. OK. Now we are going to turn our backs on each 
other [both turn around] so we can’t see each other and we are going to change 2 things 
about how we look and see if the other person notices when we turn back around… Ok, 
you girls, pairs, look at each other and notice things about each other. Everybody noticing 
things about your partner? Ok, turn around so you are back-to-back with your partner, 
back-to-back, and change two things about yourself. No peeking. No peeking. No 
peeking.” (Wheelock 11/08). 
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“This is a game about paying attention right? And once you lose focus, just like in 
improv (sic) it can also work when you have things, when you’re not actually listening to 
each other. That’s the biggest problem, if somebody does something very different or 
goes in a different direction in the improvisation and you don’t follow on then the whole 
thing sort of falls apart because everybody’s doing a sort of free for all.” (Wheelock 
11/18).  
 
Training students in observation of others paying attention was coded any time 
the teachers instructed students to listen, watch, and pay attention to others in the class. 
This included  
• Instructing a student to really look at their partner or another person in the 
class, to observe them 
• Instructing students to pay attention to the physical aspects of their partner 
and look for details and slight differences in their physical appearance.  
• The importance of paying attention to words during an improvisation  
• Did not include if the teachers’ told the students to pay attention to the 
teacher as she/ he was instructing, which was instead coded as classroom 
management.  
Pacing/Timing  
 
“Your narration is really nice I would just say slow it down. You have a lot of words 
there, buttered and hot as fire it is very descriptive so I want to hear all of those words.” 
(Wheelock 5.01 9-11 (2)) 
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 “part of remember your lines is remember what your cues are because then we don’t get 
any awkward pauses and glips in there” (Wheelock 5.01 9-11 (1)) 
 
Training students in pacing and timing was coded any time the teacher instructed 
students to  
• slow down their words 
• pick up on others actors’ verbal cues more quickly 
• move through a scene or set of lines at a faster pace 
• speak clearly and slowly so that their pacing can be followed by the 
audience easily. 
Physicality 
 
 “So roll down from your head all the way down to the ground and bend your knees a 
little, and bounce [acts out instructions throughout] And back to the middle, so that your 
spin stacks… The reason you do that is because when you do improve (sic) you want to 
have all of your body available to you, you want to have all of your voice available to 
you. So can everybody whisper? [said in whisper] Can you whisper over there? So can 
everybody whisper? [said in whisper] Can you whisper over there? … OK, so now your 
going to use a medium size voice, hi, how are you? …Say hi to the person across from 
you, Hi… OK, now I want you to yell, to the person who is like 20 feet that way [points 
behind her] Hi [yells and waves]… OK, now whisper to the person 20 feet behind you. 
Hi [whispers and waves]… ” (Wheelock 11/18).  
 
 “Awesome, remember that you want to stay in control of your body when your doing it 
and it should move around the circle so fast that we can follow it with our eyes [looks 
around the circle] steady, steady, steady OK?” (Wheelock 11.01).  
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Training in physicality was defined as any time the teachers instructed students on 
how to position their body or change themselves physically. This included 
• instructing students to think about how their bodies would look and/or feel 
if they were their character 
• instructing students to pay attention to their own physicality, think about 
how their body feels, relax part of their body 
• instructing students to space themselves at a proper distance from the 
other actors and scenery around them 
• instruction in vocal technique and skills such as instructing students in 
vocal projection 
• importance of understanding one’s own body and ensuring that it will 
move and act the way the child wants it to. 
Professionalism 
 
Teacher: “So you turn to the audience and take a step in more on to the stage and now 
turn to the audience. Right, yep excellent... Cow what do you think I am going to ask you 
to do?”  
Cow: “Be more angrier?”  
Teacher: “No, I like what you’re doing, you can always be a little angrier, but where do I 
want you to be looking?”  
Cow: “At the audience?” (Wheelock 5/01 9-11(1)) 
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Training students in professionalism was coded any time the teacher 
instructed students to take their art seriously and/ or leave socializing for after 
class. This code also included instances where the teacher instructed the students  
• how the professional acting or audition world worked  
• how to ensure the audience could be involved in a particular 
moment. 
Results and Discussion 
Each chunk was coded four times, and inter-rater reliability was 95.3% for all 
videos across all four coders, across all chunks. When they arose, discrepancies were 
resolved by majority (if three coders coded one way, and a fourth another way) or by me 
(if coders were split evenly). Individual class results can be found in Table 9. 
In what follows, I will discuss each category of habit of mind in the order of 
frequency with which I observed these habits being taught. Classroom management was 
unsurprisingly the most often used code, given the size of these classes (between 10 and 
15 students) and young age of the students. On average, 41.80% of teachers’ comments 
related to classroom management.  
The next most often teaching code was physicality; on average, 18.34% of 
teachers’ comments related to physicality. Teachers were first focused on letting the 
children explore the physical markers of a character, become comfortable with their own 
bodies, and ensure that they knew where and how their bodies would interact in a scene. 
Teachers sought to ensure that students were not only comfortable with their bodies and 
moving them in a particular way, but also that they could isolate different parts of their 
bodies that might become important in further scenes or games. 
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Motivation and trusting yourself made up 17.86% of teachers’ comments. 
Comments related to motivating the children and teaching them to trust themselves is a 
marker or many types of education, giving children a sense of self confidence and 
efficacy in their own actions. Students were encouraged to follow their initial instincts 
about an improvisation exercise or scene and to take it as far as possible. Only rarely did 
the teacher stop the child before she/he had gotten a chance to really explore their 
intuitions about a character.  
On average, 8.57% of teachers’ comments were coded as observing others. 
Students were instructed to pay attention to the other students in the classroom, their 
physicality and their expressions. They also were instructed to think about how others 
might see and observe them, to memorize and think about their partners’ physicality and 
to notice details in their partner that had changed. This kind of observational training may 
well be related to theory of mind. Learning to pay close attention to the physicality and 
facial expressions of others is likely to help the child come to infer others’ mental states.  
Across the seven classes, only 7.09% of teachers’ comments related to theory of 
mind skills. Only a small amount of time was spend talking about inner states. When 
students were asked to think about inner states, they were asked not only to describe the 
feelings of their characters in particular moments, but also to explain why the character 
was feeling that particular emotion. When engaged in an improvisation about a character 
with a specific set of emotions, the children were instructed to act out those emotions, 
transferring the cognitive skill of thinking about emotions into the enactment of 
emotions. However, only a tiny proportion of time was spent on character analysis, 
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thinking about inner states, and character impersonation. Perhaps this is why the results 
of Study 1 showed no growth in theory of mind for children of this age in theater classes.   
A few codes were seen only rarely, such as language and definitions (3.33%), 
imagination (1.43%) pacing and timing (1.85%) and professionalism (0.11%). While 
instruction in these skills forms part of many acting classes, according to acting theorists 
and the professionals consulted for the development of the coding manual, in these 
particular acting classes for this age group, language skills, imagination, pacing, and 
professionalism were not emphasized.  
Finally, and surprisingly, there were almost no instances noted in which either 
empathy or emotion regulation were taught. On average, only 0.40% of teachers’ 
comments related to empathy skills, and only 1.88% of teachers’ comments related to 
emotion regulation skills. This is particularly unanticipated in light of this group of 
actors’ gains in empathy and emotional expression over the course of the year. Perhaps 
the act of learning the physicality of a character, and practicing paying attention to others, 
both skills explicitly taught in the classes observed, is all that children of this age need to 
gain in empathy and emotional expression. In contrast, this kind of training may not 
provide the kind of experience needed to strengthen theory of mind skills. Perhaps the 
‘dosage’ of acting training needed to increase empathy is significantly lower than the 
‘dosage’ needed for improvements in theory of mind. 
In the rare moments in which the teaching of emotion regulation was observed, I 
never noticed the teachers pushing children to mute their emotions. Rather, teachers 
urged their students to intensify the expression of their emotions. The students were 
taught to express the emotional content of their scenes as fully and loudly as possible. In 
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short, children were encouraged to take their expression of emotions as far as possible. 
Perhaps this emphasis on intensity of emotion expression is part of the reason why over 
the course of a year the children in the acting classes gained in emotional expression but 
not in other forms of emotion regulation. 
In sum, at this age group, teachers instruct children in physicality, motivation, and 
paying close attention to others. A small amount of time is spent on theory of mind and 
almost no time is spent on empathy or emotion regulation.  
  99
CHAPTER 5: 
STUDY 3 
 Study 3 investigated whether one year of acting training was causally related to 
theory of mind, empathy and adaptive emotion regulation in 13-15 year olds.  
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-eight adolescents (9 males, 19 females; aged 13-16, M = 14yr, 4 mo) 
enrolled in freshman year at the Boston Arts Academy or the Walnut Hill Academy and 
majoring in theatre participated. Twenty-five students completed classes due to attrition. 
Adolescents must audition for admission to the theatre major. While they may have had 
some previous training, none had previously received the high intensity (nine hours per 
week plus productions) of training they received at the schools. Twenty- five (8 males, 17 
females; aged 13-16, M = 14yr, 4mo) nonactor participants were recruited from the 
freshman class visual arts and music majors at both high schools. Twenty-two students 
completed classes due to attrition. Like the acting students, visual arts and music students 
are admitted through portfolio/audition; both groups received the same level and intensity 
of training.  
Materials 
Theory of Mind 
 Theory of mind was measured in three ways. See Appendix 4 for all theory of 
mind measures.  
 The Interpersonal Perception Task-15 (Costanzo & Archer, 1993) is a measure of 
ability to read nonverbal social communication, using naturalistic social interaction. 
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Participants are shown fifteen real scenes which involve the ability to read deception, 
intimacy, status, kinship and competition (i.e. a woman laughing on the phone). 
Participants are asked who the protagonist is speaking with, whether the protagonist is 
lying, or the relationship between the individuals in the scene. Participants must use 
nonverbal cues in order to determine the correct answer (i.e. a) her mother b) a female 
friend c) a male friend). 
 The Reading the Mind in the Eyes task for adults (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) (used 
in Study 1 and described in Chapter 3). 
 An Empathic Accuracy Paradigm video test (Hall & Schmid-Mast, 2007; Ickes, 
2001) is a test of the ability to accurately infer specific content of thoughts and feelings of 
another person (Gleason, Jensen-Campbell, & Ickes, 2009). This test uses a video I 
created in which a target, previously video taped, is shown discussing her favorite movies 
of the last five years with her husband. The use of a real situation is critical, as social and 
emotional stimuli are inherently ambiguous in real life (Halberstadt, Winkielman, 
Niedenthal & Dalle, 2009). After taping, the video had been replayed for the target, who 
stopped the tape each time she remembered having a specific thought or feeling. The 
video was then edited so participants only saw the moments in which a particular thought 
or feeling occurred. Scoring was based on the system developed by Ickes (2001). 
Participants were scored on how closely they are able to match the target’s stated emotion 
or thought, on a scale of 0 to 2. The inter-rater reliability on this measure is typically .07 
or higher. 
 Empathy 
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 Empathy was assessed by two measures, which can both be found in Appendix 5. 
The Basic Empathy Scale for Adolescents (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006) asks about 
participants’ reactions to hypothetical others’ emotional situations, similarly to the Index 
of Empathy, but is specifically designed for and validated on adolescent participants. 
Examples of questions include “My friend’s emotions don’t affect me much,” and “After 
being with a friend who is sad about something, I usually feel sad.” This measure was 
chosen because it is specific to adolescents, and the authors took special care to avoid 
terms such as “feeling sorry” and other indicators of sympathy or prosocial behavior 
rather than empathy. As in Study 1, in order to separate emotion matching from emotion 
reading or compassion, the Video Emotion Match test (described in Study 1) was also 
administered, with videos appropriate for this age group (clips from Kramer v. Kramer, 
Dawson’s Creek, The Laramie Project and Love Story). 
Emotionality and Emotion Regulation 
 Adolescents completed two measures of emotion regulation. The Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003) measures participants tendency to 
regulate their emotions using one of two strategies: cognitive reappraisal (e.g. “When I 
want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what I’m 
thinking about.”) or suppression (e.g. “I keep my emotions to myself”).  
Five subscales of the COPE scale (Carver & Scheier, 1994) were administered. 
This measure is similar to the Coping Strategies Interviews (Saarni, 1997) given to the 
younger group. These scales assess strategies of emotion regulation while under stress. 
The Focus and Venting subscale measures awareness and venting of emotions (e.g. 
“When I’m having a stressful personal event I get upset, and am really aware of it”). The 
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Restraint, Denial, and Behavioral Disengagement subscales measure separation from and 
rejection of emotions (e.g., “When I’m having a stressful personal event, I hold off doing 
anything about it until the situation permits”; “When I’m having a stressful personal 
event, I make sure not to make matters worse by being impulsive.”) The Acceptance 
subscale measures acceptance of emotions, the opposite of rejection of emotions (i.e. 
“When I’m having a stressful personal event, I accept that this has happened and that my 
personal event can't be changed.”) Participants completed each subscale using a 7 point 
Likert scale.  
Adolescents also completed three measures of emotionality. The Berkeley 
Expressivity Questionnaire (Gross & John, 1997) (described in Study 1) was 
administered, with language adjusted for adolescents. The PANAS-X and the Affect 
Intensity Measure (both described in Study 1) were completed by the adolescents, but 
with age appropriate language and a 7 point (instead of four point) Likert scale. All 
measures of emotion regulation can be found in Appendix 6. 
Control Measures 
Demographic Information. Parents completed the same measures of previous 
training and childhood characteristics as in study 1. This questionnaire can be found in 
Appendix 7. 
IQ. All participants completed the WAIS (Wechsler, 1991), vocabulary subtest, a 
measure that correlates with full-scale IQ. Having an IQ measure was important because 
several measures involve verbal stories, and I wanted to be able to control for verbal 
ability.  
SES. SES was measured in the same way as Study 1.  
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Visual Observation 
 The same visual observation measure given to the participants in Study 1 was 
completed by the participants of Study 3. 
Learning in the Parent (Theatre) Domain 
 At the end of the academic year, in June 2009, all acting teachers were asked to 
indicate on a seven point scale each student’s level of learning over the year: (1) student 
has made no progress; (7) student has made considerable progress. This score was 
intended to be used to investigate whether the level of teacher rated learning was 
associated with gains in theory of mind, empathy, or adaptive emotion regulation. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to receive learning scores for most of the acting students 
(one teacher was unwilling to rate her students) and most parents for the control group 
did not complete characteristics questionnaires, so I was unable to complete analysis on 
those data.  
Procedure 
Adolescents were seen in small groups of 5-8 individuals at two time points at 
their schools -- once at the beginning of their school year, in early September, 2008 
during their orientation to school, and once at the end of their school year, in early June 
2009, during their study week for finals. 
Results 
 All results are presented across school, and all results patterns were replicated 
when each school’s results were investigated individually. 
Pretest 
Control measures 
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 A one way ANOVA by group showed there was no difference between the 
groups’ verbal IQ, as measured by the WAIS vocabulary test, F (1, 48) = .59, p = .45, and 
therefore vocabulary was not included in any further pretest analysis. A one way 
ANOVA by group showed there was no difference between the groups’ SES, F (1, 18) = 
0.95, p = .34, and therefore SES was not included as a factor in any further analysis. 
Theory of Mind 
Means and standard deviations for all theory of mind measures can be found table 
10. In the analyses reported below, I again include sex as a simultaneous predictor due to 
previous findings showing a female advantage in theory of mind in childhood (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001; Bryant, 1982; Happé, 1995), and one study showing a male advantage 
in theory of mind in adulthood (Russell, Tchanturia, Rahman, & Schmidt, 2007).  
A two way MANOVA (group x sex) with the three theory of mind measures as 
outcome variables revealed no differences by sex, Wilks’ Lambda F (3, 41) = 1.13, p= 
.35, group, Wilks’ Lambda F (3, 41) = 1.51, p = .23, and sex did not interact with group, 
F (3, 41) = 0.76, p = .53. 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes. A two way ANOVA (group x sex) revealed a near 
significant effect of group, F (1, 46) = 3.59, p = .065. Actors scored higher than 
nonactors. However, there were no differences on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test 
by sex, F (1, 46) = .78, p = .38, and no interaction of sex by group, F (1, 46) = 1.04, p = 
.31. 
Interpersonal Perception Task (IPT) – 15.  A two way ANOVA (group x sex) 
revealed no differences on the IPT-15 by sex, F (1, 46) = .19, p = .67 or group, F (1, 46) 
= 0.41, p = .52, and no group x sex interaction F (1, 46) = .18, p = .66. 
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Empathic Accuracy Paradigm. A two way ANOVA (group x sex) revealed no 
differences on the Empathic Accuracy Paradigm by group, F (1, 46) = 0.01, p = .93, sex, 
F (1, 46) = 1.96, p = .17, and no group by sex interaction F (1, 46) = .74, p = .39. 
Empathy 
 In the analyses reported below, I again include sex as a simultaneous predictor 
because of widely reported sex differences in empathy (Bryant, 1982; Joliffe & 
Farrington, 2006). All means for Empathy measures can be found in Table 11.  
Video Empathy Emotion Matching. A two way ANOVA (group x sex) on the 
frequency of emotion matching across four video clips revealed no significant effect of 
group F (1, 46) = 1.77, p = .19, There was no effect of sex F (1, 46) = .78, p = .38, and no 
interaction of group by sex F (1, 46) = 0.22, p = .64. 
 Video Empathy Compassion. A two-way ANOVA (group x sex) on degree of 
compassion for the protagonist of each clip revealed no significant effect of group F (1, 
46) = 2.75, p = .10, sex F (1, 46) = 0.01, p = .93, and no interaction of group x sex F (1, 
72) = 0.002, p = .97. 
Basic Empathy Scale. A two way ANOVA (group x sex) revealed no differences 
on the Basic Empathy Scale by group, F (1, 46) = 0.001, p = .98. However, there was a 
significant effect of sex, F (1, 46) = 09.55, p = .003. In addition, group interacted with 
sex, F (1, 46) = 6.86, p = .01. This occurred because while both female actors and female 
nonactors scored higher than male actors and male nonactors, the difference between the 
male and female nonactors was larger than the difference between male and female 
actors.  
Emotionality and Emotion Regulation 
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 All means and standard deviations for measures of emotionality and emotion 
regulation can be found in Table 12. 
Positive Affect. A one way ANOVA revealed that actors reported more positive 
affect than nonactors, F (1, 48) = 5.08, p = .029.  
Negative Affect. A one way ANOVA revealed no effect of group on experience of 
negative affect F (1, 48) = 1.87, p = .17.  
Positive Expressivity. A one way ANOVA revealed that actors expressed 
moderately more positive affect than nonactors, F (1, 48) = 3.11, p = .08.  
Negative Expressivity. A one way ANOVA revealed no effect of group on level of 
negative expressivity F (1, 48) = .085, p = .77.  
Affect Intensity. A one way ANOVA revealed that actors reported moderately 
more affect intensity than nonactors, F (1, 48) = 3.579, p = .06.  
Cognitive Reappraisal. A one way ANOVA revealed no effect of group on use of 
cognitive reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy F (1, 48) = 1.34, p = .25.  
 Expressive Suppression. A one way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
group on use of expressive as an emotion regulation strategy F (1, 48) = 5.15, p = .028. 
This occurred because actors used expressive suppression as an emotion regulation 
strategy less often than nonactors.  
Coping. 
Focus and Venting. A one way ANOVA revealed no main effects of group F (1, 
48) = .24, p = .62.  
Denial. A one way ANOVA revealed no effect of group for the coping strategy of 
denying ones’ emotions F (1, 48) =.026, p = .87. 
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Restraint. A one way ANOVA revealed no effect of group for the coping strategy 
of restraining oneself from ones’ emotions F (1, 48) = .536, p = .47.  
Behavioral Disengagement. A one way ANOVA revealed no effect of group for 
the coping strategy of behaviorally disengaging from ones’ emotions F (1, 48) = .88, p = 
.35.  
Acceptance. A one way ANOVA revealed no effect of group for the coping 
strategy of accepting ones’ emotions F (1, 48) = .23, p = .63.  
Observational Skill 
A one way MANOVA on all observational outcomes revealed no pretest 
differences between the groups, F (6, 45) = 0.53, p =.77. A one way ANOVA on the total 
number of similarities and differences described revealed no significant difference 
between the groups, F (1, 50) = 1.24, p = .27. A one way ANOVA on percentage of 
broad characteristics described revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 50) = 
0.45, p =.51. A one way ANOVA on percentage of medium characteristics described 
revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 50) = 0.10, p =.75. A one way ANOVA 
on percentage of specific characteristics described revealed no differences between the 
groups, F (1, 50) = 0.98, p =.32. A one way ANOVA on percentage of non-visual 
characteristics described revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 50) = 0.27, p 
=.60. A one way ANOVA on percentage of anthropomorphizing characteristics described 
revealed no differences between the groups, F (1, 50) = 0.38, p =.54. Means and standard 
deviations for Observational skill can be found in table 13. 
Previous Experience  
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 In order to determine the possibility that previous experience (before entering the 
freshman year of intense acting classes) with acting predicted the level of theory of mind, 
empathy and adaptive emotion regulation at pretest, a series of regressions with number 
of previous hours of acting experience as the independent variable and outcome test as 
the dependent variable were conducted.  
Theory of Mind. A regression with previous acting experience as the independent 
variable and Empathic Accuracy as the dependent variable was not significant F (1, 21) = 
0.45, p = .51. A regression with previous acting experience as the independent variable 
and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test as the dependent variable was not significant F 
(1, 21) = 0.21, p = .65. A regression with previous acting experience as the independent 
variable and the Interpersonal Perception test as the dependent variable was not 
significant F (1, 21) = 0.60, p = .45.  
Empathy. A regression with previous acting experience as the independent 
variable and the Basic Empathy Scale as the dependent variable was not significant F (1, 
21) = 0.27, p = .61. A regression with previous acting experience as the independent 
variable and Emotion Matching Movie test as the dependent variable was not significant 
F (1, 21) = 0.34, p = .56 for emotion matching and not significant F (1, 21) = 0.06, p = 
.94 for sympathy for the protagonist. 
Emotion regulation. Adaptive emotion regulation was calculated using the mean 
of the standardized COPE Acceptance, COPE Focus and Venting, and ERQ Cognitive 
Regulation scales. A regression with previous acting experience as the independent 
variable and adaptive emotion regulation strategies as the dependent variable was not 
significant F (1, 20) = 0.24 p = .63. 
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Correlations Among Theory of Mind, Empathy, and Adaptive Emotion Regulation 
 In order to determine the relationship among theory of mind, empathy, and 
adaptive emotion regulation, a bivariate correlation matrix using standardized overall 
scores for theory of mind, empathy, and adaptive emotion regulation was conducted for 
the overall sample population, as well as for each experimental group individually. As 
shown in Table 14, theory of mind and empathy were correlated for the actors, Pearson’s 
r= .39 p=.046, but not for nonactors at pretest. Empathy and adaptive emotion regulation 
were not correlated in either group (r = .27 for actors and nonactors). However, theory of 
mind and adaptive emotion regulation were positively correlated in the nonactors r = .45, 
p = .03, but not the actors. 
Posttest 
Control measures 
WISC Vocabulary. A repeated measures ANOVA showed no interaction of time x 
group, F < 2.5. There was no main effect of group, but there was a main effect of time 
across groups, F (1, 43) = 4.607, p = .038, which occurred because both groups improved 
their vocabulary scores.  
Theory of Mind 
I again include gender a simultaneous predictor, due to previous findings showing 
a female advantage in theory of mind in childhood (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Bryant, 
1982; Happé, 1995), and one study showing a male advantage in theory of mind in 
adulthood (Russell, Tchanturia, Rahman, & Schmidt, 2007). All means for theory of 
mind scores are shown in Table 10. I also include vocabulary score as a covariate for all 
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theory of mind tests in order ensure that any effects found are not instead the result of 
individual differences in vocabulary.  
Reading the Mind in the Eyes. A three way repeated measures ANOVA with 
gender and group as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects 
variable, controlling for the mean vocabulary score, revealed no interaction of time by 
group F (1, 41) = .023, p = .879. However, there was a main effect of group, F (1, 41) = 
4.69, p = .036, with the actors scoring higher across time than the nonactors. There was 
also a main between subjects trend of sex, F (1, 41) = 3.25, p = .079, with the females 
scoring higher across time than the males.  
Interpersonal Perception Task-15. A three way repeated measures ANOVA with 
gender and group as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects 
variable revealed no interaction of group by time, F (1, 41) = .647, p = .426, and no main 
effect of group F (1, 41) = .055, p = .82, or sex F (1, 41) = .033, p = .86. An item analysis 
revealed no pattern of differences between groups or sex across time on any individual 
item. 
Empathic Accuracy Paradigm. A three way repeated measures ANOVA with 
gender and group as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects 
variable revealed an interaction of group x time, F (1, 41) = 5.37, p = .026, d = .838. 
Consistent with prediction, actors improved their theory of mind score above nonactors 
over time. This interaction was modified by a three way interaction of group, time and 
sex, F (1, 41) = 6.67, p = .013. This occurred because in male actors changed more than 
female actors but nonactor males changed at the same rate as nonactor females. There 
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was a moderate main effect of sex, F (1, 41) = 3.08, p = .086, with females scoring higher 
than males. There was no interaction of actor and sex, and no overall effect of actor.  
Empathy 
 In the analyses reported below, I again include sex as a simultaneous predictor 
because of widely reported sex differences in empathy (Bryant, 1982; Joliffe & 
Farrington, 2006). All means for Empathy scores are shown in Table 11.  
Video Empathy Matching. A repeated measures ANOVA with gender and group 
as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable revealed no 
interactions and no main effect of time or sex of participants matching the emotions of 
characters. However, there was a main effect of group, F (1, 42) = 3.55, p = .067. This 
occurred because actors were overall more likely to match the emotions of their 
characters than nonactors.  
Video Empathy Compassion. A repeated measures ANOVA with gender and 
group as the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable revealed 
no interactions. There was no main effect of sex, but there was a main effect of time, F 
(1, 43) = 3.82, p = .057. This occurred because both groups felt less compassion for the 
characters at Time 2 than they did at Time 1, possibly because they had seen these film 
clips before. There was also a main effect of group, F (1, 43) = 4.08, p = .05. This 
occurred because the actors overall felt more compassion for the protagonists than the 
nonactors.  
Basic Empathy Scale.  A repeated measures ANOVA with gender and group as 
the between subjects variables and time as the within subjects variable revealed a time by 
group interaction: actors gained in empathy over and above nonactors, F (1, 43) = 3.69, p 
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= .06, d = .56. This was modified by a three way interaction of sex and group over time, 
F (1, 43) = 3.69, p = .06, which occurred because male and female actors were equivalent 
over time, while female nonactors scored higher than male nonactors. There was also a 
main effect of sex, F (1, 43) = 6.02, p = .018, which occurred because females scored 
higher than males. There was a no main effect of group. 
Emotionality and Emotion Regulation 
 All means and standard deviations for measures of emotionality and emotion 
regulation can be found in Table 12.  
Positive and Negative Emotional Experience. A repeated measures ANOVA with 
group as the between subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on positive 
emotionality revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 44) = 0.91, p = .34. However, 
there was a main effect of group, F (1, 44) =5.78, p =.02, because actors reported feeling 
more positive emotions in their daily lives than nonactors.  
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on positive emotionality revealed an interaction of 
group x time, F (1, 44) = 4.59, p = .038. This occurred because over time, nonactors are 
reporting feeling an increase of negative emotions, while actors remain consistent. There 
was no main effect of group, F (1, 44) =0.04 p =.83. 
Affect Intensity. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects 
variable and time as the within subject variable on affect intensity revealed no interaction 
of group x time, F (1, 44) = 0.57, p = .45. However, there was a trend effect of group, F 
(1, 44) =3.17, p =.08, which occurred because actors were overall more emotionally 
intense than nonactors.  
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Expressivity . A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects 
variable and time as the within subject variable on negative expressivity revealed an 
interaction of group x time, F (1, 44) = 4.13, p = .049. This occurred because over time, 
actors expressed their emotions more, while nonactors did not. There was no main effect 
of group, F (1, 44) =0.42, p =.52. 
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on positive expressivity revealed no interaction of 
group x time, F (1, 44) = 0.34, p = .56. However, there was a main effect of group, F (1, 
44) = 4.23, p =.046, because actors expressed more positive emotions than nonactors.  
Emotion Regulation. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between 
subjects variable and time as the within subject variable on suppression revealed no 
interaction of group x time, F (1, 44) = 1.54, p = .22, and no main effect of group, F (1, 
44) = 2.47, p =.12. 
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on cognitive reappraisal revealed no interaction of 
group x time, F (1, 44) = 0.47, p = .49, and no main effect of group, F (1, 44) =1.94, p 
=.17. 
Coping. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects 
variable and time as the within subject variable on acceptance revealed no interaction of 
group x time, F (1, 44) = 0.29, p = .59, and no main effect of group, F (1, 44) = 0.17, p 
=.68. 
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on behavioral disengagement revealed no interaction 
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of group x time, F (1, 44) = 0.05, p = .82. However, there was a trend effect of group, F 
(1, 44) =3.24, p =.079, which occurred because actors disengaged from their emotions 
less than nonactors.  
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on restraint revealed no interaction of group x time, F 
(1, 44) = 0.01, p = .90, and no main effect of group, F (1, 44) =0.77, p =.38. 
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on denial revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 
44) = 0.05, p = .81, and no main effect of group, F (1, 44) = 0.02, p =.89. 
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on venting of emotion revealed no interaction of group 
x time, F (1, 44) = 1.81, p = .18, and no main effect of group, F (1, 44) =0.11, p =.73.  
Observational Acuity 
All means and standard deviations for Observational Acuity can be found in Table 
13. A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and time 
as the within subject variable on total number of similarities and differences comments 
revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 44) = 0.31, p = .58, and no main effect of 
group, F (1, 44) = 1.00, p = .32.  
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on percentage of broad comments revealed no 
interaction of group x time, F (1, 44) = 2.31, p = .13, and no effect of group, F (1, 44) = 
0.19, p = .66.  
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A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on total percentage of medium comments revealed no 
interaction of group x time, F (1, 44) = 0.008, p = .93, and no main effect of group, F (1, 
44) = 0.37, p = .54.  
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on total percentage of specific comments revealed a 
trend interaction of group x time, F (1, 44) = 3.74, p = .06. This occurred because the 
percentage of specific comments the actors made went up sharply, while the percentage 
of specific comments the nonactors made went up gradually. There was no main effect of 
group, F (1, 44) = 1.37, p = .25. 
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on total percentage of nonvisual comments revealed 
no interaction of group x time, F (1, 44) = 0.05, p = .81, and no main effect of group, F 
(1, 44) = 0.75, p = .39. 
A repeated measures ANOVA with group as the between subjects variable and 
time as the within subject variable on total percentage of anthropomorphizing comments 
revealed no interaction of group x time, F (1, 44) = 0.04, p = .84, and no main effect of 
group, F (1, 44) = 0.38, p = .54.  
Correlations Among Theory of Mind, Empathy, and Adaptive Emotion Regulation 
In order to determine the relationship among theory of mind, empathy, and 
adaptive emotion regulation, a bivariate correlation matrix using standardized overall 
scores for theory of mind, empathy, and adaptive emotion regulation was conducted for 
the overall sample population, as well as for each experimental group individually. 
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Adaptive emotion regulation was calculated using the mean of the standardized COPE 
Acceptance, COPE Focus and Venting, and ERQ Cognitive Regulation scales. As shown 
in Table 15, theory of mind and empathy were no longer correlated for the actors, and 
remained uncorrelated for nonactors. Empathy and adaptive emotion regulation were still 
not correlated in either group. In addition, theory of mind and adaptive emotion 
regulation were no longer correlated in the nonactors, and remained uncorrelated in the 
actors.  
Discussion 
To summarize, there were fewer differences between the groups at pretest than 
originally hypothesized, and this despite the previous training many of our students had. 
In fact, previous training did not predict scores on any outcome measures at Time 1. 
There was a trend difference of group, with an actor advantage, on Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes, but no Time 1 differences between groups on Empathy. There were some 
significant differences in emotionality and emotion regulation, with actors reporting more 
positive affect, expressing more positive and negative affect, and feeling more intense 
affect in their daily lives. There was also a significant difference between groups on 
suppression of emotion as an emotion regulation strategy, with actors using suppression 
less than nonactors. 
At pretest, there were group differences on correlations among the outcome 
measures. Actors’ levels of empathy and theory of mind correlated, while nonactors’ 
levels of adaptive emotion regulation and theory of mind correlated. However, all 
correlations disappeared at posttest, which warrants further investigation. The fact that 
empathy and theory of mind correlated at pretest but not posttest for actors supports the 
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hypothesis that actors are learning to separate thinking about emotions from feeling those 
emotions.  
 At posttest, there was a main effect of group on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
test, and a significant interaction of group and time on the Empathic Accuracy Paradigm. 
Actors showed an overall advantage on reading mental states from static, posed pictures 
and gained over the year in the ability to determine mental states from live, real, dynamic 
stimuli. Male actors in particular gained in their ability to read dynamic mental states 
more than female actors, while nonactor males and females gained in identical rates. For 
empathy, at posttest there was a marginal effect of group for actors to match the emotions 
of fictional characters, and there was an interaction of group and time on the Basic 
Empathy Scale, a dispositional measure of empathy. Male and female actors were 
equivalent in their gain, while female nonactors gained more than male nonactors. At 
posttest, actors were found to experience more affect intensity, express more positive 
emotions and gained in their reported negative expressivity over nonactors. Actors also 
learned to disengage from their emotions less in order to regulate them.  
In summary, one year of acting classes was associated with a significant increase 
in dispositional empathy, a significant increase in theory of mind, and a significant 
increase in intensity and expression of emotions. Male actors in particular were helped, as 
compared to nonactors, as their dispositional empathy and theory of mind acuity 
increased more than female actors compared to female nonactors. As with the younger 
group, the actors, at posttest, had a heightened tendency to match the emotions of a 
fictional character. Differences between the two age groups’ results will be discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
STUDY 4 
 Study 3 revealed an actor advantage in theory of mind, empathy and expressive 
emotion regulation for the 13-15 year old age group. The goal of Study 4, like Study 2, 
was to determine what skills were taught in the acting classes that these participants took. 
More specifically I sought to determine whether theory of mind, empathy, and expressive 
emotion regulation were taught implicitly or explicitly and if so, to uncover the methods, 
exercises, and teachable moments that the instructors used to convey these and other 
skills. 
Methods 
Participants 
Three daily freshman acting class from Boston Arts Academy (BAA) and three 
from Walnut Hill School for the Arts (WHS) were selected for study. Participants in 
these classes were between the ages of 13-16. These six classes were chosen because they 
were spaced throughout the year and provided a variety of curriculum exemplars. Boston 
Arts Academy and Walnut Hill School were chosen for study because of the high quality 
of their training for adolescents, as well as the intensity of training (several hours every 
day) that their students receive in their chosen art form. Students attending these two 
schools are selected in part of the basis of their acting ability, unlike the students who 
attend the Wheelock Family Theatre. All participants in Study 3 were also participants in 
Study 2.  
Procedure 
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 Three sessions of the BAA class, and three sessions of the WHS class were 
videotaped in their entirety for later analysis. No special instructions were given to the 
teacher or the class and the teachers were blind to the hypotheses of the study. The 
camera focused on the teacher, as the objective of this study was to determine what the 
teacher was attempting to impart to the students. When necessary to show how a 
particular game or concept was interpreted by the students in the class, the camera briefly 
turned to the class to capture students’ reactions. 
Overview of Class Activities 
 The classes involved a variety of improvisations, scene studies and physical 
activities designed to introduce the students to character study and analysis. Exercises 
included improvisations in which students created scenes based on physical postures and 
relationships; character driven improvisations, such as making one member of the class 
guess who other members of the class were enacting as based on their interactions; short 
scenes which the students wrote and rehearsed themselves; and scene study of classic 
plays. As in Study 2, throughout these exercises and scene rehearsals, a variety of skills 
were emphasized – some games emphasized only one skill, some emphasized many 
skills, and some skills were emphasized in many games. The quotations below come 
from a variety of exercises over the course of the year from several different classes. The 
class in which each quotation was heard is noted after the quotation, and context is 
provided if necessary. 
Coding 
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All coding procedures and instructions were identical to those used in study 2. 
Below, I provide examples for each type of code because the ways in which each concept 
was taught differed from what I observed in the younger classes.  
Theory of Mind 
Teacher: “But in this scene what do you want from him in that moment, what are you 
seeking, what is the desired result for you here?” 
Student: “for me or for him?” 
Teacher: “well, both of you. But for you, let’s be real. Let’s make it about you. Where do 
you want him to wind up? That’s about you?” 
Student: “a good place. I want him to…” 
Teacher: “what good place?” 
Student: “um, I don’t want him to get fired.” (WHS 4/09) 
 
Teacher: “so let’s hold it for a moment. Who are you playing when you say ‘oh I’m sorry 
I forgot it was Tuesday?’” 
Student: “because I realize it’s Tuesday so I like”  
Teacher: “what are you playing?” 
Student: “like what am I playing for …?” 
Teacher: “yeah, what are you playing? I’m not clear about what you’re playing, that’s 
why I asked. It doesn’t seem like it hits you like ‘ohh I don’t see the conflict like oh 
shoot. How rude of me. How insensitive of me to forget... I can’t believe I double booked 
myself.’ Right, you have a doctor’s appointment or something?... like you wouldn’t miss 
this, right?” 
Student: “yeah. It’s weird for me thinking about it.” (Walnut Hill 4/08) 
 
“And the reason why it had an impact was because she was really fighting for something 
and you pushed her to a breaking point where she finally, you know she used a different 
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strategy. This is what we do as actors. Right? This is what we do. You come up with 
strategies you come up with tactics to get what you want. What she wants is to get you to 
leave her alone so she can read her book which is really what she wants to do. Right? So 
you won’t leave her alone so finally she invokes the nuclear option which is your 
mother.” (Walnut Hill 4/09) 
 
Teacher: “What are you playing there? What are you playing there? OK. What do you 
want to be playing there? What are you fighting for there? So by telling him this whole 
story what are you trying to do?” 
Student: “I am trying to get him to be an ally to me.” 
Teacher: “Yeah. So how does…the story has to be what?” 
Student: “Energizing and entertaining?” 
Teacher: “Well not just energizing and entertaining. It has to be what?” 
Student: “Convincing” 
Teacher: “Yeah, convincing, yes, persuasive. Yeah. So talking about Andrew [character 
name] and the way you do. What is it you are making a case for?”  
Student: “The need to stand up for him” 
Teacher: “Yeah, that’s right. How unfairly he was being treated. Right? That is what 
motivated you, right? That’s what prompted you, compelled you to stand up for Mr. 
Stromine, [character name] yeah?” (Walnut Hill 4/08) 
 
Empathy 
“Um, OK so I want you to keep that in the back of your mind and I want you to spend a 
lot of time, thinking about that over these next couple of days, both you and [other 
student] right. OK, what are those discoveries that I am making in my scene and when I 
think about real life people that are in this situation what am I learning about that. And 
then am I adding that into my scene, right, the more you add that to the scene, it becomes 
less one dimensional, and as actors we have to be able to either sympathize or empathize 
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with the plight of what our characters are playing so that we really are being true to them; 
does that make sense? And it’s hard, it is hard.” (Boston Arts Academy 4/09)  
 
Student: “No but I, if the fight was still that stronger, but my, my happiness at what he 
had said was a lot stronger.” 
Teacher: “I mean this is not hard for you to connect with is it?” 
Student: “No” 
Teacher: “I mean, Nora [character name] is roughly your age, maybe a year older. Are 
you 15 yet, you’re 14. Close enough. Imagine a Broadway producer saying, Kid just 
show up tomorrow and the job’s yours. Yeah, real excited yeah.” 
Student: “yeah” 
Teacher: “So you just need to make for yourself whatever that would be. What if it was 
the cast of Spring Awakening.” 
Student: “Yeah!!” 
Teacher: “yeah, yeah you can see it. Yeah so is that a place to start, or whatever the cast 
of High School Musical 7! Alright so um, what did you guys see? There was a real 
transition here that was important; I think that took place in the moment before. That I 
think really helped launch them into this scene. Compare and contrast the first two... You 
know this stuff isn’t unlike, occasionally it happens in your real lives. You really want 
something you need to ask somebody for it, that person needs to say yes. That person 
doesn’t day yes, you don’t give up. Until it is made absolutely clear to you that it isn’t 
happening. Right, and then you’re bad, right? You’ve been thwarted. Right? Well what is 
the beginning of this scene about, if not that? Yeah. But one thing causes another doesn’t 
it. She pushes, mum pushes back. She pushes more, mum pushes back again. She pushes 
more, mum says that’s it. Yeah, [student name] just had an aha! moment …” (Walnut 
Hill 4/09) 
 
Emotion Regulation 
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Teacher: “Um ladies don’t make crying your goal. Because it is not” 
Student: “Oh no no no I, it just happened” 
Teacher: “OK, alright if it just happens that is wonderful” (Walnut Hill 4/08). 
 
“Right once you have that conversation you know as an actor she feels safe with it you 
have to do that thing 100% because if you don’t do it 100% she is not going to feel the 
right level of fear, or disgust or whatever shame, whatever it is that she should be feeling 
that that particular moment in time, she wont get there if you are not fully into that… 
Why is it falling flat? Are you not fully into the moment? Are you not fully going after 
your objective? Are you acting like you are angry, or are you really angry, does that make 
sense?” (Boston Arts Academy 4/09) 
 
Classroom Management 
Shhhhh hold on, listen. Hold on, I’m waiting... Can you say that again? (BAA, 12.04) 
 
Good job, so let’s do some quick (inaudible) and then we will do another exercise (WHS 
11/20) 
 
Imagination 
“If it’s something where it’s these two, like [student name] and [student name], where 
one person is standing and one person is sitting. It’s rather simple, yeah? So use your 
imagination. Find three that are unconnected. So don’t worry about stringing them 
together, don’t worry about finding a story.” (Boston Arts Academy 12/04) 
 
Language/ Definitions 
Student: “Direct means, like, if you’re walking to a chair. You go straight to the chair and 
you sit directly down. Yeah.” 
Teacher: “And that’s direct” 
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Student: “And indirect is like, if there’s a chair there, and you’re walking, and walk 
around it, and then you sit down” 
Teacher: [demonstrating] “Kind of walk, and look at the chair for a minute, and sneak up 
on the chair, maybe, that might be indirect.” (Boston Arts Academy 12/04) 
 
Motivation and Self Trust 
“Go take your impulse [student], take you impulse [student], go for it, take the impulse. 
OK good, let’s hear it.” (WHS 11/20) 
 
Observation of Others 
“And then when I said you’re supposed to interact, you’re supposed to wait for a 
response, and it’s on the syllabus, we talked about it on the first day, it’s ‘listen, watch, 
respond.’ If you are not responding or listening or paying attention to your scene partner, 
you got two people up there own world doing. And that scene that you and [student] did 
was not working because he was not listening to you.” 
Student: “I think it was” 
Teacher: “Yeah, but in the end it was, because he finally learned how to listen. You were 
listening all along, and you were being very patient, letting him throw a temper tantrum, 
throwing the chairs, throwing the typewriter, you were like ok, ok, and then you finally 
looked at me like there’s… what’s going on, and when he was finally able to interact, 
there was a scene that we were able to enjoy as an audience. Does that make sense? So 
this concept of listening.” (Boston Arts Academy, 12/04).  
 
“right if you’re honestly listening to your partner you can’t become bored because you 
are listening to your partner and feeding off from what your partner is giving you, and 
you should be finding new discoveries, every single day” (Boston Arts Academy 4/09)  
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Pacing/ Timing 
“Jump way in, hello is still, you know, circling the periphery, yeah. You want to get right 
in the bull ring. That’s a good analogy, bull ring. Right, there is no time to think about 
what you should do or say when there is a bull in the ring with you, right. You just have 
to respond” (Walnut Hill, 11/20) 
 
Physicality 
“I’m going to check your necks, OK? (moves over to student) You seem a little tense 
(gently positions student’s head/neck to ensure posture is correct) (moves around the 
circle) Let me do it, don’t help me. (moves to next student, changes her position) Good, 
(moves to next student) Relax (moves to next student) you want to try not to exert too 
much muscularity, (moves to next student) A little softer there, yeah there you go, soft. 
So its not about being good soldiers its about being aligned and at ease and available and 
alert at the same time, it’s balance, (moves to next Student, changes position) and it’s a 
life long developmental task, I still have to work with this, um, if there were somebody 
checking my alignment they would have plenty to work with believe me. Um, I don’t 
want you to hold in the chest, I want you to um open it up a it a bit, and now your sinking 
back a bit, not by much, but we can correct that if you bring your shoulders back just a 
little. Can you see what I’m talking about? Does it feel different? Yeah you all look a lot 
better now. I would always sink into my hips, and my neck was always, always a little 
off. Eyes still at ease, you know habits, you have to dupe them unknowingly, that’s why 
they’re habits” (WHS 11/20) 
 
“I have no idea what is going on and I can’t hear you, so therefore nothing is going on.” 
(WHS 11/20) 
 
Professionalism 
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“It’s just really undisciplined in here before class. Um, I know I made this suggestion 
before, I hope this is the last time, when you walk into this space, it’s a time to collect 
yourself. Not to socialize. You’re about to do, many of you are about to do scene work, 
the rest of you are about to be watching the scene work. You should be going over things 
you need to go over to be ready to go. Not socializing. It sounded like a party in here. 
Um, and I don’t know what athlete or singer or dancer or any other artist, um, gets 
prepared in that way. Ya have to focus. Yea? In order to do your work in a way that 
makes you feel good about what you’re doing. Why do you think it’s any different for 
actors? Cuz clearly ya do. Cuz you’re not taking it seriously. So I ask that, you know, I’m 
never too far away. And we can hear you. And, but, besides that, take yourself seriously 
now. It’s in the spring semester of your freshman year. You’re now doing scene work. 
It’s time to really up the ante, remember I said that? This is part of that.” (Walnut Hill 
4/08) 
 
“If you want to laugh, that’s cool, don’t distract them. Does that make sense? Yeah? If 
you think about it critically, ‘why am I laughing, is this a nervous thing? Because 
[student] is goofing off? Or am I laughing because the subject matter that she’s 
presenting is making me laugh?’ Do you all understand that difference? Yeah?” (Boston 
Arts Academy, 12/04) 
Results and Discussion 
 Because the Walnut Hill School and Boston Arts Academy differed in the 
proportion of time spent on each skill, the two schools’ results are presented separately. 
However, as can be seen from the quotations above, the ways in which the teachers 
presented each skill at the two schools was similar. All results can be found in Table 16. 
Each chunk was coded by four independent coders, and inter-rater reliability was 68.16% 
for Boston Arts Academy and 82.05% for Walnut Hill School for all videos across all 
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four coders, across all chunks. This is a lower percentage of inter-rater reliability than 
found in Study 2, most likely because these classes were much more complex, with 
multiple codes in each chunk. When discrepancies arose, they were resolved by majority 
(if three coders coded one way, and a fourth another way) or by me (if coders were split 
evenly). 
In what follows, I will discuss each category of habit of mind in the order of 
frequency with which I observed these habits being taught. Across the six classes coded, 
32.69% Boston Arts Academy teacher comments and 21.38% of Walnut Hill School 
teachers’ comments were coded as classroom management (which included both 
organization and management of the classroom). 
Over three classes, 35.37% of Walnut Hill and 14.65% of Boston Arts Academy’s 
teachers’ comments related to theory of mind skills. Students were asked to think about 
why the characters they were playing interacted with others onstage in the way that they 
did. A special emphasis was placed on discovering the motivations behind the lines and 
the emotional states of the characters in particular moments. This explicit training may be 
why we find an actor advantage in realistic theory of mind in Study 3. As can be seen 
from the results above, Walnut Hill teachers spent much more time teaching theory of 
mind than did Boston Arts Academy teachers. 
On average, 23.15% of Boston Arts Academy but only 4.77% of Walnut Hill 
teachers’ comments related to physicality. As in the younger classes, Boston Arts 
Academy students were taught about physicality as it related to various emotions, the 
status between two individuals and the ways in which characters would move. Physicality 
at Walnut Hill was taught in relation to the students’ ability to relax and isolate parts of 
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their bodies, enabling them to then place the character’s physicality “on top” of their own 
relaxed bodies. 
As in the classes for the younger group, the teaching of motivation and self trust 
played a large role. On average, 14.80% of Boston Arts Academy and 20.99% of Walnut 
Hill teachers’ comments related to motivating the adolescents and teaching them to trust 
themselves. Students were encouraged to follow their instincts with a particular character, 
or to go farther in an improvisation exercise, and to not be scared of judgments from 
others.  
A few codes came up only rarely despite being described by acting professionals 
and coaches as important. Only 5.22% of Boston Arts Academy 4.33% of Walnut Hill of 
teachers’ comments related to language and definitions. Unlike in Study 2, just 3.67% 
Boston Arts Academy and 1.05% of Walnut Hill School teachers’ comments related to 
observing others and paying attention. This is far less than in the classes for the younger 
group, and this lack was replaced by a much larger percentage of theory of mind 
coaching. This change supports my previous assertion that learning how to pay attention 
and observe others is a precursor to thinking about their mental and emotional states. 
Finally, 1.28% of Boston Arts 1.02% of Walnut Hill teachers’ comments related to 
professionalism, 1.05% of Boston Arts Academy 0.12% of Walnut Hill teachers’ 
comments related to pacing and timing, and 0.58% of Boston Arts Academy and 3.02% 
of Walnut Hill School comments related to imagination skills. 
Lastly, as in the classes for the younger group, emotion regulation and empathy 
were rarely seen. On average, 1.67% of Boston Arts Academy and 3.30% of Walnut Hill 
School teachers’ comments related to empathy skills, and 1.24% of Boston Arts 
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Academy and 4.66% of Walnut Hill School teachers’ comments related to emotion 
regulation skills. However, when teachers did discuss feeling the emotions of a character 
or regulating emotions in general, there was less emphasis on expressing as much 
emotion as possible then in the younger classes. Instead, there were discussions on when 
expressing emotion was necessary, and whether actually feeling the emotions of 
characters was needed. 
 On average, the codes for the Boston Arts Academy classes were closer to the 
codes for the Wheelock Family Theatre classes than the Walnut Hill classes. This may be 
due to the previous experience the adolescents in the BAA versus WHS had in acting. 
The Walnut Hill School is a private boarding school, with a much smaller freshman class 
than BAA, while Boston Arts Academy is public and admits a larger percentage of 
applicants than WHS. However, it is important to note that the findings from the 
longitudinal study, as reported in Chapter 5, were consistent across the two schools.  
The large amount of theory of mind training observed in these classes is 
consistent with the finding that those in the theater group, but not those in the music and 
visual arts groups, gained significantly on a measure of theory of mind. Surprisingly, 
however, despite finding significant gains in empathy and expression of emotions, there 
was little or no explicit training in empathy and emotion expression observed. As I 
suggested in Chapter 4, it is possible that the skill of empathy expressive emotion 
regulation can be gained through learning the physicality of a character and thinking 
about a character’s mental and emotional states. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
All cultures watch performances, whether through religious rituals or stories 
enacted on stage for the pleasure of the audience. We pretend to be another person 
without any intent to deceive, and for the enjoyment and edification of ourselves and 
others, and call it “acting”. Despite the widespread involvement of humans in acting 
either as performers or audience members, psychologists know very little about the 
cognitive and affective underpinnings of acting. Yet acting may provide a powerful lens 
through which to understand the mind. We could not act on stage without the ability to 
pretend and without the ability to imitate, both skills that develop in the second year of 
life (Piaget, 1962). Yet clearly pretense and imitation cannot be sufficient to allow us to 
act: while researchers have observed pretense and imitation in non-human primates 
(Byrne & Whiten, 1988), no evidence of dramatic acting has ever been reported in non-
humans.  
Because psychologists have not studied acting, we therefore know little about the 
psychological components of acting—the prerequisite skills required, the developmental 
course of acting talent, and the cognitive and affective effects of engaging in acting. This 
stands in contrast to how much psychologists have learned about the psychological 
components of engagement in the visual arts (e.g., Arnheim, 1974; Freeman, 1980; 
Gardner, 1980; Golomb, 2004; Hagen, 1980; Zeki, 1999; for a review see Winner, 2006) 
and music (e.g., Bamberger, 1991; Deutsch, 1982; Sloboda, 1986; Trehub, 2003; for a 
review see Winner, 2006). This dissertation is an attempt to correct the gap between 
knowledge about visual arts and music and knowledge about acting. 
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The studies reported here demonstrated that one year of acting training, in 
comparison to one year of visual arts or music training, increases dispositional empathy 
and expression of emotion in 8-10 and 13-15 year olds, and also increases theory of mind 
acuity in young adolescents. Surprisingly, there was little to no explicit teaching of 
empathy or emotion regulation in acting classes for either age group. Instead, there was 
some focus on theory of mind, and an emphasis on understanding physicality and 
motivating the students to trust their instincts. 
Differences between Study 1 and Study 3 
Studies 1 and 3 tested the effects of one year of acting training on 8-10 (Study 1) 
and 13-15 (Study 3) year olds compared to the effects of one year of visual art or music 
training at the same ages. Both studies investigated theory of mind, empathy, 
emotionality, and emotion regulation both before and after the year of training. Acting 
training affected the two age groups of actors differently for some outcomes and similarly 
for others. Neither age group’s previous experience with acting predicted their pretest 
scores on any outcome measure. 
Theory of Mind 
There were some differences in levels of theory of mind at pretest. The younger 
actors were not different from the younger nonactors on any theory of mind measure, but 
the adolescent actors had higher Reading the Mind in the Eyes scores than the adolescent 
nonactors. At posttest, there were no theory of mind differences between the groups for 
the younger participants, but the adolescent actors retained their significant Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes advantage, and there was a significant group x time interaction on 
reading real, dynamic mental states, as measured by the Empathic Accuracy paradigm. 
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Thus, at some point between age 11 (when the younger participants took the posttest) and 
age 13 (when the older participants took the pretest), children involved in acting training 
begin to have an advantage in theory of mind over children involved in other art forms. 
And as shown by Study 3, one year of intensive acting training at age 13 intensifies the 
actor advantage when the measure is a dynamic and realistic (Empathic Accuracy).  
Empathy 
 At pretest, there were no dispositional empathy differences between actors and 
nonactors in either age group, although the younger actors did match the emotions of a 
fictional character more often than their same age counter parts. At posttest, actors in 
both age groups matched the emotions of a fictional character significantly more often 
than nonactors; and there was an interaction of group and time for dispositional measures 
of empathy for both age groups. Unlike theory of mind, actors in both age groups began 
the year of training without a dispositional difference in empathy, and gained 
significantly in empathy over the course of the year. 
Emotionality and Emotion Regulation  
At both ages, the actors expressed their emotions more strongly at pretest than did 
nonactors. However, the younger actors rated suppression as a significantly better (and 
more often used) emotion regulation technique than did their age matched counterparts, 
while the older actors rated themselves as suppressing their emotions significantly less 
than the nonactors. Over the course of the year, the younger and older actors learned to 
externalize and express their emotions even more and chose disengagement and 
suppression as the best emotion regulation strategy significantly less than did their age 
matched counterparts. The younger actors became more like the older actors over the 
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course of the year of acting training, and the older actors continued, as hypothesized, to 
express their emotions more and disengage from and suppress them less.  
In summary, the younger and older actors followed a similar trajectory over the 
year of training for empathy, emotional expression, and decreasing suppression of 
emotions. However, the older actors started the year with an advantage in theory of mind 
for static pictures (as measured by the Reading the Mind in the Eyes), and gained in 
theory of mind for real life dynamic stimuli (as measured by the Empathic Accuracy 
Paradigm) while the younger actors did not have a preexisting advantage or gain over the 
nonactors. More investigation is needed to discover if there is something specific about 
acting training between the ages of 11 and 13 (the gap between the end of the younger 
group’s training and the beginning of the older group) that increases the ability to read 
mental states from static, posed pictures or increase in the ability to gain in realistic 
theory of mind over a year, or if there was something atypical about the tested groups of 
8-10 and 13-15 year olds.  
Differences between Study 2 and Study 4 
 Studies 2 and 4 investigated the skills that were taught in the acting classes where 
participants of Studies 1 and 3 were enrolled. More specifically these studies were 
designed to determine whether theory of mind, empathy, and emotion regulation were 
taught implicitly or explicitly, and if so, to uncover the methods, exercises, and teachable 
moments the instructors used to convey these and other skills.  
 Some differences were found in how these two age groups were taught. The most 
striking differences were in the amount time spent teaching how to pay attention, 
concepts of physicality, and theory of mind skills. Younger children spent much of their 
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time learning how to pay attention to others, to notice physical changes in partners, and to 
notice how a classmate or the teacher reacted to a particular moment. Adolescents, in 
contrast, spent very little time on the skill of paying attention. Instead, they spent much 
more time working on thinking about the mental and emotional states of characters and 
other actors- i.e. theory of mind – than the younger actors. Additionally, younger and 
older classes differed in the amount of time spent learning and thinking about physicality: 
the actors’ bodies and their uses, the positioning of actors onstage, and the physical 
relationships between actors.  
 Were the classes that the younger children received “acting” classes?  Acting 
requires character analysis and character impersonation, and these are the major kinds of 
skills discussed in texts on acting. But as shown in Study 2, in the younger children’s 
classes, the teachers focused on physicality and paying attention to others, not on 
character analysis and impersonation. Thus teachers at this age group were not providing 
children with the kind of training that might plausibly enhance understanding of others’ 
mental states.  In striking contrast, classes for the older children focused heavily on 
character analysis and impersonation. Perhaps it is this difference in emphasis that 
explains why theory of mind skills were strengthened in the older but not the younger age 
group.     
There were also differences between the two high schools. At Walnut Hill, the 
older actors spent much more time working on theory of mind than at Boston Arts 
Academy. However, the high school classes still focused on theory of mind for more time 
than the younger acting classes. For the teaching of physicality, there was again a large 
difference between the high schools. The acting classes at Boston Arts Academy actually 
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spent the most amount of time working on physicality, followed by the Wheelock classes 
and then the Walnut Hill classes, which spent significantly less time than the other two 
groups. This may, however, be a consequence of the particular classes I was able to 
record at Boston Arts Academy, which were focused on learning the technique and 
theories of a physicality based theorist of acting. Further study and analysis will provide a 
clearer picture of the amount of physicality typically seen in acting classes for 
adolescents. 
Finally, there were many areas of teaching in which all three schools were similar, 
notably in the amount of time spent on concepts of empathy and emotion regulation. For 
actors at both ages and all schools, there was an extremely low amount of empathy and 
emotion regulation teaching in each class. Another similarity was in the levels of 
motivation teaching, which were high across all three schools. Students were encouraged 
to follow their instincts and to trust their own abilities when trying new exercises or 
during character analysis or performance in class.  
Differences from Previous Correlational Studies 
 In earlier studies (with these same age groups) that were correlational rather than 
experimental in design, I found that students involved in acting showed no reliable 
advantage in empathy, and that adolescents, but not 8-10 year olds involved in acting had 
higher levels of theory of mind (Goldstein, Wu & Winner, 2009-2010; Goldstein & 
Winner, 2009). I also previously found that when performing onstage, but not in their 
everyday lives, college actors accepted their emotions more and disengaged from and 
suppressed them less. I also found that these actors expressed both positive and negative 
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emotions more than did non-actors, and this was true both when they were performing 
and when they were off-stage (Goldstein & Tamir, in preparation).  
The results presented here reveal a somewhat different picture. Again the 
adolescent but not the 8-10 year old actors showed an advantage in theory of mind, but 
now actors in both age groups show a reliable advantage in empathy. Actors again show a 
general tendency to express their emotions more, but these studies also show that over a 
year, actors learn to suppress and disengage from their emotions in their everyday lives 
less than nonactors. 
There are several possible reasons for the differences between correlational study 
results and the present experimental results. I believe this divergence was partially due to 
the measures used for theory of mind and empathy. The empathy measure for adolescents 
was specific to adolescent populations rather than a more age general measure. The 
measure of theory of mind used for adolescents (but not children) was real and dynamic, 
mimicking situations in which theory of mind is used in daily life. Additionally, the 
group of children studied in these experiments was much larger and more diverse than the 
previous study conducted at this age group, which was 90% female. Finally, because 
previous findings on emotion regulation in college students showed differences between 
actors and nonactors in an onstage context but not in their everyday lives, it is not 
surprising that I did not find large gains over time in general, daily, adaptive emotion 
regulation, with few exceptions. 
Theoretical Implications 
 In addition to shedding light on the psychological components involved in acting, 
the results presented here tell us about the development of theory of mind, empathy and 
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adaptive emotion regulation, and the factors that foster the growth of these skills. Acting 
is a uniquely human and universal human behavior, with modern Western styles of acting 
traced back to ancient Greece. Yet almost no research has been carried out on acting. 
These studies lay the foundation for the study of the psychology of acting: the cognitive 
and affective components of acting talent, the cognitive and affective results of engaging 
in acting training at various ages, and the relationship between the skills trained in acting 
classes with skills needed off stage – skills involved in understanding others and 
understanding oneself.  
Olson and Dweck (2008) recently appealed for more research into social 
cognitive development, specifically calling for “what factors besides autism spectrum 
disorders predict early or late theory of mind development” (p. 199). To my knowledge, 
the studies presented here are the first to look at factors that predict late-developing, 
advanced levels of theory of mind, empathy, and adaptive emotion regulation for both 8-
10 year olds and young adolescents. 
Although it is often assumed that levels of theory of mind and empathy develop 
together, the present results show that these skills can develop at different rates and 
advantage in one does not necessarily lead to advantage in another. And given recent 
work on the connections between empathy and emotion regulation, and the overlapping 
brain regions involved in both (e.g. Ochsner, Zaki, Hanelin, Ludlow, Knierim, 
Ramachandran, et al., 2008), these studies also provide evidence for the connections or 
lack thereof between the development of empathy and adaptive emotion regulation.  
Practical Implications 
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The present findings also have educational implications for populations impaired 
in the skills studied. Sociopaths, delinquents, and autistic individuals all have difficulty in 
feeling empathy and in understanding others’ thoughts and feelings. Because acting 
training fosters empathy and emotional expression in both childhood and adolescence, 
and theory of mind in adolescents, perhaps acting training could be used to remediate 
deficits in individuals who are weak in these skills. 
Drama based programs for children with autism already exist (Lerner & Levine, 
2007), based on concepts from acting classes such as timing, pacing and the interaction of 
characters. And several books have already been written suggesting acting can help those 
with Asperger’s (i.e. Davies & McAfee, 2004 Teaching Asperger’s Students Social Skills 
Through Acting: All Their World’s a Stage! and Schneider & Attwood, 2007 Acting 
Antics: A Theatrical Approach to Teaching Social Understanding to Kids and Teens with 
Asperger Syndrome). However, none of these are programs or claims are based on well-
designed research. There is no systematic research to support the claim that acting fosters 
social understanding and social skills in atypical populations. 
I venture to suggest populations deficient in theory of mind (e.g. individuals with 
ASD), empathy (e.g. bullies, or psychopathy [Decety, 2005]), and who show maladaptive 
strategies of emotion regulation (e.g. depressive, antisocial, or manic disorders [Decety & 
Jackson, 2006]) could benefit from training acting. The idea that these skills are 
malleable and could be trained by acting (as compared to another artistic and intense 
activity such as visual arts) has wide relevance for policy and education, as well as the 
understanding of typical development. The social-cognitive skills of empathy, theory of 
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mind, and emotion regulation are of value to individuals of any age, whether in school, in 
the family, among friends, or in the workplace.  
Limitations 
 The largest limitation of these studies is that I was not able to randomly assign 
participants to conditions. For the younger group, participants were recruited for either art 
lessons or acting classes. Although most participants had previously engaged in little to 
no art or acting, they still showed enough interest to sign up for classes. In the adolescent 
group, all participants had previously studied their art form, either acting, music or the 
visual arts. Students at both schools had to either audition or show a portfolio in order to 
enter these schools. However, the amount of training they received increased 
significantly when they began their high school programs. I attempted to control for this 
lack of random assignment by carefully measuring how many hours of previous 
experience each participant had engaged in before beginning the study, and using that 
measurement as a predictor for Time 1 scores. I did not find any predictive value in 
previous experience, suggesting that previous interest and experience in acting or the 
visual arts did not affect outcome scores at pretest. And although I did find some pretest 
differences between the students involved in acting classes and the students involved in 
other art forms at both age groups, the use of a longitudinal design allowed me to see the 
effects of training in change over time. 
Another limitation is that these studies cannot specify a mechanism for the acting 
groups’ increases in empathy and emotional expression at both age groups and theory of 
mind in the adolescent group. Studies 2 and 4 showed that these acting classes did not 
include a large amount of explicit empathy or emotional expression teaching moments, 
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and therefore these studies cannot specify a mechanism for development more precise 
than “acting classes.” We do not and cannot know if it is the enactment of characters, the 
preparation of becoming a character, the social interaction of acting classes, the 
improvisation exercises, or some combination of these activities that is causing the found 
increases. Further studies are needed to pinpoint one or more underlying mechanisms. 
 Finally, it is possible that the classes I chose were atypical, and that their method 
of teaching acting (and therefore the results that emerged) are not generalizable to other 
acting classes or to a wider variety of ages. This kind of problem could be countered if a 
future study were to study children attending a large number of acting programs, but for 
this dissertation, it was simply not feasible. I therefore selected very highly regarded 
programs: the Wheelock Family Theatre classes are considered some of the most 
prestigious for this age group in Boston, and both the Boston Arts Academy and the 
Walnut Hill School are models of intensive arts education in high school. Of course there 
is no guarantee that other acting schools in this age range conduct their classes in just the 
same manner as the schools chosen, and future research will have to examine acting 
training and its outcomes in other sites. 
Future Directions 
These studies suggest a number of possible future directions. The first is another 
longitudinal training study, following up and correcting some of the limitations and 
issues with the current studies. A study in which all participants are randomly assigned to 
groups, have no previous training in any art form, take classes for a longer period of time, 
and are tested on the outcome measures more frequently would help clarify the results of 
these studies.  
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Additional control groups could also help isolate the possible mechanisms for 
change in theory of mind, empathy and expression of emotion. Ideal control groups 
would be: 1) a speech and debate group, where participants work on performance of non-
character driven speeches, take the perspectives of the opposing side in order to prepare 
their debates, and work collaboratively to prepare those performances, would control for 
the performance, non-character based perspective taking, and collaborative aspects of 
acting classes; 2) a collaborative visual arts group, where participants learn to make 
visual art, but engage in the work collaboratively, would control for the artistic, 
collaborative aspects and group activities of acting classes; 3) a character analysis group 
without a performance aspect, where participants learn the skills of literary theorists and 
analyze the mental and emotional states of characters without performing those 
characters, would control for the analysis of characters that occurs in acting classes. 
These additional control groups, compared to a group of children and adolescents who 
engage in acting classes, would make it possible to isolate the mechanism(s) driving the 
changes reported here.  
I predict that children in groups that learn to analyze characters (debate and 
literary criticism) would increase their theory of mind skills, but only in the acting classes 
would empathy and emotional expression increase as well. This is because I believe 
underlying the changes found in Studies 1 and 3 is not only the analysis of character 
which the actors completed, but also the physical embodiment and performance of other 
viewpoints and personalities in a realistic manner.  
An additional longitudinal study of this kind would also allow a deeper 
investigation into the developmental relationship among theory of mind, empathy, and 
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emotion expression and regulation. There have been no longitudinal studies of the 
interaction of these three skills during development. Because I found changes in the 
correlations among these skills across time, a longitudinal study with more time points 
would allow for modeling of the change of the individual developmental trajectories of 
each of these skills, and when they converge or diverge. I would expect that empathy and 
theory of mind would diverge earlier and to a greater extent than currently predicted by 
theorists of empathy (e.g. Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987), and that emotion regulation would 
be positively related to empathy across time. 
The studies reported here could also lead to neuroscientific investigations of brain 
differences between actors and nonactors. Studies could be conducted to explore 
differences between actors and nonactors in brain function when asked to interpret 
others’ mental states; comparisons between groups on matching the emotions of fictional 
characters and real people; and studies of brain activation in actors during the generation 
and expression of emotions versus the experiencing of real emotions. One might expect 
stronger activation in actors when engaged in theory of mind tasks due to their experience 
with this skill and their practice in brining background knowledge and analysis to each 
character they play. Actors may have stronger automatic activation to a variety of 
individuals when asked to match their emotions, or may avoid taking into account 
personal similarities or judging worthiness when deciding whether to feel empathy when 
compared to nonactors. Finally, actors may also recruit different brain areas than 
nonactors when asked to create or express emotions on cue due to their increased abilities 
in this area, and their tendency to accept rather than suppress or disengage from their 
emotions. By investigating possible brain differences, we could discover the neural 
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systems that actors engage while thinking about others, feeling others’ emotions, and 
expressing their own emotions, and whether these differ from nonactors. 
Conclusions 
Assertions about the arts and their benefits abound. The arts have been claimed to 
help students with their test scores, empathy, morality, humanity and becoming better 
citizens (e.g. McCarthy, Ondaatje, Zakaras, & Brooks, 2004). Yet there is no research to 
support these claims (Winner & Hetland, 2000). Claims are often made about transfer 
from the arts without a specific mechanism for this transfer in mind. The studies in this 
dissertation were completed with a specific mechanism in mind: stepping in to the shoes 
of another person and performing that other as the means by which individuals can learn 
to express their emotions, feel the emotions of others and understand their mental states. 
Many studies of transfer from the arts to a non-arts outcome also compare involvement in 
an art form with no involvement in any activity, or involvement in a sports or academic 
activity. Those studies cannot determine whether it is a specific quality of the art form 
studied, or the arts in general which cause change. The studies in this dissertation show 
transfer not from all art forms, but theatre specifically. Visual arts and music training did 
not increase empathy, theory of mind, and emotional expression as greatly as theatre did. 
Future research on the arts should have a plausible mechanism and hypothesis in mind 
when looking for transfer from the arts to non-arts outcomes.  
The present findings demonstrate the power of imagining and enacting oneself as 
an imaginary other – a peculiarly human activity. Role playing may be the route by which 
humans come to infer others’ mental states, feel their emotions, and become comfortable 
expressing their emotions. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Means and SDs, Theory of Mind measures by group, 8-10 
 Time 1 Time 2 
 Actors NonActors Actors NonActors 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
RME 8.67 .30 8.88 .36 8.92 .27 8.68 .32 
Faux Pas 7.66 2.90 8.43 2.67 9.66 2.55 9.70 2.97 
Strange 
Stories 
4.52 1.75 4.62 1.73 6.45 1.56 6.89 1.32 
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Table 2. Means and SDs, Empathy measures by group, 8-10 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 
 Actors NonActors Actors NonActors 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Index of 
Empathy 
13.38 2.94 12.75 3.42 15.16 2.65 12.83 3.61
Movie Match 
Empathy 
0.62 0.46 0.25 0.43 .54 .53 .33 .46 
Movie Match 
Compassion 
2.44 .83 2.31 .67 2.48 .73 2.27 .64 
Movie Match 
Protagonists’ 
Emotion 
3.42 .42 3.37 .37 3.52 .32 3.58 .30 
Movie Match 
Participants’ 
Emotion 
2.64 .59 2.15 .58 2.61 .50 2.42 .62 
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Table 3. Means and SDs, Emotion Regulation measures by group, 8-10 
 Time 1 Time 2 
 Actor NonActor Actor NonActor 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
PANAS-X Positive 5.49 .94 5.56 .65 - - - - 
PANAS-X Negative 2.05 .78 1.80 .58 - - - - 
Affect Intensity  2.71 .36 2.59 .38 2.81 .41 2.65 .41 
BEQ Positive 2.83 .72 2.59 .69 2.87 .46 2.79 .61 
BEQ Negative 2.71 .54 2.54 .50 2.51 .41 2.48 .48 
Coping Social Support 
Best 
2.41 .99 2.61 1.07 2.54 1.03 2.77 1.39 
Coping Social Support 
Worst 
.064 .25 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coping Social Support 
Personal 
.25 .44 .36 .48 .48 .57 55 .65 
Coping Problem 
Solving Best 
4.25 1.26 4.36 1.35 4.45 1.26 4.36 1.17 
Coping Problem 
Solving Worst 
.06 .24 .03 .17 0.0 0.0 .05 .23 
Coping Problem 
Solving Personal 
3.09 1.19 3.44 1.15 3.25 1.34 3.27 .94 
Coping Distancing 
Best 
.83 .77 .75 .80 .70 .69 .58 .64 
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Coping Distancing 
Worst 
.32 .59 .44 .65 .22 .56 .25 .44 
Coping Distancing 
Personal 
.25 .52 .36 .63 .33 .55 .25 .50 
Coping Internalizing 
Best 
.32 .47 .27 .51 .22 .49 .25 .50 
Coping Internalizing  
Worst 
.19 .40 .41 .69 .35 .55 .36 .59 
Coping Internalizing 
Personal 
.08 .27 .03 .17 .00 0.0 .08 .28 
Coping Externalizing 
Best 
.16 .45 .166 .50 .29 .97 .05 .23 
Coping Externalizing 
Worst 
4.03 1.04 3.77 1.12 4.25 .96 4.11 .91 
Coping Externalizing 
Personal 
.74 1.16 .28 .61 .93 1.07 .16 .38 
Coping Suppression 
Best 
.41 .62 .13 .42 .03 .17 .19 .57 
Coping Suppression 
Worst 
.19 .47 .25 .64 .03 .17 .08 .28 
Coping Suppression 
Personal 
0.0 0.0 .08 .23 0.0 .00 .05 .23 
Coping Reappraisal 1.54 .96 1.69 1.21 1.96 1.55 1.77 1.04 
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Best 
Coping Reappraisal 
Worst 
.13 .34 .06 .28 .12 .34 .13 .35 
Coping Reappraisal 
Personal 
.40 .50 .22 .42 .35 .48 .69 1.26 
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Table 4. Means and SDs, Observation Acuity by group, 8-10 year olds 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 
 Actors NonActors Actors NonActors 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Total Number 9.32 3.91 7.54 2.89 8.09 3.38 8.83 4.37 
% Broad 45.13 22.95 37.81 21.19 37.11 20.23 29.73 17.77
% Medium 27.22 12.89 24.78 11.68 29.51 15.38 31.50 17.13
% Detailed 22.94 15.86 30.56 20.51 31.39 22.22 30.42 18.03
% NonVisual 4.04 7.19 3.63 9.74 1.38 3.51 1.48 4.39 
% 
Anthropomorphize 
0.86 2.7 0.26 1.06 0.55 3.1 0.09 0.57 
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Table 5. Factor Analysis Scores of Parental Rated Characteristics 
Factor Loadings 
Characteristic Theatrical 
Performance 
Audience Other 
Worlds 
Emotionally 
Lonely 
Creating Imaginary 
Playmate 
Attuned to 
Emotion 
.465 -.123 .572 -.148 .216 .185 
Mimics 
Others 
.214 .155 -.045 -.074 .802 .015 
Extroverted .196 .799 .080 -.007 .185 .093 
Daydreams .052 .285 .172 .204 .767 -.070 
Sensitive -.010 -.172 .152 .706 .363 .081 
Class Clown .054 .740 -.033 .153 .178 -.238 
Bored -.009 .203 .074 .578 -.002 .322 
Imaginary 
Playmate 
.411 .264 .072 .246 .178 .539 
Role Play .851 .061 .095 .170 .047 -.011 
Dress Up .906 .058 .008 .036 .011 -.257 
Perform .691 .407 .263 -.140 .180 .247 
Audience .529 .640 .267 -.064 .122 .187 
Memory for 
Words 
.099 -.023 .870 .228 .028 -.038 
Fiction .091 .411 .702 -.097 .000 -.054 
Make Up .695 .308 .153 .115 .250 .202 
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Different .181 .052 -.099 .787 -.114 -.177 
Eigenvalue 5.23 1.73 1.6 1.41 1.33 1.05 
% of 
Variance 
30.78 10.18 9.41 8.31 7.85 6.16 
Note: Factors loadings over .53 are in bold
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Table 6. Group differences on parentally rated characteristics, by factor 
 
 Theatrical 
Performance 
Audience Other 
Worlds 
Emotionally 
Lonely 
Creating Imaginary 
Playmate 
Amount at age 5 
Actor 5.56 4.93 5.66 3.09 4.72 3.41+ 
NonActor 4.49 3.66 5.33 3.12 4.47 2.45 
Age when began 
Actor 3.55 3.17 3.76 4.34 3.95 3.25 
NonActor 4.12 4.04 4.39 4.31 4.06 4.00 
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Table 7. Time 1 Correlation Scores, Theory of Mind, Empathy, Adaptive Emotion 
Regulation by group 
 
 
Scale 1 2 3 
 Actors (n = 34)   
1. Theory of Mind 
(z-score) 
-- .16 .52** 
2. Empathy 
(z-score) 
 -- .22 
3. Adaptive 
Emotion Regulation 
  -- 
 NonActors (n = 40)   
1. Theory of Mind 
(z-score) 
-- .14 .10 
2. Empathy 
(z-score) 
 -- .10 
3. Adaptive 
Emotion Regulation 
  -- 
**p<.01, *p <.05, + p <.10 
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Table 8. Time 2 Correlation Scores, Theory of Mind, Empathy, Adaptive Emotion 
Regulation by group 
 
Scale 1 2 3 
 Actors (n = 34)   
1. Theory of Mind 
(z-score) 
-- -.06 .22 
2. Empathy 
(z-score) 
 -- .15 
3. Adaptive 
Emotion Regulation 
  -- 
 NonActors (n = 40)   
1. Theory of Mind 
(z-score) 
-- .11 .15 
2. Empathy 
(z-score) 
 -- .22 
3. Adaptive 
Emotion Regulation 
  
 
-- 
**p<.01, *p <.05, + p <.10 
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Table 9. Overall Individual Class Scores 8-10-year-olds 
  Theory of Mind Empathy 
Emotion 
Regulation  
Class 
Management 
 
Imagination Language 
Motivation/ 
Trust 
Yourself 
 Paying 
attention  Physical Professionalism 
\Timing/ 
Pacing 
Wheelock 
11/01 
18.15% 0.21% 1.16% 34.25% 2.53% 2.67% 16.57% 0.82% 26.10% 0.00% 0.21% 
Wheelock 
11/08 0.32% 0.00% 0.24% 57.47% 2.03% 1.62% 24.85% 6.74% 7.14% 0.00% 0.00% 
Wheelock 
11/18 
6.05% 0.00% 0.00% 48.41% 2.04% 7.11% 12.92% 11.37% 14.39% 0.08% 0.33% 
Wheelock 
5/01 6-8 
(1) 
7.42% 0.06% 0.35% 42.43% 0.00% 8.36% 4.90% 23.90% 13.21% 0.00% 0.00% 
Wheelock 
5/01 6-8 
(2) 
2.51% 0.00% 1.88% 39.90% 0.50% 2.76% 9.28% 15.93% 28.23% 0.00% 0.00% 
Wheelock 
5/01 9-11 
(1) 
9.34% 1.63% 6.84% 27.04% 1.85% 0.33% 30.62% 0.76% 22.80% 0.11% 7.17% 
Wheelock 
5/01 9-11 
(2) 
5.81% 0.89% 2.68% 43.07% 1.04% 0.45% 25.93% 0.45% 16.54% 0.60% 5.22% 
Wheelock 
Average 7.09% 0.40% 1.88% 41.80% 1.43% 3.33% 17.86% 8.57% 18.34% 0.11% 1.85% 
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Table 10. Means and SDs, Theory of Mind measures by group, 13-15 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 
 Actors NonActors Actors NonActors 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
RME Orig 11.96 3.22 10.85 3.78 11.96 3.18 11.04 3.42 
IPT-15 8.73 2.01 9.33 2.24 8.96 1.59 8.52 1.88 
Emp Acc 3.98 2.43 3.54 2.19 9.32 4.44 8.07 3.64 
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Table 11. Means and SDs, Empathy measures by group, 13-15 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 
 Actors NonActors Actors NonActors 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Basic Empathy Scale+ 
 
3.42 .43 3.56 .54 3.51 .45 3.33 .70 
Movie Match 
Empathy 
.71 .53 .45 .53 .72 .45 .57 .43 
Movie Match 
Compassion 
5.34 1.37 4.80 1.32 5.02 1.23 4.29 1.35 
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Table 12. Means and SDs, Emotion Regulation measures by group, 13-15 
 Time 1 Time 2 
 Actors NonActors Actors NonActors 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Affect Intensity 4.63 0.73 4.18 0.82 4.70 0.60 4.40 1.00 
BEQ Positive 5.51 1.11 4.99 1.03 5.75 1.15 5.05 1.04 
BEQ Negative 3.62 1.12 3.79 0.91 4.31 1.20 3.78 1.05 
PANAS Positive 5.35 1.22 4.42 1.17 5.04 1.14 4.50 1.41 
PANAS Negative 3.16 1.24 2.78 1.09 3.46 1.29 3.98 1.31 
COPE Acceptance 4.82 1.23 4.58 1.10 4.66 1.32 4.63 1.37 
COPE Behavioral 
Disengage 
2.72 1.25 3.28 1.31 2.20 1.23 2.86 1.17 
COPE Denial 2.49 1.23 2.48 1.33 2.17 0.90 2.25 1.12 
COPE Venting 4.46 1.39 4.05 1.46 4.18 1.22 4.36 1.13 
COPE Restraint 4.60 1.21 4.34 1.03 3.88 1.06 3.68 1.08 
ERQ Suppression 3.18 1.27 3.86 1.06 3.20 1.02 3.44 1.21 
ERQ Reappraisal 4.68 1.31 4.12 1.37 4.64 1.20 4.37 1.02 
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Table 13. 13-15  year old Visualization Scores 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 
 Actors NonActors Actors NonActors 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Total Number 6.78 3.06 5.85 2.99 7.64 2.59 7.16 2.07 
         
% Broad 51.39 21.13 47.94 26.41 42.78 25.65 51.60 26.39
% Medium 32.45 16.26 35.25 21.72 30.91 15.37 33.11 18.77
% Detailed 8.92 12.31 10.33 16.13 24.68 21.30 13.45 20.72
% NonVisual 2.11 5.14 3.71 11.06 0.43 2.15 1.51 4.25 
% 
Anthropomorphize 
1.10 5.50 0.39 1.81 0.91 3.74 0.34 1.56 
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Table 14. Time 1 Correlation Scores, Theory of Mind, Empathy and Adaptive Emotion 
Regulation by group 
 
Scale 1 2 3 
 Actors (n = 27)   
1. Theory of Mind 
(z-score) 
-- .39* -.06 
2. Empathy 
(z-score) 
 -- .27 
3. Adaptive Emotion 
Regulation (z-score) 
  -- 
 NonActors (n = 23)   
1. Theory of Mind 
(z-score) 
-- .18 .45* 
2. Empathy 
(z-score) 
 -- .27 
3. Adaptive Emotion 
Regulation (z-score) 
  -- 
**p<.01, *p <.05, + p <.10 
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Table 15. Time 2 Correlation Scores, Theory of Mind, Empathy, and Adaptive Emotion 
Regulation by group 
 
Scale 1 2 3 
 Actors (n = 26)   
1. Theory of Mind 
(z-score) 
-- .25 .17 
2. Empathy 
(z-score) 
 -- .09 
3. Adaptive Emotion 
Regulation (z-score) 
  -- 
 NonActors (n = 22)   
1. Theory of Mind 
(z-score) 
-- .25 .32 
2. Empathy 
(z-score) 
 -- .17 
3. Adaptive Emotion 
Regulation (z-score) 
  -- 
**p<.01, *p <.05, + p <.10 
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Table 16. Overall Individual Class Scores 13-15-year-olds  
 
 
Theory of 
Mind Empathy 
Emotion 
Regulation 
Class 
Management Imagination Language Motivation 
Paying 
attention Physical Professionalism 
Timing/ 
Pacing 
WHS 11/20 28.40% 0.00% 0.90% 28.70% 2.20% 3.20% 29.70% 2.30% 4.60% 0.00% 0.00% 
WHS 4/08 32.61% 3.48% 6.09% 17.83% 5.87% 4.35% 20.43% 0.00% 7.61% 1.52% 0.22% 
WHS 4/09 45.11% 6.42% 6.98% 17.60% 0.98% 5.45% 12.85% 0.84% 2.09% 1.54% 0.14% 
WHS Total 35.37% 3.30% 4.66% 21.38% 3.02% 4.33% 20.99% 1.05% 4.77% 1.02% 0.12% 
BAA 12/04 26.89% 0.24% 0.59% 24.23% 0.63% 8.39% 15.05% 3.76% 18.19% 0.63% 1.41% 
BAA 12/05 4.72% 0.00% 0.39% 42.78% 1.05% 4.72% 10.50% 5.77% 29.40% 0.39% 0.26% 
BAA 4/09 12.34% 4.76% 2.75% 31.05% 0.07% 2.55% 18.85% 1.48% 21.86% 2.82% 1.48% 
BAA Total 14.65% 1.67% 1.24% 32.69% 0.58% 5.22% 14.80% 3.67% 23.15% 1.28% 1.05% 
Total 25.01% 2.48% 2.95% 27.03% 1.80% 4.78% 17.90% 2.36% 13.96% 1.15% 0.59% 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. Empathic Accuracy Paradigm, Group x Time Interaction 
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Figure 2. Index of Empathy, Group x Time Interaction 
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Figure 3. Basic Empathy Scale, Group x Time Interaction 
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Figure 4. Use of Internalizing as Personal Strategy, Group x Time Interaction 
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Figure 5. Use of Suppression as Best Strategy, Group x Time Interaction 
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Figure 6. Negative Expressivity, Group x Time Interaction 
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APPENDICIES 
Appendix 1. Theory of Mind Measures, 8-10 year olds 
Faux Pas 
Investigator: I’m going to tell you some stories. I want you to listen very carefully 
because afterwards I am going to ask you some questions to see what you think of them. 
Are you ready? 
1) Tim was in a restaurant. He spilt his coffee on the floor by accident. Jack was another 
person in the restaurant, standing by the cash register waiting to pay. Tim went to Jack 
and said “I’m terribly sorry, but I’ve spilt my coffee. Would you be able to mop it up? 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
What did they say that they should not have said? 
Where did the story take place? 
Did Tim know Jack was a customer? 
2) All of the class took part in a story competition. Emma really wanted to win. While 
she was away from school, the results of the competition were announced: Alice was the 
winner. The next day, Alice saw Emma and said “I’m sorry about your story.” “What do 
you mean?” said Emma, “Oh nothing,” said Alice. 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
What did they say that they should not have said? 
Who won the story competition? 
Did Alice realize Emma hadn’t heard the results of the competition? 
3) Jill had just moved into a new house. She went shopping with her Mom and bought 
some new curtain. When Jill had just put them up, her best friend Lisa came over and 
  195
said, “Oh those curtains are horrible, I hope you’re going to get some new ones.” Jill 
asked, “Do you like the rest of my room?” 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
What did they say that they should not have said? 
What had Jill just bought? 
Did Lisa Know the curtains were new? 
4) Mrs. West, the teacher, had something to tell her class, “One of the boys in our class, 
Simon, is very seriously ill” she said. The class were all very sad and were sitting quietly 
when a little girl, Becky, arrived late. “Have you heard my new joke about sick people?” 
she asked. The teacher said to her “Sit down and do your work.” 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
What did they say that they should not have said? 
What did the teacher tell the class at the beginning of the story? 
Did Becky know Simon was sick? 
5) All of the class took part in a poetry competition. Jane really wanted to win. While she 
was away, the results of the competition were announced: Mary was the winner. The next 
day, Jane bumped into Mary. Mary said “How are you feeling?” “Fine thanks?” said 
Jane, “Oh good” said Mary. 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
Who won the story competition? 
Did Mary know that Jane hadn’t heard the results of the competition? 
6) David had just started at a new school. He said to his new friend, Mike, “My Mom is a 
teacher in this school.” The Jess came over. “I hate school” he told them, “It’s so small.” 
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“Do you want to come and play catch?” Mike asked Jeff. “No” he replied “I’m not 
feeling very well.” 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
What job does David’s Mom do? 
Did Jeff know that David’s Mom was a teacher? 
7) Kim helped her Mom make an apple pie for her uncle when he came to visit. She 
carried it out of the kitchen. “I made it just for you,” said Kim. “Mmmm” replied Uncle 
Tom, “That looks great. I love pies, except for apple, of course.” 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
What did they say that they should not have said? 
What kind of pie had Kim made? 
Did Uncle Tom know the pies was an apple pie? 
8) James bought Richard a toy airplane for his birthday. A few months later, they were 
playing with it, and James accidentally dropped it, “Don’t worry” said Richard, “I never 
liked it anyway. Someone gave it to me for my birthday.” 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
What did they say that they should not have said? 
What did James give Richard for his birthday? 
Did Richard remember James had given him the toy airplane for his Birthday? 
9) Helen’s Mom was having a surprise party for Helen’s birthday. She invited Nicky and 
said “Don’t tell anyone, especially Helen!” The day before the party Nicky and Helen 
were playing together and Nicky ripped her new dress, “Oh!” said Nicky, “I was going to 
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wear this to your party,” “What party?” said Helen. “Come on” said Nicky “Let’s go and 
see if my Mom can sew this tear.” 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
What did they say that they should not have said? 
Who was the surprise party for? 
Did Nicky remember the party was a surprise? 
10) John was in one of the stall in the bathroom at school. Sam and Eddy were at the 
sinks nearby. Sam said “You know that new boy in the class – you know, his name is 
John. Doesn’t he look cool!” John then came out of the cubicles. Peter said “Oh, hi John. 
Are you going to play soccer now?” 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
Where were Sam and Eddy when they were talking? 
Did Sam know that John was in the stall? 
11) Kate helped her Mom make a fruit pie for her neighbor when he came to visit. She 
carried it out of the kitchen. “I made it just for you,” said Kate. “Mmmm”, replied her 
neighbor, “That looks lovely, I love pies, especially fruit ones!” 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
What kind of pie had Kate made? 
Did the neighbor know that the pie was a fruit pie? 
12) Simon bought Robert a toy car for his birthday. A few months later, they were 
playing with it, and Simon dropped it. “Don’t worry,” said Robert, “It was only an 
accident”. 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
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What did Simon give Robert for his birthday? 
Did Simon know Robert had given him the toy car for his birthday? 
13) Mike was in one of the stalls in the bathroom at school. Joe and peter were at the 
sinks nearby. Joe said “You know the new boy in class, his name is Mike. Doesn’t he 
look really weird!” Mike then came out of the stall. Peter said “Oh, hello Mike, are you 
going to play baseball now?” 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
What did they say that they should not have said? 
Where were Joe and peter when they were talking? 
Did Joe know Mike was in the stall? 
14) Robert had just started at a new school. He said to his new friend, Andrew, “My 
Mom is a lunch lady at his school” Then Claire came over and said “I hate lunch ladies, 
they’re horrible.” “Do you want to come and play soccer?” Claire asked Andrew, “No” 
he replied “I’m not feeling very well.” 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
What did they say that they should not have said? 
What job does Robert’s Mom do? 
Did Claire know Robert’s Mom was a lunch lady? 
15) Sally had short blonde hair. She was at her Aunt Carol’s house. The doorbell rang. It 
was Mary, a neighbor. Mary said “Hello, “then looked at Sally and said “Oh, I don’t 
think I’ve met this little boy. What’s your name?” Aunt Carol said “Who’d like a cup of 
tea?” 
In the story, did someone say something that they should not have said? 
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What did they say that they should not have said? 
Whose house was Sally at? 
Did Mary know that Sally was a little girl? 
Faux Pas Recognition: ____________ 
Faux Pas Explination: ____________ 
Faux Pas Control Question: ____________ 
Non Faux Pas Control: ____________ 
Total: ____________ 
  200
Strange Stories 
Investigator: Here are some stories and some questions. I’m going to read out the stories 
and I’d like to you listen carefully, and help me with the questions at the end of each 
story. 
1) Katie and Emma are playing in the house. Emma picks up a banana from the fruit bowl 
and holds it up to her ear. She says to Katie, “Look! This banana is a telephone!” 
Is it true, what Emma says? 
Why does Emma say this? 
2)Today James is going to Claire’s house for the first time. He is going over for a snack, 
and is looking forward to seeing Claire’s dog, which she talks about all the time. James 
likes dogs very much. When James arrives at Claire’s house Claire runs to open the door, 
and her dog jumps up to greet James. Claire’s dog is huge, it’s almost as big as James! 
When James sees Claire’s huge dog he says “Claire you don’t have a dog at all, you have 
an elephant! 
Is it true, what James says? 
Why does James say this? 
3) One day, while she is playing in the house, Anna accidentally knocks over and breaks 
her mother’s favorite crystal vase. Oh dear, when mother finds out she will be very mad! 
So when Anna’s mother comes home and sees the broken vase and asks Anna what 
happened, Anna says, “The dog knocked it over, it wasn’t my fault!” 
Was it true, what Anna told her mother? 
Why did she say this? 
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4) Helen waited all year for Christmas, because she knew at Christmas she could ask her 
parents for a rabbit. Helen wanted a rabbit more than anything in the world. At last 
Christmas Day arrived, and Helen ran to unwrap the big box her parents had given her. 
She felt sure it would contain a little rabbit in a cage. But when she opened it, with all the 
family standing round, she found her present was just a boring old set of encyclopedias, 
which Helen did not want at all! Still, when Helen’s parents asked her how she liked her 
Christmas present, she said “It’s lovely, thank you. It’s just what I wanted.” 
Is it true, what Helen said? 
Why did she say that to her parents? 
5) Emma has a cough. All through lunch she coughs and coughs and coughs. Father says, 
“Poor Emma, you must have a frog in your throat!” 
It is true, what Father says to Emma? 
Why does he say that? 
6): During the war, the Red army captured a member of the Blue army. They want him to 
tell them where his army’s tanks are, they know they are either by the sea or in the 
mountains. They know that the prisoners will not want to tell them, he will want to save 
his army, and so he will certainly lie to them. The prisoner is very brave and very clever, 
he will not let them find his tanks. The tanks are really in the mountains. Now when the 
other side asks him where his tanks are, he says “They are in the mountains.” 
Is it true, what the prisoner said? 
Where will the other army look for the tanks? 
Why did the prisoner say what he said? 
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7) Ann’s mother has spent a long time cooking Ann’s favorite meal: hamburger and 
French fries. But when she brings it in to Ann, she is watching TV, and she doesn’t even 
look up or say thank you. Ann’s mother is mad and says “Well that’s very nice! That’s 
what I call politeness!” 
Is it true, what Ann’s mother says? 
Why does Ann’s mother say that? 
8)Jill wanted to buy a kitten, so she went to see Mrs. Smith, who had lots of kittens she 
didn’t want. Now Mrs. Smith loved the kittens, and she wouldn’t do anything to harm 
them, though she couldn’t keep them all herself. When Jane visited she wasn’t sure she 
wanted one of Mrs. Smith’s kittens, since they were all males and she had wanted a 
female. But Mrs. Smith said “If no one buys the kittens I’ll just have to drown them!” 
Was it true, what Mrs. Smith said? 
Why did Mrs. Smith say this to Jane? 
9) Sally is in the garden. She is sowing seeds, so that next year she will have lots of 
vegetables in her garden. She sows for carrots, lettuce and peas. She sows the seeds well, 
but when she goes inside after sowing them, the birds fly down and eat up all of Sally’s 
seeds! Poor Sally, not one of her seeds is left! 
Is it true that Sally sowed seeds fir turnips and beans? 
Why will Sally not have any vegetable in her garden? 
Mental State Recognition:______ 
Mental State Explanation:______ 
Theory of Mind Score:______ 
Control Question:______ 
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Reading the Mind in the Eyes for Kids 
Children’s Eyes Instructions 
In this folder I’ve got lots of pictures of people’s eyes. Each picture has four words round 
it. I want you to look carefully at the picture and then choose the word that best describes 
what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling. Let’s have a go with this one 
(practice item). Look at this person. Do you think he is feeling jealous, scared, relaxed or 
hate (point to words as they are read)? Make sure child picks one of the options and give 
encouraging feedback without revealing whether they are right or wrong. 
OK, let’s have a go at the rest of them. You might find some of them quite easy and some 
of them quite hard, so don’t worry if it’s not always easy to choose the best word. I’ll 
read all the words for you so you don’t need to worry about that. If you really can’t 
choose the best word, you can have a guess. Proceed with the test items in exactly the 
same way as the practice item. 
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Appendix 2: Empathy measures, 8-10 year olds 
The Index of Empathy for Children and Adolescents 
Investigator: I'm going to read you some statements about how you might think and feel 
in many different situations, the statements may or may not describe you. I want you to 
let me know if a statement describes you or not. There is no right or wrong answer, so 
just let me know which statements describe you. No one but myself will see your 
answers; your parents won’t see them, only me.  
I will read you a statement and then I would like you to let me know how you think or 
feel by saying ‘yes’ if you agree with the statement and ‘no’ if you disagree. Do you 
understand how you would let me know what you think? 
OK, let’s try the first statement: "I like to eat Spinach,", which best describes how you 
would feel about eating spinach, “yes” or “no” Some people like to eat spinach, so they 
would say "yes" and some people don't like to eat spinach and they would say "no". 
Either answer is O.K. to say depending on how you feel.  
Let’s try the next statement 
Continue this procedure through the 22 items. 
The Index of Empathy for Children  
A) I like to eat spinach. 
YES   NO 
B) I don’t like ice cream.  
YES   NO 
1. It makes me sad to see a girl who can’t find anyone to play with.  
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YES   NO 
2. People who kiss and hug in public are silly.  
YES   NO 
3. Boys who cry because they are happy are silly.  
YES   NO 
4. I really like to watch people open presents, even when I don’t get a present myself.  
YES   NO 
5. Seeing a boy who is crying makes me feel like crying.  
YES   NO 
6. I get upset when I see a girl being hurt.  
YES   NO 
7. Even when I don’t know why someone is laughing, I laugh too.  
YES   NO 
8. Sometimes I cry when I watch TV.  
YES   NO 
9. Girls who cry because they are happy are silly.  
YES   NO 
10. It’s hard for me to see why someone else gets upset.  
YES   NO 
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11. I get upset when I see an animal being hurt.  
YES   NO 
12. It makes me sad to see a boy who can’t find anyone to play with.  
YES   NO 
13. Some songs make me so sad I feel like crying.  
YES   NO 
14. I get upset when I see a boy being hurt.  
YES   NO 
15. Grown ups sometimes cry even when they have nothing to be sad about.  
YES   NO 
16. It’s silly to treat dogs and cats as though they have feelings like people.  
YES   NO 
17. I get mad when I see a classmate pretending to need help from the teacher all the 
time.  
YES   NO 
18. Kids who had no friends probably don’t want any.  
YES   NO 
19. Seeing a girl who is crying makes me feel like crying.  
YES   NO 
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20. I think it is funny that some people cry during a sad movie or while reading a sad 
book.  
YES   NO 
21. I am able to eat all my cookies even when I see someone looking at me wanting one.  
YES   NO 
22. I don’t feel upset when I see a classmate being punished by a teacher for not obeying 
school rules.  
YES   NO 
TOTAL SCORE:_______________ 
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Movie Clip Questionnaire 
 
IF BEFORE BEQ AND AIM: 
Do you know what an emotion is? Answer: 
IF NO- It’s a feeling. Do you know what a feeling is? Answer: 
IF NO- Happy, sad, and angry are all feelings. Do you understand what a feeling or 
emotion is?  
I am going to show you some movie clips and then ask you some questions. I would like 
to answer as best you can. I don’t think there are any right or wrong answers to these 
questions, so just answer what you think is most true for you. 
Questionnaire for Clip #1 (Charlie and Chocolate Old, outside of Wonka gate) 
In this clip, you will see a boy looking at an old abandoned factory. 
1) What is the main emotion felt by the boy in this movie? _______________________ 
2) How strongly does the boy feel that emotion?  
   1………………….2…………………….3……………………..4 
Not at all …………A little bit………… A lot ……………Very very much 
3) What was your emotion as you watched this movie? _______________________ 
4) How strongly do you feel that emotion?  
   1………………….2…………………….3……………………..4 
Not at all …………A little bit………… A lot ……………Very very much 
5) How sorry do you feel for the boy? 
   1………………….2…………………….3……………………..4 
Not at all …………A little bit………… A lot ……………Very very much 
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----------------------------------------------------- 
Questionnaire for Clip #2 (Augustus drowning) 
In this clip, you will see a young boy who falls into a river of chocolate, and his Mom 
watching him. 
1) What is the main emotion felt by the woman in this movie? 
_______________________ 
2) How strongly does the woman feel that emotion?  
   1………………….2…………………….3……………………..4 
Not at all …………A little bit………… A lot ……………Very very much 
3) What was your emotion as you watched this movie? _______________________ 
4) How strongly do you feel that emotion?  
   1………………….2…………………….3……………………..4 
Not at all …………A little bit………… A lot ……………Very very much 
5) How sorry do you feel for the woman? 
   1………………….2…………………….3……………………..4 
Not at all …………A little bit………… A lot ……………Very very much 
Questionnaire for Clip #3 (Violet exploding) 
In this clip, you will see a young girl who ate something which makes her turn blue. 
1) What is the main emotion felt by the girl in this movie? _______________________ 
2) How strongly does the girl feel that emotion?  
   1………………….2…………………….3……………………..4 
Not at all …………A little bit………… A lot ……………Very very much 
3) What was your emotion as you watched this movie? _______________________ 
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4) How strongly do you feel that emotion?  
   1………………….2…………………….3……………………..4 
Not at all …………A little bit………… A lot ……………Very very much 
5) How sorry do you feel for the girl? 
   1………………….2…………………….3……………………..4 
Not at all …………A little bit………… A lot ……………Very very much 
--------------------------------------- 
Questionnaire for Clip #4  
In this clip, you will see a girl who is trapped by a group of squirrels. 
1) What is the main emotion felt by the girl in this movie? _______________________ 
2) How strongly does the girl feel that emotion?  
   1………………….2…………………….3……………………..4 
Not at all …………A little bit………… A lot ……………Very very much 
3) What was your emotion as you watched this movie? _________________________ 
4) How strongly do you feel that emotion?  
   1………………….2…………………….3……………………..4 
Not at all …………A little bit………… A lot ……………Very very much 
5) How sorry do you feel for the girl? 
   1………………….2…………………….3……………………..4 
Not at all …………A little bit………… A lot ……………Very very much 
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Appendix 3: Emotion Regulation measures, 8-10 year olds  
Coping Strategies Stories 
Subject #: _________ Today's date:  ______________________ Interviewer:  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 Interview instructions:  
"I have 5 very short stories about kids having to deal with a problem, and I'll ask 
you some questions about each one, like what the kid in the story should do. For 
these 5 stories I'll also ask you what you would do yourself if you were in the 
same situation as the girl (boy) in the story. 
We can read the story together out loud, and then I'll ask the questions. You can 
answer any way you want, because I don't think there are any right or wrong 
answers. Just whatever comes into your mind first is the best answer. We made 
some stick-figure cartoons to go with the stories to help make the stories easier to 
understand." 
 
[TAKE OUT THE 5 STORY ENVELOPES. MAKE SURE YOU HAVE THE 
RIGHT GENDER. SCRAMBLE THE ORDER OF PRESENTATION FOR EACH 
CHILD.] 
 Use judicious and non-leading probes where necessary; the point is to elicit 
enough elaboration from the child that codable responses are obtained. 
 In your role-play, if child elects to seek support from someone, pretend you are 
that "someone," e.g., a teacher, a parent, and try to elicit the child's role-played behavior 
and speech toward that support figure. 
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WHEN FINISHED, PAPER-CLIP EACH CHILD'S ASSORTED PROTOCOL PAGES 
TOGETHER. 
 
Ripped Pants (GIRLS) 
1. "How is Teresa feeling at the end of the story?" (comprehension check; enter exact 
response here): 
 [If child does not give a substantively similar answer to the emotion mentioned at 
end of story, say the following:] 
 "So you think it's -----she's feeling; let's read the last part of the story over 
again and look at the picture too. Now what do you think Teresa is feeling 
here?" 
Continue with guided prompts until child provides equivalent emotion term. Enter here 
how may "runs" you have to go through until child says equivalent term. Stop after 3 and 
continue with coping strategies selection. Number of "runs:"  
2. "Here are some cards that have printed on them some ideas of what Teresa 
might do next. I would like you to pick out for me what you think is the best 
choice for Teresa to do." 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
3. "How do you think that [the coping strategy selected] would make things 
better for Teresa?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
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4. "How will Teresa feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use follow-up probes as necessary: 
5. "Of these remaining cards, which one do you think would be the worst thing 
Teresa might do?" 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
6. "How would that make things worse?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
7. "How will Teresa feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use follow-up probes if necessary: 
8. "I wonder what you would do yourself if you were in that situation? I'll 
pretend that I am one of the other kids saying something to Teresa, and you 
pretend to be Teresa." 
[Say script lines here and add expressive gestures as needed. You may need to 
repeat yourself and coax child somewhat, but if they are extremely resistant, go on 
to next story.] 
Script: (While laughing and pointing) "Look at that! Teresa's pants are ripped!" 
Enter anything noteworthy here or whatever might help us later with coding the 
observational data: 
"Now let's go on to the next story." 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Fly-Away Bird (GIRLS) 
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1. "How is Mara feeling at the end of the story?" (comprehension check; enter exact 
response here): 
 [If child does not give a substantively similar answer to the emotion mentioned at 
end of story, say:] 
 "So you think it's ----- she's feeling; let's read the last part of the story over 
again and look at the picture too. Now what do you think Mara is feeling 
here?" 
Continue with guided prompts until child provides equivalent emotion term. Enter here 
how may "runs" you have to go through until child says equivalent term. Stop after 3 and 
continue with coping strategies selection. Number of "runs:"  
2. "Here are some cards that have printed on them some ideas of what Mara 
might do next. I would like you to pick out for me what you think is the best 
choice for Mara to do." 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
3. "How do you think that [the coping strategy selected] would make things 
better for Mara?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
4. "How will Mara feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
5. "Of these remaining cards, which one do you think would be the worst thing 
Mara might do?" 
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Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
6. "How would that make things worse?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
7. "How will Mara feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
8. "I wonder what you would do yourself if you were in that situation? I'll 
pretend that I am the other kid, Barbara, saying something to Mara, and you 
pretend to be Mara." 
[Say script lines here and add expressive gestures as needed. You may need to 
repeat yourself and coax child somewhat, but if they are extremely resistant, go on 
to next story.] 
Script: (With a concerned look and voice) "Hey, where is your bird? It's not in the 
cage." 
Enter anything noteworthy here or whatever might help us later with coding the 
observational data: 
"Now let's go on to the next story." 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Destroyed Ball (GIRLS) 
1. "How is Debbie feeling at the end of the story?" (comprehension check; enter exact 
response here): 
 [If child does not give a substantively similar answer to the emotion mentioned at 
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end of story, say:] 
 "So you think it's ----- she's feeling; let's read the last part of the story over 
again and look at the picture too. Now what do you think Debbie is feeling 
here?" 
Continue with guided prompts until child provides equivalent emotion term. Enter here 
how may "runs" you have to go through until child says equivalent term. Stop after 3 and 
continue with coping strategies selection. Number of "runs:"  
2. "Here are some cards that have printed on them some ideas of what Debbie 
might do next. I would like you to pick out for me what you think is the best 
choice for Debbie to do." 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
3. "How do you think that [the coping strategy selected] would make things 
better for Debbie?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
4. "How will Debbie feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
5. "Of these remaining cards, which one do you think would be the worst thing 
Debbie might do?" 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
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6. "How would that make things worse?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
7. "How will Debbie feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
8. "I wonder what you would do yourself if you were in that situation? I'll 
pretend that I am the other kid, Allison, [point to interactant in picture] 
saying something to Debbie, and you pretend to be Debbie." 
[Say script lines here and add expressive gestures as needed. You may need to 
repeat yourself and coax child somewhat, but if they are extremely resistant, go on 
to next story.] 
Script: (With aggravated voice) "It wasn't my fault, and my dog can't pay for it!" 
Enter anything noteworthy here or whatever might help us later with coding the 
observational data: 
"Now let's go on to the next story." 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Fierce Dog (GIRLS)  
1. "How is Mary feeling at the end of the story?" (comprehension check; enter exact 
response here): 
 [If child does not give a substantively similar answer to the emotion mentioned at 
end of story, say:] 
 "So you think it's ----- she's feeling; let's read the last part of the story over 
again and look at the picture too. Now what do you think Mary is feeling 
here?" 
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Continue with guided prompts until child provides equivalent emotion term. Enter here 
how may "runs" you have to go through until child says equivalent term. Stop after 3 and 
continue with coping strategies selection. Number of "runs:"  
2. "Here are some cards that have printed on them some ideas of what Mary 
might do next. I would like you to pick out for me what you think is the best 
choice for Mary to do." 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
3. "How do you think that [the coping strategy selected] would make things 
better for Mary?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
4. "How will Mary feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
5. "Of these remaining cards, which one do you think would be the worst thing 
Mary might do?" 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
6. "How would that make things worse?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
7. "How will Mary feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
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8. "I wonder what you would do yourself if you were in that situation? I'll 
pretend that I am the other kid, Sandy, [point to interactant in picture] 
saying something to Mary, and you pretend to be Mary." 
[Say script lines here and add expressive gestures as needed. You may need to 
repeat yourself and coax child somewhat, but if they are extremely resistant, go on 
to next story.] 
Script: (With a fearful tone & face) "I don't like that dog! I'm afraid he'll get out and 
come after us!" 
Enter anything noteworthy here or whatever might help us later with coding the 
observational data: 
"Now let's go on to the next story." 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Special Jacket (GIRLS) 
1. "How is Jenny feeling at the end of the story?" (comprehension check; enter exact 
response here): 
 [If child does not give a substantively similar answer to the emotion mentioned at 
end of story, say:] 
 "So you think it's ----- she's feeling; let's read the last part of the story over 
again and look at the picture too. Now what do you think Jenny is feeling 
here?" 
Continue with guided prompts until child provides equivalent emotion term. Enter here 
how may "runs" you have to go through until child says equivalent term. Stop after 3 and 
continue with coping strategies selection. Number of "runs:"  
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2. "Here are some cards that have printed on them some ideas of what Jenny 
might do next. I would like you to pick out for me what you think is the best 
choice for Jenny to do." 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
3. "How do you think that [the coping strategy selected] would make things 
better for Jenny?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
4. "How will Jenny feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
5. "Of these remaining cards, which one do you think would be the worst thing 
Jenny might do?" 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
6. "How would that make things worse?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
7. "How will Jenny feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
8. "I wonder what you would do yourself if you were in that situation? I'll 
pretend that I am Alice [point to interactant in picture] saying something to 
Jenny, and you pretend to be Jenny." 
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[Say script lines here and add expressive gestures as needed. You may need to 
repeat yourself and coax child somewhat, but if they are extremely resistant, go on 
to next story.] 
Script: (With a mocking voice and face) "Where'd you get your jacket, Jenny, out of 
the dumpster?" 
Enter anything noteworthy here or whatever might help us later with coding the 
observational data: 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
"THE INTERCEPTED NOTE" (Shame) 
1. "How is Amy feeling at the end of the story?" (comprehension check; enter exact 
response here): 
 [If child does not give a substantively similar answer to the emotion mentioned at 
end of story, say:] 
 "So you think it's ----- she's feeling; let's read the last part of the story over 
again and look at the picture too. Now what do you think Amy is feeling 
here?" 
Continue with guided prompts until child provides equivalent emotion term. Enter here 
how may "runs" you have to go through until child says equivalent term. Stop after 3 and 
continue with coping strategies selection. Number of "runs:"  
2. "Here are some cards that have printed on them some ideas of what Amy 
might do next. I would like you to pick out for me what you think is the best 
choice for Amy to do." 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
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Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
3. "How do you think that [the coping strategy selected] would make things 
better for Amy?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
4. "How will Amy feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
5. "Of these remaining cards, which one do you think would be the worst thing 
Amy might do?" 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
6. "How would that make things worse?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
7. "How will Amy feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
8. "I wonder what you would do yourself if you were in that situation? I'll 
pretend that I am Alice [point to interactant in picture] saying something to 
Amy, and you pretend to be Amy." 
[Say script lines here and add expressive gestures as needed. You may need to 
repeat yourself and coax child somewhat, but if they are extremely resistant, go on 
to next story.] 
Script: (With a shocked voice) Who wrote this note saying my earpiece was a 
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mushroom? 
Enter anything noteworthy here or whatever might help us later with coding the 
observational data: 
"Now let's go on to the next story." 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
“Big Feet” (Sadness)  
1. "How is Nora feeling at the end of the story?" (comprehension check; enter exact 
response here): 
 [If child does not give a substantively similar answer to the emotion mentioned at 
end of story, say:] 
 "So you think it's ----- she's feeling; let's read the last part of the story over 
again and look at the picture too. Now what do you think Nora is feeling 
here?" 
Continue with guided prompts until child provides equivalent emotion term. Enter here 
how may "runs" you have to go through until child says equivalent term. Stop after 3 and 
continue with coping strategies selection. Number of "runs:"  
2. "Here are some cards that have printed on them some ideas of what Nora 
might do next. I would like you to pick out for me what you think is the best 
choice for Nora to do." 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
3. "How do you think that [the coping strategy selected] would make things 
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better for Nora?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
4. "How will Nora feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
5. "Of these remaining cards, which one do you think would be the worst thing 
Nora might do?" 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
6. "How would that make things worse?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
7. "How will Nora feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
8. "I wonder what you would do yourself if you were in that situation? I'll 
pretend that I am Alice [point to interactant in picture] saying something to 
Nora, and you pretend to be Nora." 
[Say script lines here and add expressive gestures as needed. You may need to 
repeat yourself and coax child somewhat, but if they are extremely resistant, go on 
to next story.] 
Script: (With a mad voice) I don’t want to be your friend anymore, stay away from 
me. 
Enter anything noteworthy here or whatever might help us later with coding the 
observational data: 
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"Now let's go on to the next story." 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
“THE DESTROYED CLAY POT" (Anger) 
1. "How is Rachel feeling at the end of the story?" (comprehension check; enter exact 
response here): 
 [If child does not give a substantively similar answer to the emotion mentioned at 
end of story, say:] 
 "So you think it's ----- she's feeling; let's read the last part of the story over 
again and look at the picture too. Now what do you think Rachel is feeling 
here?" 
Continue with guided prompts until child provides equivalent emotion term. Enter here 
how may "runs" you have to go through until child says equivalent term. Stop after 3 and 
continue with coping strategies selection. Number of "runs:"  
2. "Here are some cards that have printed on them some ideas of what Rachel 
might do next. I would like you to pick out for me what you think is the best 
choice for Rachel to do." 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
3. "How do you think that [the coping strategy selected] would make things 
better for Rachel?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
4. "How will Rachel feel after doing that?" 
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Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
5. "Of these remaining cards, which one do you think would be the worst thing 
Rachel might do?" 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
6. "How would that make things worse?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
7. "How will Rachel feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
8. "I wonder what you would do yourself if you were in that situation? I'll 
pretend that I am Alice [point to interactant in picture] saying something to 
Rachel, and you pretend to be Rachel." 
[Say script lines here and add expressive gestures as needed. You may need to 
repeat yourself and coax child somewhat, but if they are extremely resistant, go on 
to next story.] 
Script: (With a mad voice) I can’t believe you broke my pot! I wanted to give that to 
Dad!! 
Enter anything noteworthy here or whatever might help us later with coding the 
observational data: 
----------------------------- 
“THE DARK WOODS’ (Fear) 
1. "How is Cathy and Sara feeling at the end of the story?" (comprehension check; 
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enter exact response here): 
 [If child does not give a substantively similar answer to the emotion mentioned at 
end of story, say:] 
 "So you think it's ----- she's feeling; let's read the last part of the story over 
again and look at the picture too. Now what do you think Cathy and Sara is 
feeling here?" 
Continue with guided prompts until child provides equivalent emotion term. Enter here 
how may "runs" you have to go through until child says equivalent term. Stop after 3 and 
continue with coping strategies selection. Number of "runs:"  
2. "Here are some cards that have printed on them some ideas of what Cathy 
and Sara might do next. I would like you to pick out for me what you think is 
the best choice for Cathy and Sara to do." 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
3. "How do you think that [the coping strategy selected] would make things 
better for Cathy and Sara?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
4. "How will Cathy and Sara feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
5. "Of these remaining cards, which one do you think would be the worst thing 
Cathy and Sara might do?" 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
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Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
6. "How would that make things worse?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
7. "How will Cathy and Sara feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
8. "I wonder what you would do yourself if you were in that situation? I'll 
pretend that I am Cathy and Sara, and you pretend to be Cathy and Sara." 
[Say script lines here and add expressive gestures as needed. You may need to 
repeat yourself and coax child somewhat, but if they are extremely resistant, go on 
to next story.] 
Script: (With a scared voice) I don’t know which way to get home! We’re lost! 
Enter anything noteworthy here or whatever might help us later with coding the 
observational data: 
"Now let's go on to the next story." 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
"NO INVITATION" (Hurt) 
1. "How is Megan feeling at the end of the story?" (comprehension check; enter exact 
response here): 
 [If child does not give a substantively similar answer to the emotion mentioned at 
end of story, say:] 
 "So you think it's ----- she's feeling; let's read the last part of the story over 
again and look at the picture too. Now what do you think Megan is feeling 
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here?" 
Continue with guided prompts until child provides equivalent emotion term. Enter here 
how may "runs" you have to go through until child says equivalent term. Stop after 3 and 
continue with coping strategies selection. Number of "runs:"  
2. "Here are some cards that have printed on them some ideas of what Megan 
might do next. I would like you to pick out for me what you think is the best 
choice for Megan to do." 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
3. "How do you think that [the coping strategy selected] would make things 
better for Megan?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
4. "How will Megan feel after doing that?" 
Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
5. "Of these remaining cards, which one do you think would be the worst thing 
Megan might do?" 
Circle which strategy was picked and enter the option letter: 
Supp. (option ) // Prob. (option ) // Dist. (option ) // Int. (option ) // Ext. (option )// 
Supr. // Reap. 
6. "How would that make things worse?" 
Enter here what the child says: 
7. "How will Megan feel after doing that?" 
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Enter here what the child says; use probes if necessary: 
8. "I wonder what you would do yourself if you were in that situation? I'll 
pretend that I am Alice [point to interactant in picture] saying something to 
Megan, and you pretend to be Megan." 
[Say script lines here and add expressive gestures as needed. You may need to 
repeat yourself and coax child somewhat, but if they are extremely resistant, go on 
to next story.] 
Script: (With a sad voice) Everyone else got an invitation to the party except for me! 
Enter anything noteworthy here or whatever might help us later with coding the 
observational data: 
"Now let's go on to the next story." 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire 
Do you know what an emotion is? Answer: 
IF NO- It’s a feeling. Do you know what a feeling is? Answer: 
IF NO- Happy, sad, and angry are all feelings. Do you understand what a feeling or 
emotion is?  
I am going to ask you some questions about emotions. I would like to answer as best you 
can. I don’t think there are any right or wrong answers to these questions, so just answer 
what you think is most true for you. 
FOR EACH ANSWER:  1: Almost never 
    2: Sometimes 
3: A lot 
4: Always 
RA: Whenever I feel good or happy, people can easily see exactly what I am feeling 
almost never, sometimes, a lot or always?  
____ 1. Whenever I feel good or happy, people can easily see exactly what I am feeling. 
____ 2. I sometimes cry when I watch sad movies. 
____ 3. People do not know what I am feeling. 
____ 4. I laugh out loud when someone tells me a joke that I think is funny. 
____ 5. It is hard for me to hide my feelings when I am scared. 
____ 6. When I'm happy, my feelings show. 
____ 7. When I feel things really strongly – when I feel very emotional – I can feel it 
physically in my body.  
____ 8. I've learned it is better to keep my anger inside than to show it. 
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____ 9. No matter how nervous or upset I am, I seem calm on the outside. 
____10. I usually show my emotions. 
____11. I have strong feelings and emotions. 
____12. I am unable to hide my feelings, even though I would like to. 
____13. Whenever I feel sad or angry, people can easily see exactly what I am feeling. 
____14. There have been times when I have not been able to stop crying even though I 
tried to stop. 
____15. I feel my emotions very strongly. 
____16. Other people can see what I am feeling very easily. 
  247
Affect Intensity Measure  
Do you know what an emotion is? Answer: 
IF NO- It’s a feeling. Do you know what a feeling is? Answer: 
IF NO- Happy, sad, and angry are all feelings. Do you understand what a feeling or 
emotion is?  
I am going to ask you some questions about emotions. I would like to answer as best you 
can. I don’t think there are any right or wrong answers to these questions, so just answer 
what you think is most true for you. 
DIRECTIONS: The following questions refer to how you react to things that happen to 
you. Please tell me how YOU react.  
Example item: When I do a good job on something that is difficult I feel vey 
happy Almost never, Sometimes, A lot, or Always? 
1: Almost never  2: Sometimes   3: A lot  4: Always 
1. _____ When I do a good job on something that is difficult I feel vey happy. 
2. _____ When I feel happy it is a very strong feeling. 
3. _____ I like being with other people very much. 
4. _____ I feel pretty bad when I tell a lie. 
5. _____ When I fix something that is wrong in my life, I feel very, very happy. 
6. _____ My feelings are stronger than most other people’s feelings. 
7. _____ My happy moods are so strong that I feel like I'm in heaven. 
8. _____ I get very, very excited. 
9. _____ If I finish a job that I thought was impossible, I am very, very happy. 
10. _____  My heart beats very fast when I am waiting for something exciting. 
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11. _____ Sad movies can make me feel very sad. 
12. _____ When I'm happy I feel relaxed and calm, instead of feeling all excited. 
13. _____ When I talk in front of a group of people for the first time my voice gets 
shaky and my heart beats really fast. 
14. _____  When something good happens, I'm much more happy and excited than 
other people are. 
15. _____ My friends say I'm emotional and feel things really strongly. 
16. _____ The memories I like the most are of those times when I felt calm and  
  relaxed rather than very happy and excited. 
17. _____ When I see someone who is hurt I feel very upset. 
18. _____ When I'm feeling good, it's easy for me to go from being in a good mood 
to being very very happy. 
19. _____ I’m a person you could describe as "Calm and relaxed." 
20. _____ When I'm happy I feel like I'm bursting with joy. 
21. _____ If I saw a picture of a very bad car accident I would feel sick to my 
stomach. 
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PANAS-X For Parents 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that 
word. Indicate to what extent your child felt this way during the past month. Use the 
following scale to record your answers. Please try to answer as best as you can for your 
child over the past month. 
 
  1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
 not at all very slightly  a little bit moderately   quite a bit     extremely  
 
___cheerful  ___attentive  ___strong   ___irritable 
___delighted  ___inspired  ___sad    ___afraid 
___happy  ___alone  ___alert   ___upset 
___blue  ___active  ___guilty   ___joyful 
___nervous  ___lonely  ___excited   ___hostile  
___proud  ___jittery  ___lively   ___ashamed  
___scared  ___angry at self ___enthusiastic      ___downhearted 
___distressed  ___determined ___interested   ___energetic 
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Appendix 4: Theory of Mind measures, 13-15 year olds  
Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
 
Adult Eyes Instructions 
For each set of eyes, choose and circle which word best describes what the person in the 
picture is thinking or feeling. You may feel that more than one word is applicable but 
please choose just one word, the word which you consider to be most suitable. Before 
making your choice, make sure that you have read all 4 words. You should try to do the 
task as quickly as possible but you will not be timed. If you really don’t know what a 
word means you can look it up in the definition handout. 
 
 
 
 
  251
  252
  253
  254
  255
  256
  257
  258
  259
  260
  261
  262
  263
  264
  265
  266
  267
  268
 
  269
Appendix 5: Empathy measures, 13-15 year olds  
Basic Empathy Scale 
The following are characteristics that may or may not apply to you. Please tick one 
answer for each statement to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each 
statement. Please answer as honestly as you can. 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1.  My friend’s emotions don’t affect 
me much. 
 
     
 
2.  After being with a friend who is 
sad about something, I usually 
feel sad. 
 
     
 
3.  I get frightened when I watch 
characters in a good scary movie. 
 
     
 
4. I get caught up in other people’s 
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feelings easily. 
 
 
5. I don’t become sad when I see 
other people crying. 
 
     
 
6. Other people’s feelings don’t 
bother me at all. 
 
     
 
7. I often become sad when 
watching sad things on TV or in 
films. 
 
     
 
8. Seeing a person who has been 
angered has no effect on my 
feelings. 
 
     
 
9. I tend to feel scared when I am 
with friends who are afraid. 
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10. I often get swept up in my 
friend’s feelings.  
 
     
 
11. My friend’s unhappiness doesn’t 
make me feel anything. 
 
     
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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Movie Clip Questionnaire 
In this task, you will watch 4 short movie clips. For each clip, we would like you to 
answer how you think the main person in the clip felt, and how strongly, how you felt 
when you watched the clip, and how strongly and how sorry you felt for the person in the 
clip.  
 
Questionnaire for Clip #1 (LP) 
1) What is the main emotion felt by the man in this movie? _______________________ 
2) How strongly does the man feel that emotion?  
   1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Not at all        Extremely 
3) What was your emotion as you watched this movie? _______________________ 
4) How strongly do you feel that emotion?  
   1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Not at all        Extremely 
5) How sorry do you feel for the man? 
   1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Not at all        Extremely 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Questionnaire for Clip #2 (DC) 
1) What is the main emotion felt by the woman in this movie? 
_______________________ 
2) How strongly does the woman feel that emotion?  
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   1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Not at all        Extremely 
3) What was your emotion as you watched this movie? _______________________ 
4) How strongly do you feel that emotion?  
   1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Not at all        Extremely 
5) How sorry do you feel for the woman? 
   1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Not at all        Extremely 
Questionnaire for Clip #3 (KK) 
1) What is the main emotion felt by the father in this movie? 
_______________________ 
2) How strongly does the father feel that emotion?  
   1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Not at all        Extremely 
3) What was your emotion as you watched this movie? _______________________ 
4) How strongly do you feel that emotion?  
   1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Not at all        Extremely 
5) How sorry do you feel for the father? 
   1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Not at all        Extremely 
--------------------------------------- 
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Questionnaire for Clip #4 (LS) 
1) What is the main emotion felt by the young man in this movie? 
_______________________ 
2) How strongly does the young man feel that emotion?  
   1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Not at all        Extremely 
3) What was your emotion as you watched this movie? _________________________ 
4) How strongly do you feel that emotion?  
   1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Not at all        Extremely 
5) How sorry do you feel for the young man? 
   1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
Not at all        Extremely 
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Appendix 6: Emotion Regulation measures, 13-15 year olds  
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)  
Gross & John  
9/03  
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire is designed to assess individual differences in the 
habitual use of two emotion regulation strategies: cognitive reappraisal and expressive 
suppression.  
Citation  
Gross, J.J., & John, O.P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation 
processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 85, 348-362.  
Instructions and Items  
We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how 
you control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below involve 
two distinct aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what 
you feel like inside. The other is your emotional expression, or how you show your 
emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although some of the following 
questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways. For each item, 
please answer using the following scale:  
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1---------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7  
strongly     neutral     strongly  
disagree          agree  
1. ____ When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change 
what I’m thinking about.  
2. ____ I keep my emotions to myself.  
3. ____ When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change 
what I’m thinking about.  
4. ____ When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.  
5. ____ When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way 
that helps me stay calm.  
6. ____ I control my emotions by not expressing them.  
7. ____ When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about 
the situation.  
8. ____ I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in.  
9. ____ When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them.  
10. ____ When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about 
the situation.  
Note  
Do not change item order, as items 1 and 3 at the beginning of the questionnaire define 
the terms “positive emotion” and “negative emotion”.  
Scoring (no reversals)  
Reappraisal Items: 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10; Suppression Items: 2, 4, 6, 9.  
  277
Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire 
 
  1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
 strongly         neutral                   strongly 
 disagree               agree 
1. ___ In my personal life, whenever I feel positive emotions, people can easily see 
exactly what I am feeling.  
2. ___ In my personal life, I sometimes cry during sad movies.  
3. ___ In my personal life, people often do not know what I am feeling.  
4. ___ In my personal life, I laugh out loud when someone tells me a joke that I 
think is funny.  
5. ___ In my personal life, it is difficult for me to hide my fear.  
6. ___ In my personal life, when I’m happy, my feelings show.  
7. ___ In my personal life, my body reacts very strongly to emotional situations.  
8. ___ In my personal life, I’ve learned it is better to suppress my anger than to show 
it.  
9. ___ In my personal life, no matter how nervous or upset I am, I tend to keep a 
calm exterior.  
10. ___ In my personal life, I am an emotionally expressive person.  
11. ___ In my personal life, I have strong emotions.  
12. ___ In my personal life, I am sometimes unable to hide my feelings, even though 
I would like to.  
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13. ___ In my personal life, whenever I feel negative emotions, people can easily see 
exactly what I am feeling.  
14. ___ In my personal life, there have been times when I have not been able to stop 
crying even though I tried to stop.  
15. ___ In my personal life, I experience my emotions very strongly.  
16. ___ In my personal life, what I’m feeling is written all over my face. 
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COPE Questionnaire 
The following items ask how you typically think about or handle the emotions or feelings 
you experience in your personal life. Some of the items below refer to unpleasant or 
negative feelings and situations and some of them refer to pleasant or positive feelings or 
situations. Please read each item very carefully because each item is different from the 
next. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each item as it relates to 
you. Use the following scale to rate your responses: 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
  strongly     neutral      strongly 
disagree          agree 
1. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I admit to myself that I can't deal with 
it, and quit trying. 
2. _____ I've learned it is better to suppress my anger than to show it. 
3. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I give up the attempt to get what I 
want. 
4. _____ I am an emotionally expressive person. 
5. _____ When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them.  
6. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I make sure not to make matters worse 
by acting too soon. 
7. _____ I keep my emotions to myself.  
8. _____ People often do not know what I am feeling. 
9. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I say to myself "this isn't real." 
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10. _____ When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.  
11. _____ Whenever I feel positive emotions, people can easily see exactly what I am 
feeling. 
12. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I restrain myself from doing anything 
too quickly. 
13. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I feel a lot of emotional distress and I 
find myself expressing those feelings a lot. 
14. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I get upset, and am really aware of it. 
15. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I just give up trying to reach my goal. 
16. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I refuse to believe that it has 
happened. 
17. _____ When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking 
about the situation.  
18. _____ What I'm feeling is written all over my face. 
19. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I let my feelings out. 
20. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I get used to the idea that it happened. 
21. _____ No matter how nervous or upset I am, I tend to keep a calm exterior. 
22. _____ Whenever I feel negative emotions, people can easily see exactly what I 
am feeling 
23. _____ I control my emotions by not expressing them.  
24. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I reduce the amount of effort I'm 
putting into solving the problem. 
  281
25. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I pretend that it hasn't really 
happened. 
26. _____ When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I 
change what I’m thinking about.  
27. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I learn to live with it. 
28. _____ It is difficult for me to hide my fear. 
29. _____ When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking 
about the situation. 
30. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I get upset and let my emotions out. 
31. _____ When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a 
way that helps me stay calm.  
32. _____ I laugh out loud when someone tells me a joke that I think is funny. 
33. _____ When I'm happy, my feelings show. 
34. _____ I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m 
in.  
35. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I accept that this has happened and 
that it can't be changed. 
36. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I accept the reality of the fact that it 
happened. 
37. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I act as though it hasn't even 
happened. 
38. _____ When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I 
change what I’m thinking about.  
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39. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I force myself to wait for the right 
time to do something. 
40. _____ When I experience a stressful event, I hold off doing anything about it until 
the situation permits. 
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Affect Intensity Measure 
 
DIRECTIONS: The following questions refer to emotional reactions to typical 
life-events. Please indicate how YOU react to these events by placing a number from the 
following scale in the blank space preceding each item. Please base your answers on how 
YOU react, not on how you think others react or how you think a person should react. 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Almost           Sometimes    Often           Almost 
never                always 
22. _____ When I accomplish something difficult I feel delighted or elated. 
23. _____ When I feel happy it is a strong type of exuberance. 
24. _____ I enjoy being with other people very much. 
25. _____ I feel pretty bad when I tell a lie. 
26. _____ When I solve a small personal problem, I feel euphoric. 
27. _____ My emotions tend to be more intense than those of most people. 
28. _____ My happy moods are so strong that I feel like I'm in heaven. 
29. _____ I get overly enthusiastic. 
30. _____ If I complete a task I thought was impossible, I am ecstatic. 
31. _____  My heart races at the anticipation of some exciting event. 
32. _____ Sad movies deeply touch me. 
33. _____ When I'm happy it's a feeling of being untroubled and content rather than 
being  zestful and aroused. 
34. _____ When I talk in front of a group for the first time my voice gets shaky and 
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my heart races. 
35. _____  When something good happens, I'm usually much more jubilant than 
others. 
36. _____ My friends might say I'm emotional. 
37. _____ The memories I like the most are of those times when I felt content and  
  peaceful rather than zestful and enthusiastic. 
38. _____ The sight of someone who is hurt badly affects me strongly. 
39. _____ When I'm feeling well it's easy for me to go from being in a good mood to 
being  
  really joyful. 
40. _____ "Calm and cool" could easily describe me. 
41. _____ When I'm happy I feel like I'm bursting with joy. 
42. _____ Seeing a picture of some violent car accident in a newspaper makes me 
feel sick to my stomach. 
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PANAS-X 
 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that 
word. Indicate to what extent you felt this way during the past month. Use the following 
scale to record your answers. 
 
  1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
 not at all very slightly  a little bit moderately   quite a bit     extremely  
 
 
___cheerful  ___attentive  ___strong   ___irritable 
___delighted  ___inspired  ___sad    ___afraid 
___happy  ___alone  ___alert   ___upset 
___blue  ___active  ___guilty   ___joyful 
___nervous  ___lonely  ___excited   ___hostile  
___proud  ___jittery  ___lively   ___ashamed  
___scared  ___angry at self ___enthusiastic      ___downhearted 
___distressed  ___determined ___interested   ___energetic  
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Appendix 7. Demographic Questionnaire. 
Please fill in/ circle your answers to the questions below.  
1) Child’s birth date: ____________/______________/_____________ 
2) Child’s sex: Male Female  
3) We would like to determine, as exactly as possible, how much acting training your 
child has had. Please indicate the number of hours in class per week, starting with the 
current class. We’d also like you to note each show the child has participated in, and the 
hours of rehearsal per week of that show. Please note the number of weeks vacation taken 
each year if your family went on vacation during the course of the class or show. Please 
be as exact as possible. If you cannot remember exactly, please estimate to the best of 
your ability. Thank you! 
 
Class or 
Show 
Number of 
hours in class/ 
rehearsal per 
week 
Start 
Date 
End 
Date 
Vacation? 
Y/N 
Additional 
hours? 
(outside of 
typical)  Comments 
              
  
  
           
       
       
              
 
  287
4) What is Mother/Guardian 1’s highest level of Education? _______________________ 
 Current Profession: _______________________________________________ 
 What is Father/ Guardian 2’s highest level of Education? ______________________ 
 Current Profession: _______________________________________________ 
5) Does your child participate in any visual arts or music activities? If so what, and for 
how long has your child been doing this? 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
6) Does he/she participate in any other structured activity? (e.g., ballet, soccer, Quiz 
Bowl/ Odyssey of the Mind) If so please indicate when the activity began and how much 
time your child has devoted to this activity. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
7) How did you first decide to enroll your child in acting classes? Did he/she ask to be 
enrolled? Is he/she naturally “theatrical?” _____________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
8) Did you notice any early signs of acting ability/ interest in your child? What were 
they? __________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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For each of the following questions, please answer what your child was like when 
he/she was 5 years old by circling the best number. Also, please answer if your child 
showed any of the following skills/ signs at an earlier or later age. If your child does 
not and has never shown these qualities, just answer n/a. Thank you! 
9) At age five, was your child especially attuned to others’ emotions/ motivations?  
 1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first show attunement to others’ emotions/ motivations? 
_______ 
10) When he/she was five, was your child a mimic (imitating other’s behavior, speech, 
etc)?  
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did you child first begin to be a mimic? _____________ 
11) When he/she was five, was your child extroverted?  
 1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 
6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first show signs of extraversion? _____________ 
12) At age five, did your child daydream a lot?  
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first begin to day dream a lot? _____________ 
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13) At age five, was your child considered highly sensitive? 
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first begin to be considered highly sensitive? _____________ 
14) At age five, was your child the class clown? 
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first begin to be the class clown? _____________ 
15) At age five, was your child easily bored in school?  
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first show signs of being bored in school? _____________ 
16) At age five, did your child have an imaginary playmate?  
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first show signs of having an imaginary playmate? 
____________ 
17) At age five, did your child role play and pretend play a lot? 
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first show signs of role play and pretend play? 
_____________ 
18) At age five, did your child like to dress up in costumes?  
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1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first show signs of liking to dress up in costume? 
_____________ 
19) At age five, did your child perform for parents/ friends? 
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first show signs of wanting to perform for parents/ friends? 
_____ 
20) At age five, did your child enjoy having an audience?  
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first show signs of enjoying having an audience? 
_____________ 
21) At age five, did your child have a good memory for words and books?  
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first show signs of having a good memory for words and 
books? _______ 
22) At age five, did your child like to watch movies? 
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your first child show signs of liking to watch movies? _____________ 
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23) At age five, did your child like to read? Fiction? Non-fiction?  
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first show signs of liking to read fiction? _____________ 
24) At age five, did your child make up his/her own songs, plays, stories, or puppet 
shows?  
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first show signs of making up his/her own songs, plays, etc ? 
_______ 
25) At age five, did your child feel different from other kids? 
1…….…..….2…….…..…. 3….….….…. 4….….….…. 5….……..…. 6……..….…. 7 
Not at all           Very much  
At what age did your child first show signs of feeling different from other kids? 
_____________ 
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Appendix 8. Observational Acuity measure 
 
Look carefully at these two birds. Tell me everything that you notice that is similar about 
these two birds, and everything you notice that is different.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
      
 
Now look carefully at these two fish. Tell me everything that you notice that is similar 
about these two fish, and everything you notice that is different.  
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Appendix 9. Coding guide used by all coders for video study at both ages.  
1. Theory of Mind: instructing students to think about another person’s mental or 
emotional state.  
a. Beliefs: instructing students to think about what another believes. 
b. Intentions: instructing students to think about what another person intends. 
c. Relationship: instructing students to think about the relationship between 
two people. 
d. Motivation: instructing students to think about why someone does a 
particular behavior or says a line. 
e. Simulation: instructing students to think about what they would do if they 
were a particular person or doing a particular behavior. 
f. Self: instructing students to think about what they yourself would believe, 
desire or intend in a particular situation. 
g. Emotion Understanding: instructing students to think about what other 
people are feeling and/or why they are feeling that way. 
2. Empathy: instructing students to feel the feelings of another person. 
a. Feeling Emotion: instructing students to feel a particular emotion because 
their character would feel that emotion. 
b. Connection to Own Emotion: instructing students to recall and feeling a 
particular emotional moment in their own life because it is similar to what 
their character is feeling. 
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3. Emotion Regulation: instructing students to create an emotion.  
a. Create Emotion: Instructing students to create or control an emotion for a 
particular situation. 
b. Emotion Change Understanding: Instructing students to think about how 
an emotion changes for a character at a particular moment. 
4. Imagination: Instructing students to imagine what the environment is like in a 
particular situation. 
a. Imagining External Pretend Environment: Instructing students to imagine 
what it smells like, sounds like, looks like. 
5. Pure Physicality: Instructing students how to position their body or change 
themselves physically. 
a. Simulation: Instructing students to think about how their bodies would 
look and/or feel if they were their character.  
b. Physical spacing on stage: Instructing students to space themselves at a 
proper distance from the other actors and scenery around them. 
c. Self: Instructing students to pay attention to their own physicality, think 
about how their body feels, relax part of their body, etc. 
d. Vocal Technique/Skills: Instructing students in vocal projection. 
6. Observation of Others: Instructing students to listen and pay attention to others in 
the class.  
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7. Language/ Definitions: Instructing students to use and understand language 
precisely. 
8. Classroom Management: Instructing students to in self-control and managing day-
to-day activities in the classroom. 
a. Focus: Instructing students to pay attention and/or quiet down.  
b. Organization: Instructing students to move or stand as a group in a 
particular way, or to divide into groups.  
9. Motivation: Instructing students in perseverance and confidence. 
a. Perseverance: Instructing students to keep at it. 
b. Trust: Instructing students to trust their impulses.  
10. Professionalism: Instructing students to take their art seriously, leaving socializing 
for after class. 
11. Pacing/Timing: Instructing students to slow down their words, or to pick up on 
others actors’ verbal cues more quickly. 
 
